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Nairobi, Kenya is one of the most volatile urban centers in Africa, suffering from 60%1
of its population living in crowded and poverty-stricken informal settlements around the
periphery of the city. Efforts to upgrade Nairobi’s slums have been attempted by the
Government of Kenya (GoK) for decades, using different theories and strategies ranging from
forced eviction and demolition to the current Sustainable Livelihoods Approach that claims
resident participation as its hallmark. A new initiative based on this strategy entitled the Kenya
Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), headed in partnership between the GoK & UN-Habitat,
is focusing initially on Kibera – East Africa’s largest slum of over 700,000 residents.
Specifically, the KENSUP’s starting point is a “village” of Kibera called Soweto, which has a
population of approximately 60,000 residents and is considered the poorest section of Kibera
informal settlement. This current venture is entitled the Soweto Slum Upgrading Project
(SSUP).
On paper, it appears to offer a plausible solution. However, upon interviewing Kibera’s
residents, key NGOs, UN-Habitat, and the GoK, it is clear that there is a lack of coordination,
dialog, and cooperation between the stakeholders of this project. This combined with more
enduring factors, such as the lack of clear national polices on land tenure and allocation, and
Kibera’s dominant political power structure that has strong economic incentives to maintain the
status quo, suggest that this large-scale slum upgrading project will not be successful, while
smaller and more localized self-help efforts provide a brighter alternative.
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In memory of Nicodemus Mutemi,
who was one of several residents of Kibera
who graciously shared their lives and settlement with me
as I struggled both to understand the dynamics and forces at work in their communities,
and to briefly join them in solidarity on the rough road towards a more dignified life.
Rest in Peace my brother.
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1) Kibera informal settlement: Nairobi, Kenya (July 2003) –Photo: Peter Ehresmann
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2) Typical path and open ditch sewer in Kibera, Nairobi (July 2003)

–Photo: Peter Ehresmann
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3) One of the few wide roads in Kibera, Nairobi (July 2003) –Photo: Peter Ehresmann

4) Main Kenya Railway track to west Kenya lined with informal shops, Kibera, Nairobi (July 2003)
–Photo: Peter Ehresmann
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5) Pit Latrine along a stream in Kibera, Nairobi (July 2003) –Photo: Peter Ehresmann
6) Kibera Highrise, Nairobi (July 2003) –Photo: Peter Ehresmann
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Executive Summary
Chapter 1.0 places this analysis within the context of the worsening global crisis

involving the failure of many governments of developing countries to effectively handle the ongoing phenomenon of mass rural to urban migration, or urbanization. This failure is causing
growing slum populations and deteriorating living conditions that translate into mass human
rights violations. The focus is quickly drawn to Nairobi, Kenya, where a new slum upgrading
programme, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), is getting under way with its
first project in Soweto village of the Kibera informal settlement, called the Soweto Slum
Upgrading Project (SSUP). The primary and secondary research questions are presented at the
end of the introduction, leading to a tangible starting place for the reader in Chapter 2.0 – a basic
description of the present conditions and situation in Kibera based largely on the author’s
personal experience in addition to numerous secondary sources.
In order to gain a better understanding of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, how its
strategies evolved, and how it fits in as the present continuation of the history of slum upgrading
initiatives, Chapter 3.0 provides a historical context for this analysis through a chronological
overview of Kenya’s policy history towards its informal settlements from 1963 to the present. It
should be noted that the majority of Kenya’s slum policies and strategies followed the major
global trends in development theory. This chapter also provides examples of what has worked
and more often, what has not worked in slum upgrading and poverty eradication efforts in
Kenya. A major objective of this chapter is to point out the failing points of past projects that are
now present in the KENSUP’s SSUP.
Chapter 4.0 provides a description of what the KENSUP and the SSUP are on paper and
in theory, according to official programme documents and meeting notes that the author obtained
in Nairobi between 4 June 2003 and 11 August 2003. It should be noted that at the time of this
writing, the SSUP was still in its relatively early stages, having been officially announced in
January 2003 and begun on the ground in July 2003. However, the groundwork for the
KENSUP began two years earlier in 2001. This chapter additionally places the KENSUP and
SSUP within the current development theory of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL),
essentially serving as the final section of Chapter 3.0 as a link between these two chapters.
Chapter 5.0 moves beyond the paper and theory of the KENSUP and SSUP and dives
into the stakeholder analysis, the primary analytical chapter of this paper. By examining the
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conflicting interests and motivations of twelve diverse stakeholder groups involved in the
Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP), it becomes clear why the KENSUP – through
its SSUP starting point – has been struggling and continues to struggle on its noble yet seemingly
impassable path towards achieving its goal of providing a better quality of life for the residents
of Kibera-Soweto.
Chapter 6.0 journeys deeper into the complexities and confusion surrounding the
KENSUP and SSUP. In addition to exploring larger trends such as Kenya’s culture of corruption
and Kibera’s well-established political-economic power structure, the flaws of the KENSUP and
SSUP become more and more evident by examining both the lack of participation and interaction
between the different stakeholder groups discussed in Chapter 5.0, and the nature of their
interactions when they have occurred.
In closing, Chapter 7.0 summaries the conclusions of this analysis, while Chapter 8.0
provides the author’s suggestions for a way forward based on the findings herein.
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KENSUP Timeline in Brief
-November 2000 – The initial meeting took place between former President Moi and the
Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka. Resulting from this meeting
were a committee and a task force, created respectively by the GoK and UN-Habitat to
discuss the benefits of a partnership.
-February 2001 – President Moi officially announced the Collaborative Nairobi Slum
Upgrading Initiative.
-February 2001 - November 2002 – The Inception Stage of the KENSUP.
-December 2001 – Comments by President Moi (KANU) and MP Raila Odinga (NDP)
concerning the lowering of rents in Kibera incited violent clashes in Kibera allegedly
between structure owners and tenants.
-2002: Presidential election year – Incumbent Daniel arap Moi (KANU) lost to Mwai Kibaki
(NARC) on December 27th 2002. Moi had been Kenya’s president for 24 years.
-November 2002 – President Moi refused to sign the initial project papers of the KENSUP
unless the first project was done in Kibera, part of Moi’s long-time constituency of
Langata District. This rejected Huruma neighborhood, the top-ranked site of the
KENSUP Site Selection Committee.
-January 2003 – Mwai Kibaki took presidential office in a peaceful transition of
power from Daniel Moi, giving Kenyans a renewed spirit of hope for justice and peace.
-16 January 2003 – The Memorandum of Understanding between the GoK and UN-Habitat
was signed by both parties, making the KENSUP official and active. Minister Raila
Odinga also publicly announced that Kibera-Soweto was to be the first site of the
KENSUP at this meeting.
-11 February 2003 – Gentrification began in Kibera-Soweto after Minister Raila’s
announcement that new housing in Athi River (35km from Nairobi) was becoming part
of the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP).2
-March 2003 – The official KENSUP and SSUP programme and project documents were
completed. The documents include objectives, strategies, background information,
institutional structure, and funding information. No end product is decided, only the
participatory process of KENSUP/SSUP management is explained.
-April 2003 – Minister Raila Odinga explains his plan for building four-storey flats in Kibera2

See Chapter 6.0, section 6.3.4 titled, “The Athi River Controversy,” for further discussion of this old project
component.
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Soweto, similar to the Kibera Highrise project, in an exclusive interview with Kenya
Land Alliance (KLA), an NGO in Nairobi. The interview was published in the KLA’s
April-June 2003 issue of their publication, Land Update.
-May - July 2003 – Kenya’s newspapers frequently covered updates on the Athi River
controversy – Minister Raila’s proposed temporary relocation site for Kibera-Soweto
residents during the SSUP.
-Early June 2003 – A grassroots meeting was called in Kibera and facilitated by Kituo cha
Sheria (NGO), Shelter Forum (NGO), and Kibera Community Development Agenda
(KCODA – the youth group who started The Kiberan newsletter) with numerous Kiberan
organization leaders to discuss the KENSUP/SSUP in frustration and concern over the
massive information void and the lack of dialogue on the project between the Kiberan
community and the GoK and UN-Habitat. A committee was formed to contact UNHabitat and the GoK to report back to the group with basic information about the plans of
the SSUP in Kibera.
-28 June 2003 – The second Kiberan grassroots meeting was started, but was soon forcefully
broken up by youth thugs hired by the local Nairobi City Councilor. The city councilor
in Kibera misunderstood the meeting as organized opposition to the SSUP.
-July 2003 – This was the start date of the Preparatory Phase for the SSUP according to
Kithakye of UN-Habitat and Makokha of the Shelter Forum, however it is unclear if the
SSUP actually began in this month.
-8 August 2003 – The GoK published an official KENSUP press notice with UN Habitat’s
permission in the East African Standard. The press notice explained what the KENSUP
is and what steps are taking place. A consultancy ad was also published in the same
newspaper that solicited an outside organization to gather data on the makeup of the
Kibera-Soweto community. Both of these publications can be found at the end of this
paper in Appendix I and II respectively.
-8 August 2003 – Minister Raila issued an ultimatum to structure owners in Kibera, giving them
six months to make way for the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project or else risk
forced eviction, publicized in Amran’s 8 August 2003 East African Standard article.
-Mid-October 2003 – The GoK and UN-Habitat held an official launching ceremony of the
SSUP in Kibera, next to Kibera-Highrise. Minister Raila publicly announced that the
SSUP will consist of building four-storey flats (confirming his April 2003 KLA
interview) and temporary dislocation of the majority of the Kibera-Soweto community to
sites near Kibera during the construction.
-February 2004 – Minister Raila approves forced evictions in the Kiberan village named after
him, Raila Village, for a road project. Other threats of eviction to Kiberans also came
from the Kenya Railway and the Kenya Power Company in newspaper notices.
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1.0 Introduction
“…everyone [should] have adequate shelter that is healthy, safe, secure, accessible and
affordable and that includes basic services, facilities and amenities, and [should] enjoy
freedom from discrimination in housing and legal security of tenure.”
-Habitat Agenda

Urbanization is happening at an incredible rate in the developing world today. This mass
migration has greatly strained cities struggling to provide shelter for their growing numbers.
Despite the negative aspects of this rural to urban transition, it has become a sign of a
modernizing society. The global north has experienced a similar phenomenon of mass rural to
urban migration owing to the Industrial Revolution over the last two centuries that continues
today with the Information Revolution.
Due to the flood of people into urban centers in the developing world, large informal
settlements have grown around the outskirts of cities. In many cases these slums now house the
majority of the cities’ populations. According to the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-Habitat), there are roughly 925 million slum dwellers in the world today
(2003), which will grow to 1.5 billion by 2020 and to 3 billion by 2050 if there is no significant
intervention to improve access to water, sanitation, secure tenure, and adequate housing, (World
Bank Group; UN-Habitat Web). In response to this worldwide crisis, the United Nations set
Target 11 of Goal Number 7 in the Millennium Declaration (2000) to improve the lives of at
least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020, (UN-Habitat web, History). Unfortunately, taking care
of 10% of the present worldwide slum population by 2020 will not be nearly enough. According
to recent research by UN-Habitat, the world’s slum population has already grown by a daunting
75 million in just three years since the Millennium Declaration, (UN-Habitat Web).
Much of the informal settlement problem lies in the fact that many of the cities of Africa,
Latin America, and Asia have been unable to keep up with the recent high demand for urban
housing that has developed primarily over the last 50 years. In fact, according to the US
National Intelligence Council, “the world population is expected to grow from its current 6
billion to 7.2 billion in the next fifteen years. Ninety-five percent of that population growth will
occur in developing countries and in already stressed urban areas – megacities such as Lagos and
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Mexico City,” (Love 328-9). Following this, it must be asked why, beyond pure numbers of
growing populations, have developing countries been unable to keep up with housing their
populations? A significant part of this inability of governments to keep up with urban housing is
due to neglectful national policies on housing and land, in addition to corruption on all levels.
Nairobi, Kenya is one of the principal cities in the world that is experiencing this severe
urban population growth. Starting with a population of 10,000 at the turn of the twentieth
century, (Syagga, et al., Nairobi Situation Analysis [NSA] 28), Nairobi’s population quickly
grew to 119,000 in the 1950s and more than doubled just a decade later to 350,000 at Kenya’s
independence in 1963.3 According to figures from 2001, Nairobi officially houses 2.5 million
people. However it is probable that the real figure is significantly higher than this due to
difficulty of obtaining accurate population data in informal settlements, (Warah 1). The NSA
shows Nairobi’s population has been estimated as high as four million. Of the official 2.5
million, it is agreed upon by multiple sources that 60% of Nairobi’s population live in the city’s
approximate 130-150 informal settlements, which comprise 5% of the city’s total land, and 1.5%
of its residential land. Most of these urban slums are located around the periphery of the city
with smaller pockets within.
As a result of this severe lack of affordable housing, basic services, and basic human
rights, various governmental and international bodies along with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) have been attempting to do something about the slum crisis for years.
Unfortunately, the informal settlement problem in Nairobi is very complex. The quandary is
linked not only to national land policy problems, but is also intimately related to powerful
national political forces which have strong interests in maintaining or building political power
and ensuring economic gain. As phrased by Syagga, et al., Mugo found in a 2000 study that,
“out of a sample of 120 landlords interviewed, 57% were public officials…with enough
influence to ensure that they are not displaced,” (Nairobi Situation Analysis Supplementary
Study: A Rapid Economic Appraisal 15). It is no surprise that Kenya’s elites are involved in
Kibera since this estate (or neighborhood) has the highest rate of return for housing investments
in Nairobi with an annual return of 102% or higher.

3
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The wider national economic situation, based largely on international economic forces,
simply cannot provide formal jobs to the multitude of people who have migrated from the rural
areas to Nairobi over the last forty years. The result is that many of Nairobi’s youth and general
population are unable to find formal work, therefore hindering their ability to afford better
housing. In lieu of formal jobs, people set up their own small entrepreneurial businesses illegally
in the informal economic sector, also referred to as the “undercapitalized sector,” because the
process of legally setting up a business costs too much and is too complex and time-consuming
to be practical.4
Even though many are employed in the informal sector, the NSA points out that only
“63% of those aged between 15 and 50 are economically active. [Furthermore]…regular wage
employment…has been drastically reducing given various austerity economic reform measures
being adopted by the government,” (144). The pressure to adopt these economic reform
measures are coming from the neo-liberal, global free market push of intergovernmental
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by way of the
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) mechanism. Additional economic pressure has been
coming from Western countries seeking open and secure markets for their transnational
corporations that are already investing or seeking to start investing in Kenya.
To compensate for the contradiction of declining formal jobs and the continuing rise of
the urban population in Kenya, the informal economic sectors within slum neighborhoods are
becoming even more critical to the national economy. Informal economies provide vital income
sources for the majority of slum dwellers. In fact, the informal economy is where most of
Nairobi’s jobs are found, as the NSA points out, “between 50-70% of all dwellings double as
workshops and [production sites of] family-based crafts…[and house] small-scale traders,”
(141).
Unfortunately, several previous slum upgrading projects in Nairobi (such as the Kibera
Highrise project) have not adequately focused on providing economic supports for the majority
of slum dwellers who were required to uproot and dismantle their source of income when
relocating. Due in part to these political-economic complications, most previous efforts of slum

4
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upgrading have met limited success, leaving slum dwellers fearful and skeptical of future
upgrade attempts.
Despite these past failures, the right to adequate housing and an adequate standard of
living remain protected for all people under article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, as well as article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
rights, which Kenya acceded to in 1972, (Kituo Cha Sheria 7). The slum dwellers of Nairobi and
those elsewhere in the world have the right to better living conditions. Therefore, despite past
failures, it is imperative for all those involved with housing and slum upgrading to continue
striving towards a solution to the developing world’s urban housing crisis.
Currently, a new slum upgrading initiative in Nairobi based on the Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach (SL) has been launched, entitled the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme
(KENSUP). It is directly motivated by the UN Millennium Development Goal (Target 11 of
Goal Number 7) to achieve “a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum
dwellers by 2020.” The programme is a partnership between the GoK and UN-Habitat and is
focusing initially on Kibera – East Africa’s oldest and largest slum of over 700,000 residents.
Specifically, the KENSUP’s starting point is a “village” of Kibera called Soweto, which has a
population of approximately 60,000 residents and is considered the poorest section of Kibera
informal settlement. This initiative, which was still in progress at the time this paper was
completed, is entitled the [Kibera]-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP).
Stemming from both the current situation in Nairobi and the greater demand for effective
solutions to the developing world’s housing crisis, the primary research question of this thesis is:
Is the KENSUP via the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) on a path towards
successfully meeting the project’s primary objective of improving the quality of life and
livelihood of Kibera-Soweto’s slum dwellers?
Secondary questions relating to the primary research question that will be addressed
include: What are the causes of Nairobi’s slum growth and their perpetuation? What
development theories have been applied in previous slum upgrading efforts both in Nairobi and
other developing cities and how did they work? How is the success of slum upgrading projects
measured? What has gone wrong in past upgrading attempts? How is the KENSUP addressing
these challenges? What are the most promising paths to slum improvement in Nairobi today?
How do the theoretical KENSUP and SSUP that exist on paper and in the minds of its leaders
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line up with what is happening on the ground in Kibera-Soweto? What could be done better in
the SSUP? Have slum dwellers’ wishes been seriously sought, considered, and applied in
previous upgrade attempts and in the current SSUP?
The theoretical framework for this paper that guides this analysis largely revolves around
four development theorists – Turner, Scott, Berger, and Werlin – as well as the findings in the
Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA)5 that was written specifically for the KENSUP in 2001.
John Turner’s writings on human settlements greatly shaped the self-help movement in
the 1970s. His most famous work is Freedom to Build (1972), though he first presented a paper
on human settlements at a UN conference in Pittsburgh in 1966. The UN notes the presentation
of both of these works as “influential international events” in human settlements, (UN ESCAP).
In general, Turner was opposed to the efforts of large, centralized and hierarchical organizations
to organize and control the lives of slum dwellers. Turner’s slum upgrading scheme was rooted
in local participation and bottom-up development.
Similarly, James Scott is against large state-run development projects. As a current
political theorist and anthropologist at Yale, he is concerned about government officials who
make policy decisions without the knowledge of the beneficiaries’ interests and needs. He
explores the limitations of government-lead development projects in his recent book, Seeing
Like a State (1998).
Peter Berger builds off of the ideas of Turner. He is currently a sociological expert in
social ethics at Boston University, though his 1979 book, Pyramids of Sacrifice, most applies to
this paper. In his book, Berger emphasizes the necessity of target beneficiaries playing a major
role in preliminary planning and decision-making processes for any project directly affecting
them. Berger’s idea is based on the concept of cognitive respect, which holds that no one knows
his or her specific situation better than that individual.
Herbert Werlin has spent years evaluating World Bank slum upgrading projects since the
1970s. He is currently an independent consultant, though was involved in Nairobi early on in
1966 through his dissertation on the Nairobi City Council. Contrary to Turner, Werlin values a
strong government role in slum upgrading. He claims such a strong role is necessary to both
manage the complexities of a large project and to effectively achieve popular community
5
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participation. Werlin ultimately advocates a compromise with Turner through a “topdown/bottom-up” approach.
From the work of these four theorists and others, comes the current Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach (SL) for development projects. Maintaining that people are the starting
place, SL recognizes that every community is different with unique needs and interests. SL
therefore focuses on community participation in the planning and design phases of a project and
their empowerment to lead their project. SL is further discussed in Chapter 4.0, while the ideas
of Turner, Scott, Berger, and Werlin are discussed both in Chapter 3.0 and throughout later
chapters.
This chapter has set Nairobi’s slum crisis in a global context and has introduced several
of the major challenges that the KENSUP and SSUP seek to overcome. The next chapter will
describe the conditions in Kibera, the focal informal settlement of this paper. It will put the rest
of this analysis in perspective and will help us keep in mind why there is a Kenya Slum
Upgrading Programme and Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project in the first place.

Ehresmann

7

2.0 A Snapshot of Kibera Today

Kibera’s prime location is one major factor responsible for attracting its over 700,000
residents, over 60% of whom are between the ages of ten and twenty-four years old, (Khasiani).
The 225 hectare (550 acre) settlement is located about five kilometers southwest of Nairobi’s
city centre, a couple kilometers west of the industrial area, and is right next door to Langata
District’s wealthier neighborhoods to the north and west of Kibera. The settlement’s close
proximity to these three major employment centers allow 75% of Kiberans to walk to work – a
very important benefit when transportation costs are too high for most slum dwellers’ budgets,
(Matrix 16). Two other major land marks and resources are the Nairobi River that runs through
Kibera’s center (though it is horribly polluted), and the major train line (Nairobi-Kisumu,
Western Kenya) that runs through northern Kibera, which is functional but is in serious need of
maintenance and upgrading itself.6
The population has grown very dense with the steady influx of new residents. In the
densest places, the density is as high as 63,000 people per square kilometer, causing an acute
lack of privacy. Due to the unplanned haphazard physical layout, the earthen walkways are
narrow, most between one and two meters wide and some smaller.7 Very few passages are wide
enough for vehicles. As an unlit labyrinth at night, Kibera hosts plenty of crime. Most crimes
are individual robberies of those walking alone after dark, forcing most residents to stay behind
locked doors after 9:00pm or earlier.
The actual housing structures do not come close to conforming to Nairobi’s minimum
housing standards. Characteristic of Kibera and most of the developing world’s urban slums are
the temporary building materials used to construct housing in addition to other structures such as
kiosks used for informal sector trade and business. Nearly all structures in Kibera-slum8 are
constructed with mud walls supported on a wooden stick frame (widdle), with corrugated iron
sheet roofs. Some use iron sheets for walls instead of mud, and a minority of structures have
concrete floors. The housing structures are usually long row buildings like barracks with most
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individual household rooms being three square meters in size (about ten square feet), for an
average family of five. This type of structure is similar to the traditional Kenyan house still
found in rural areas, comprising one moderately sized room constructed of mud on a wooden
frame with a thatched roof.
Water that must be first boiled to drink is sold at privately owned neighborhood taps.
Women’s water committees, self-help youth groups, and other community-based organizations
(CBOs) own most water taps, while others are individually owned. Taps that are legal have been
purchased from the Nairobi City Council, while other taps are illegal and lower water pressure
and cheat those out of profits who follow the law. In order to make even a small profit, water is
more expensive in Kibera and Nairobi’s other informal settlements than in middle and highincome neighborhoods, usually selling for three to five cents per twenty-liter jerrican.
Other basic services including proper sewage and garbage disposal do not exist. Shared
pit latrines service an average of fifty people but as many as 400.9 There are one or two
upgraded concrete pit latrines in Kibera that the World Bank has funded. Most sewage drains
are dirt ditches that flow to the Nairobi River, the latter of which has been tested to show higher
concentrations of wastes and pollutants than the city’s typical raw sewage. Although the sight of
garbage strewn all over walking paths is something one may get used to, the smell of human
waste never becomes tolerable. Surprisingly, the foul smells of waste and garbage are only
noticeable in certain places and only occasionally as the winds shift. Combining human waste
with non-biodegradable plastic garbage, many residents use “flying toilets” especially at night,
whereby human waste is deposited into a plastic bag and thrown into the Nairobi River or nearest
stream the next day.
Mortality rates caused by diseases stemming from these poor environmental conditions
common in all African slums are drastically higher than in the developed world. Due to the lack
of safe water, sewer systems, and basic health care facilities, according to Hardoy (1990),
“children in African informal settlements are 40-50 times more likely to die before reaching the
age of 5 than their Western counterparts,” (qtd. paraphrase in Syagga, et al., NSA). Although a
major epidemic in all of Africa, the occurrence of HIV/AIDS in Kibera and Nairobi’s other
urban slums is understandably higher than Kenya’s national average. A higher death rate from
9
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AIDS results from a lack of affordable life-extending drugs and professional health care, which
are readily available in the US and Europe. Many parents have already perished from AIDS
complications, resulting in some 50,000 orphaned children in Kibera alone, according to a 2001
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report, (Scalia).
According to the US Center for Disease Control, approximately 20% of Kibera is HIV
positive, (Scalia). It is probable that the actual percentage is higher. In addition to difficulty in
obtaining accurate numbers in the labyrinth that is Kibera, many AIDS cases are covered up or
hidden. Individuals and families with AIDS are traditionally very looked down upon in Kenya.
Having HIV/AIDS is traditionally viewed as disgraceful and its discussion taboo, (Bodewes,
Social and Cultural Analysis no pag.). Often AIDS patients quietly die while hidden by their
families, or worse, they die alone after being abandoned by their family. Moreover, many go
undiagnosed. Since AIDS patients actually die of other diseases, ignorance in addition to the
cultural stigma make it easy to not attribute deaths to AIDS.
Beyond the poor conditions, logistically the greatest complication to slum upgrading in
this settlement is that the entire area on which Kibera-slum stands is officially government land.
Because of this, as Kibera-specialist attorney Christine Bodewes explains, “the entire settlement
is considered ‘illegal’ and not officially recognized by the government,” (Social and Cultural
Analysis 3). No one officially owns any land that makes up Kibera or most of Nairobi’s other
informal settlements for that matter. Therefore, land tenure is at the heart of Nairobi’s slum
issue. Land is perhaps the most important asset a Kenyan can have, as the NSA points out that,
“…land ownership remains a primary economic factor that determines prosperity or poverty for
most Kenyans,” (Syagga, et al. iii).
Despite the lack of land ownership, a well-established system of “landlords” and
“tenants” exists in Kibera. Since landlords do not own the land in Kibera, this stakeholder group
will be referred to as “structure owners” throughout this paper. Structure owners hold either a
quasi-legal right of occupation (temporary licenses or letters from the Provincial
Administration10) or no right at all. Plots are unofficially and illegally allocated for a bribe by
local authorities, namely chiefs11 and city councilors. The majority of the structures are let on a
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room-by-room basis and the majority of households occupy a single room or part of a room.
Monthly rent in Kibera for a three-square meter room is usually 550-700 Kenya Shillings (Ksh)
or about US$8-12, but can be as low as 80 Ksh (US$1.10) and as high as 1,300 Ksh (US$18.00).
Soweto village of Kibera has cheaper than average rents, with the majority paying 500-650 Ksh
(US$7-9 per month), (Goux 9). Since most Kiberan tenants make between US$1.00 and $2.00 a
day (US$20-$40 a month), rent accounts for about 40% or more of the average household’s
income unless more than one person is able to work. Yet compared to more permanent housing
in other parts of Nairobi, Kibera’s rents are relatively low. Affordable rent is the other major
factor luring people to stay in or move to Kibera, next to Kibera’s prime location.
Without the law to support structure owners in collecting rent from their tenants, payment
is enforced by the threat of forceful eviction. Youth, who comprise the majority of Kenya’s
population and are hard pressed to find work, are often hired by structure owners or local
government authorities to perform these evictions. Unfortunately these evictions often come
with little or no warning and are violent and devastating, especially if the evictors loot the
family’s personal belongings, which is not uncommon.
A trait of the complexity of land ownership in Kibera is the coexistence of multiple types
of documents expressing supposed “ownership.” Although in reality all of Kibera slum is
government land, different groups do have reasonable arguments for a right to the land. As can
be expected in the informal/extralegal sector, since Kibera’s existence from the beginning has
not been formally legal, the legitimacy of the “rights” to portions of Kibera is very murky.
Everyone’s claim lies somewhere on a spectrum of more or less probable legitimacy. The
documentation variations include the following: remnants of the original temporary residency
permits granted to the Nubian veterans of the King’s African Rifle (KAR) (the most legitimate
legal claim to Kiberan land), letters or verbal allocation (more common) from the local chiefs
that go unchallenged even though they do not follow land law, actual title deeds that may or may
not be legal (granted in most cases by former President Moi for political patronage), and
unofficial sale agreement letters given by sellers of Kiberan land to buyers as a record of their
transaction.
Due to the extralegal nature of land control and occupation in Kibera that has existed
from its first settling in 1912 by the Nubians, it is nearly an impossible task to legalize the
present land ownership status. This one factor of land tenure has been the largest roadblock for
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past upgrade projects both in Kibera and in Nairobi’s other urban slums. Although the GoK
prefers not to pay compensation to structure owners in Kibera for their land because this would
legitimize all past illegal land transactions, several sources suggest that such compensation is the
only practical and just way forward for any slum upgrading project.
DeSoto, a Latin American development economist, acknowledges the dire need for the
restructuring of the formal legal land systems in all developing countries due to the acute failure
of the formal system to serve the masses (especially those living in informal settlements.) Libya
provides an example of the extent to which a government can go after accepting the failure of the
formal land law system. In 1992, Libyan leader Mu’ammar Gadhafi decided to actually destroy
all previous land titles and reported on his action to his justice ministry, “All records and
documents in the old land register, which showed that a land belonged to this or that tribe, have
been burned . . . They were burned because they were based on exploitation, forgery, and
looting,” (qtd. in DeSoto 91). While this may not be a realistic or just strategy for Kenya,
Gadhafi’s action makes it clear how difficult and complicated solving land problems in the
developing world are. Kenya’s land problems are at the forefront of national debate and conflict.
Kibera’s residents comprise not only the poorest of Nairobi’s poor. Some working and
middle-class residents also live in Kibera and other informal settlements around the city due to
the severe lack of middle-class as well as working-class housing in the metropolis. This creates
competition for improved housing, especially for brand new housing that may possibly be
created through the current Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP). This factor will be
explored further later in this paper.
How did Kibera develop into its sprawling hills of dense shanty-type housing units, now
well known as the largest slum in East Africa? Like most African countries, European
colonization, specifically by Great Britain, caused major changes in Kenya over the last century.
Among these changes, the most significant at the time of colonization and remaining the main
issue at the heart of much conflict and injustice in Kenya yet today is land ownership. That is,
the introduction of the privatization of land through the formal English Land Law system and the
manner in which it was implemented at the end of the ninetieth century radically changed the
lifestyle of most indigenous African cultures in present day Kenya.
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The area of present Kibera itself was first informally settled in 1911 by Sudanese military
veterans and their families (now called the Nubians12) of the King’s African Rifle (KAR),
Britain’s consolidated colonial East Africa military force, (Parsons). Before the Nubians settled,
the British had reserved the 4,000-acre plot as military training grounds in 1904, who had
previously grabbed the land from the pastoralist Massai people. Nubian men were originally
recruited in 1891 by the Uganda Rifles (later the 4th Battalion KAR), whose main objective, like
the other divisions of the British-organized “native” forces, was initially to protect the expanding
British interests in the East African colonies. The Nubians received temporary occupancy
permits from the British colonial government after they settled Kibera as part of their
compensation for their military service. Despite these permits and three generations of residency
in Kibera, presently the Nubians (and every other ethnic group in a very heterogeneous Kibera)
have not received legal ownership of any Kiberan land. However, Soweto village of Kibera has
few Nubian residents, rendering this ethnic group as a minor stakeholder in the SSUP. Further
explanation of Kibera’s colonial history is beyond the scope of this paper.13
With a shared understanding of the conditions in Kibera and Nairobi’s other urban slums,
albeit limited, we are prepared to examine the efforts that have gone before the current KENSUP
and SSUP in attempts to ameliorate the inhumane conditions described above. The next chapter
explores what has failed in past slum housing projects since Kenya’s independence in 1963. In
addition to specific case studies of previous projects, the next chapter will place the KENSUP
and SSUP in a historical context through a chronological briefing of Kenya’s major policy and
theoretical shifts on its treatment of informal settlements.
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3.0 Historical Context of Kenya’s Slum Policies and Upgrading Initiatives

“The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most important
objective of every human settlement policy.”
-Vancouver Convention (from Habitat I, 1976)

After establishing a tangible understanding of Kibera’s conditions in the previous
chapter, this chapter provides a historical context for the KENSUP and SSUP efforts. This gives
a better understanding of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme, its strategies, and how it fits in
as the present continuation of Kenya’s history of slum upgrading initiatives. This will be done
through a chronological overview of Kenya’s policy history towards its informal settlements. It
should be noted that the majority of Kenya’s slum policies and strategies followed the major
global trends in development theory. A major objective of this chapter is to point out the failing
points of past projects that are now present in the KENSUP’s SSUP.
December 12, 1963 marks the day Kenya achieved the independence sought by the
Kenya African Union (KAU) and other nationalists, with President Jomo Kenyatta at the helm of
the new nation. Previous policies, including that of the Nairobi residence ID card, that had acted
to restrict the flow of rural migrants to Kenyan urban centers were removed. As a result, the
steady trickle of rural migrants into Nairobi that had existed for decades suddenly erupted into a
flood of new migrants with hopes of obtaining good jobs. Similar to European cities during the
Industrial Revolution, Nairobi’s economy simply did not have the number of formal job
positions needed to provide incomes to the wave of new urbanite-hopefuls.
Without employment, many new migrants were forced to find or build their own cheap
housing. New settlements sprang up as migrants put up their own shanty dwellings on vacant
government land, while others sought sub-leasing agreements in existing structures. Migrants
would typically receive permission from local chiefs and elders to build, despite the officials’
lack of authority to do so. This practice continues unchallenged today, (Kituo cha Sheria 3).
Kibera naturally also ballooned in its population. Two big factors caused especially rapid
growth and expansion of Kibera: the fact that Kibera was already settled, and Kibera’s prime
location near both the city centre and the industrial area, which allows residents to walk to work
to avoid transportation costs. Nubians took advantage of the increased demand for housing in
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Kibera and built more temporary rental housing, contributing to the expansion of Kibera’s
population (Onguje 6).
The primary reason behind this rapid rural-urban migration was the decided inaction of
the new Kenyan Government on the issue of land. As Kituo cha Sheria notes, “…there was no
deliberate attempt by the first post-independence government to address the land question,” (3).
This comes as a surprise since land injustices were the fundamental grounds for the Mau Mau
rebellion that lead to Kenya’s independence. The heart of the matter is that the new government,
although Kenyan, was ushered in by the exiting colonial administration. The old colonial
governance practices that were designed to benefit European settlers and thus create a system of
elitism, was simply handed off to a new Kenyan elite. Instead of being the people’s government
that the general population was eagerly expecting, while the government did its best to provide
for the country’s overall economic growth, it also ensured that elitism would continue.
Correspondingly, instead of working to return confiscated land taken from nearly all
Kenyan ethnic groups by the colonial administration, the new government required the original
inhabitants to buy it back. This devastated the majority of Kenyans who lacked the financial
resources to buy back their land. Thus, the land market was opened to the wealthy elite now
running the country. As Kituo cha Sheria puts it, “…millions of Kenya[ns] who had been kept
on reserves after they lost their land to [European] settlers became landless squatters in their own
country,” (3). With dismal poverty levels in the rural areas and no where else to go, mass
numbers of landless people migrated to Kenya’s cities. Since many Kenyans already had friends
or extended relatives living there, Kibera-Nairobi became one of the most popular destinations
for migrants.
At Independence neither the young Kenyan Government nor Nairobi’s City Council
(NCC) was in a place to adequately handle the huge influx into the capital city. In recognition of
the impending problems from such uncontrolled urban growth resulting from a policy of
unrestricted urban migration, then President Jomo Kenyatta actually encouraged Kenyans to stay
in the rural areas. Specifically, he called for “Turudi Mashambani,” which means, “let’s go back
to the rural areas” in Kiswahili (Macharia 228). Already in the mid 1960s, the inseparable
connection between urban and rural development was evident to the Kenyan Government.
The Government of Kenya (GoK) and UN-Habitat outline and categorize the history of
Kenyan policy towards informal settlements into five phases in the KENSUP programme
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document. These phases include: slum clearance and forced migration, slum clearance and
public housing, provision of minimum services, extension of tenure security and physical
upgrading, and finally the recognition of the legitimate role of low income earners in urban
development. Syagga, Mitullah, and Gitau outline the same policy eras but with alternative titles
to emphasize different components of the policies in the Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA). A
review of these policy eras and past urban development strategies and theories will develop a
historical context and theoretical framework within which to better understand the actions the
GoK and other stakeholders are now taking to address the challenges of the SSUP and the larger
KENSUP.

Table 1: Overview of slum and housing policy of the Government of Kenya (GoK)

-1963 - Mid 1970s – Containment and slum clearance (eviction and demolition).
-1970s – Self-help projects through site and service and slum upgrading schemes.
-1980s – Enablement Approach, where the GoK was to enable the private sector and other
stakeholders (NGOs and CBOs to a lesser extent) to actually provide housing by providing
economic incentives through the creation of a neo-liberal economic environment.
-1986 – SAPs created extreme dependence on non-public support and reduced basic
service provision in settlements as well as subsidies for housing, health care, and education.
-1990s – Unclear and questioning. The definition of slum upgrading was in question.
Limitations of the Enablement Approach were recognized. Work towards new polices and
strategies, including full or partial cost recovery, economic development, comprehensive assetsbased development instead of just focusing on basic-needs. A re-emphasis on participatory
mechanisms.
-2001 – The result of the new strategy development of the 1990s has come to be known as the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), which places people as the starting point.
-Source: modified from Syagga, et al., Nairobi Situation Analysis 1-2.

3.1 1963-mid 1970s: Slum Clearance
Following the example of the colonial government while at the same time keeping in step
with most other developing nations in the 1960s, Kenya’s first policy towards informal
settlements was demolition and forced migration. The second part of this policy refers to the fact
that after slum dwellers’ homes were destroyed during this period, they literally had no options
but to migrate back to the rural areas or to the remnants of the native reserves left over from the

16 Ehresmann
colonial period. Although this only lasted through the late 1960s, the demolition component of
the policy lasted until the late 1970s. Slum eradication continued to be largely justified by the
Public Health Act of 1930, as it had been under the colonial regime. The claim was that informal
settlements were health hazards to the city. While this claim does hold true, it conflicts with
international human rights law against forced evictions.14 Furthermore, urban slum evictions in
Nairobi directly hurt rural farmers as well. A female rural farmer/seller expressed concern that
policy makers hardly understood the consequences of evicting slum dwellers, “When evictions
occur, food markets are destroyed so that the farmers in rural areas who supply the stuff and
traders have nowhere to sell,” (Okwemba). This further illustrates the connection between urban
and rural development.
Kenya’s eviction and slum clearance policy reflect the desperation of the GoK to
effectively handle its growing urban population and political economy. The young government’s
struggles were based on the major complications of the inherited and worsening land allocation
crisis.
When the new Kenyan Government realized it was impossible to completely control
Nairobi’s rising poor population, the GoK began investing in public housing. Kenya’s leaders
faced the fact that leaving tens of thousands of slum dwellers out in the streets to supposedly find
their way back to their rural home areas after destroying their urban homes was not contributing
to the prosperity and development of the country. The National Housing Corporation (NHC)
was established in 1967 as the extension of the colonial Central Housing Board, started in 1943.
The new housing built by the NHC was typically tenant-purchase schemes, while some were
rented out and subsidized. While this was certainly a positive step forward for the GoK by
taking action to provide for its urban citizens, the demolition of slums continued.
Kenya’s official housing policy was written in the Session Paper No.5 of 1966/7, titled
“Housing Policy in Kenya.” It not only authorized slum demolition as a policy, but it demanded
it:
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If towns are not to develop into slums and centres of ill health and of evil social conditions, low-income
urban housing and slum clearance must continue to form the major part of the nation’s housing Programme,
(qtd. in Government of Kenya, KENSUP).

Unfortunately the new public housing effort did not come close to meeting the needs of
Nairobi’s lower class – comprising 70% of the housing need, (Kenya). The NHC’s annual 2,000
new housing units (built mostly in Nairobi) comprised only 10% of the total housing need in the
capital city, (Syagga, et al., NSA 17). Moreover, the public housing project was not sustainable
due to high costs and it being socially undesirable, (NSA 17.) Not only did much of the public
housing that was built go to middle and upper income residents because of the higher cost, but
the GoK and the local authorities were also destroying more housing than they were building.15
Werlin, a World Bank evaluator of slum upgrading projects since the 1970s, witnessed this first
hand, “In November of 1970...the Nairobi City Council (NCC) authorized the destruction of 49
illegal settlements, containing perhaps 40,000 people. This resulted in a swelling of housing
demand, a decreasing housing supply and greater exploitation of tenants in the remaining
unauthorized settlements where an estimated third of the population lived,” (Werlin).
As the largest and best-known informal settlement in Kenya, Kibera naturally absorbed
its share of intra-city migrants. This growth pleased some structure owners as their profit rose
despite the worsening living conditions. Although Kibera settlement as a whole has never been
evicted and demolished, the Nairobi Municipal Council did demolish Nubian villages in Kibera
(with their permission) in 1968/69 and relocated the residents in Langata. A decade later, the
Nubians were moved back to Kibera after the Langata settlement was destroyed, (Bodewes,
Social and Cultural Analysis). Fortunately, they were not left on their own without options as
most slum dwellers from other ethnic groups were, in large part due to the Nubians’ military
connections and relevant claim to part of Kibera.
Shortly after the demolitions Werlin witnessed in 1970, the growing housing dilemma
forced the GoK and the NCC to acknowledge the inevitability of informal settlements and the
failure of the slum clearance policy. Furthermore, slum dwellers were growing increasingly
upset with the government policy, which put additional pressure on the GoK to stop authorizing
15
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slum demolition. New policy was written more to temporarily end the previous highly
unpopular policy than to provide a new solution or strategy. In the words of the KENSUP
document, the new policy document titled, 1970/74 Development Plan of the Republic of Kenya,
stated, “that demolition would be postponed until such a time that the housing shortage is met,”
(Government of Kenya 3).16

3.2 Early 1970s: Provision of Minimum Services
Although the KENSUP document calls this new policy phase, “provision of minimum
services,” in reality it was much less pro-active than this titling implies. Kituo cha Sheria, a legal
services non-governmental organization (NGO) in Nairobi, refers to this policy phase as the
government’s “tacit acceptance of informal settlements…[using] a laissez faire approach,”
(Kenyan Perspective on Housing Rights 3). In other words little to nothing was done, resulting
in an explosion in the growth of informal settlements and the corresponding boom of the
informal economy – the continuation of the colonial legacy of negligence towards informal
settlements.
In light of then President Kenyatta’s views on the matter, one can understand from where
the early 1970s policy of neglect came from. Jomo Kenyatta himself, ironically viewed as the
leader of the grassroots Mau Mau freedom fighters, referred to Kenya’s poorest as “ragai,”
meaning “lazy” or “useless,” (Macharia 229). Kenyatta held no respect for the growing
majority-class of urban poor and the importance of the growing informal economy. As Macharia
explains, this lack of respect exposes Kenyatta’s, “lack of understanding about the significance
of the growing number of Africans who were making a valuable contribution to the economy by
their innovative micro-enterprises [in the informal sector],” (229). Indeed, it is the
entrepreneurial spirit of slum dwellers that not only earns them a living enough to survive and
raise their families on, but is vitally linked with the formal economy. For example, slum
workshops provide fine wood and metal works to be re-sold in up-scale stores in Nairobi’s city
centre.
16
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Naturally, the president’s perspective was not unique and became well shared by others
in his KANU administration as they focused on building Kenya’s new middle class. Moreover,
as Kenyatta quickly became engulfed in the accumulation of his own private wealth and power,
he set the example that his vice president, Daniel arap Moi, was to follow when he took office
after Kenyatta’s death: a trend towards centralization with the concentration of power in the
presidential office.
However there was a positive aspect to the “provision of minimum services” policy
phase. Despite the GoK’s disengagement with direct action in Kenya’s informal settlements, the
government did foster relationships with the World Bank and international organizations such as
USAID during this time that later came to fruition in the late 1970s and 1980s. New
development strategies were being created, many based on multilateral partnerships centering on
international donor funding, a model still used today.
From this new momentum, Kenya’s “do-nothing” policy phase developed into the phase
the KENSUP document calls “extension of tenure security and physical upgrading,” or as the
(NSA) calls it, “aided self-help housing.” Stemming in large part from the work of development
theorist John Turner17 and others, this policy moved away from expensive public housing
projects towards recognizing and mobilizing the assets that the residents of informal settlements
already had. The theory followed that slum residents could be aided to use their assets to allow
them to build or improve their own houses; hence the terms “self-help” and “assets-based”
development. Residents’ most important assets include labor and commitment that come from a
sense of ownership in their community and their houses. The “aided” part and the “extension of
tenure” were the government’s responsibility. As the KENSUP document states, during this
period the “…government focused on that which the people cannot provide for themselves such
as legal framework, institutional mechanism, tenure security, infrastructure, and income
generation facilities,” – a full plate certainly, (Government of Kenya 4).

17

Turner’s most commonly sited work in regards to his ideas that helped create the slum upgrading mechanism is
Freedom to Build, which he edited with Robert Fichter, published in 1972.
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3.3 Mid 1970s: Self-Help via the Site and Service and original Slum Upgrading Schemes
Out of the aforementioned policy thinking came an effort to develop new strategies and
mechanisms for development. The two most widely supported strategies produced by this effort
were the site and service scheme and the slum upgrading scheme. Both were endorsed and
developed in large part by the World Bank in the mid 1970s and implemented in Kenya among
many other countries, although slum upgrading was not common in Kenya until the early 1980s,
(Syagga, et al., NSA 18).
John Turner’s work produced the concepts of the site and service, and slum upgrading
schemes, which are wholly self-help based. Werlin notes that, “[Turner] was opposed to the
efforts of large, central and hierarchical organizations to organize and control the lives of slumdwellers.” Thus, in both strategies, the government does not provide actual housing, rather they
provide the means for the people to provide or improve their own housing. The self-help
emphasis drastically reduced the cost of development and housing provision for the GoK and
other lesser-developed countries’ (LDC) governments around the world.
In the site and services scheme, the government simply provides open serviced plots
ready for residents to build their own houses, while the World Bank and international donors
provided funding to the governments to buy land and install services. Initially, people would
build temporary houses out of mud and sticks on their plot. Over time through self-help
harambee18 fundraising and small loans for new upgraded housing materials granted by the
government or other organizations, residents would slowly build permanent houses on their
plots, and in some cases also make payments towards the purchase of the land title. Depending
on the community, loans and development happened on an individual basis or more often as a
community-wide initiative in order to share the risk and burden of the loans.
Slum upgrading on the other hand focused on the government’s role to improve the
environment in pre-existing communities and provide for resident’s basic needs instead of full
housing provision. Included in this was improving the public services and infrastructure such as
access to safe water, waste disposal, sewer, and possibly roads. The ultimate government-giving
18

Harambee is the Kiswahili word meaning fundraiser, which both individuals and institutions such as schools hold
when in financial need, i.e. when a death in the family requires funds for a proper funeral, or a school would like to
build an addition. Harambee is usually focused on raising funds from the community, though an honorable guest
such as a Member of Parliament (MP) is often invited to larger events for institutions.
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on top of this would be secure and official land tenure, which was a key component for the
World Bank slum upgrading strategy, though Turner himself did not deem this mandatory.
Security of tenure comes in the form of several possible formal land ownership systems,
including individual or community land title, and renting or owning schemes.
These three things, environment, basic needs, and land tenure, were all intended to give
structure owners and tenants pride and ownership in their houses and communities. According
to his theory, stemming from this would come the magic ingredient Turner recognized all
humans to possess when in the proper environment: incentive – that is incentive to improve (or
upgrade) one’s own dwelling and community, and thus participate and take ownership in the
improvement of one’s life after satisfying the more basic needs of stability and security.
Agreeing with Turner and emphasizing Kenya’s spirit of self-help, the Kenyan legal services
NGO, Kituo cha Sheria, states, “If the government can provide security of tenure, the residents
themselves will create new avenues for investment and improvement of housing,” (The Kenyan
Perspective 16). His ideas of local participation and bottom-up development also parallel those
of Scott, who is against large-scale, state-run projects that are seemingly developed in an
information vacuum by officials distanced from their target beneficiaries.
However the other side of the land tenure debate holds that contrary to Kituo’s
implications, provision of security of tenure is not a cure-all for slum dwellers and urban
poverty. Many urban planning experts point out that when slum dwellers begin receiving
security of tenure, a sharp increase in rural-urban and intra-city migration is likely from people
rushing in to benefit from such a programme, (Okwemba). Goux, a researcher working for UN
Habitat on the SSUP in 2003, found this migration-for-benefits phenomenon already taking place
in Kibera-Soweto in mid 2003, (12). The Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Ann Tibaijuka,
acknowledges the potential of mushrooming slums resulting from the granting of secure tenure.
In response, she names strong rural development partnering with slum upgrading strategies as the
best way to avoid excessive rural-urban migration, (in Okwemba).
One of the key differences between site and service and the slum upgrading schemes is
that upgrading minimizes the dislocation of residents, typically under 10% of the target group,
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while the site and service scheme depends on it, (NSA iv).19 According to the slum upgrading
scheme theory, improved housing happens slowly over time by the residents themselves after
being motivated with improved services and environmental conditions. Hence, slum upgrading
became the favored of the two schemes by the World Bank. Although both seem hopeful, Kenya
had few successful projects with either schemes.

3.3.1 Failures of Site & Service Schemes in Kenya
Unfortunately, the Government of Kenya (GoK) was largely unable to provide the
conditions necessary to provide for the large-scale success of the aided self-help housing policy
schemes. Inherited outdated and wealthy-favoring land policies proved too difficult to change; a
problem that continues to plague the country.20 Beyond this historic factor, both of these
development schemes ran into inherent problems that forced development experts to accept that
pure self-help initiatives, while certainly beneficial to some communities, are no panacea for the
urban poor both in Kenya and around the developing world.
The site and service scheme was unable to help a large number of people in Kenya due to
the lack of open land around urban centres – a requirement of this strategy. One must remember
that many of these projects were being implemented over a decade after the flood of rural
Kenyans to Nairobi after independence in 1963 as discussed above. By this time, land was
already at a premium with high demand.
The major efforts incorporating the site and service, and slum upgrading schemes in
Kenya include a series of World Bank projects in Nairobi and other Kenyan cities between the
1970s and the 1990s titled the First Urban Project (in Dandora, Nairobi), followed by the
Second, and Third Urban Projects in Mombassa and Kisumu. Another big initiative included
two projects in the Nairobi estates of Umoja 1 and Umoja 11 headed by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), (Syagga, et al., NSA 18). In these projects, the
19

There is a new concept of slum upgrading currently in Kenya that veers away from this characteristic explained
below in section 3.5.
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From 1999 to 2003, the Njonjo Commission has sought to provide answers for a way forward for Kenyan land
policy. Originally commissioned by former President Moi, the lengthy Njonjo report provides a description of the
problems and no definite policy answers. While it does provide points to be considered while developing the longanticipated land policy to end Kenya’s confusion and conflict over their most important asset, the difficult task of
re-working Kenya’s land policy continues to be passed on to other committees and commissions.
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World Bank and USAID respectively provided loans to the low-income families of Dandora and
Umoja to build their own housing. At the same time local governmental authorities were to
provide the plots. According to a 1996 Kenyan Human Rights Commission Report,21 both of
these major urban projects failed to accomplish their goal to provide improved housing to
landless people, (in Kituo cha Sheria, The Kenyan). As with most site and service projects, these
two projects exemplify the common problem of target beneficiaries being unable to make
payments on their loans.
The inability to make loan payments shows that many target beneficiaries could simply
not afford to build on the sites given them. Due to a non-participatory and top-down planning
phase, beneficiaries had no input in location, plot size, and level of services. Unfortunately, the
Kenyan Government (implementing the World Bank’s funding) often over-estimated the ability
and willingness of low-income households to pay for their actual housing, (Syagga, et al., NSA
19). Over-designed and unaffordable infrastructure was provided in the absence of respecting
and realizing the interests and needs of the target beneficiaries through a participatory planning
and design stage of the projects. This is a key factor that will likely become a source of failure in
the SSUP as well if residents are not consulted in the planning stage by the coordinators of the
project, namely the Government of Kenya (GoK) and the Nairobi City Council (NCC), with the
utmost support from UN-Habitat.
The importance of cognitive respect may be recognized here. This concept holds that no
one knows his or her specific situation better than that individual, (Wera 3). Had the GoK
consulted the target beneficiaries of the site and service schemes, more appropriate sites and loan
repayment plans within the people’s budgets could have been developed. Since this was not
done, gentrification became the norm rather than the exception: many target beneficiaries
decided to sell their plots to middle and upper-income households who were financially betterequipped to build new housing on the valuable government-provided serviced sites. This
essentially rendered the projects failures, save for their contribution to Nairobi’s middle-income
housing stock.
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The report is titled, “Behind the Curtain, a Study on Squatters, Slums and Slum Dwellers.”
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3.3.1.1 A Non-Conventional Site and Service Case Study: The Huruma-J Cooperative Housing Group

While many site and services projects failed to substantially improve the lives of most
target beneficiaries, not all completely failed. Although the improvement or upgrading of their
actual housing stock is taking a long time, the current community housing cooperative of
Huruma-J has been developing community members’ homes since 1973. The members first
organized themselves and then asked the GoK for a site. After a tenant and purchase scheme
was attempted and failed due to the inability of the group to raise the deposit money for that
scheme, the GoK turned toward the site and service option for this community. Each household
was provided a serviced plot without houses by the government, with intact sewer and water on
every 20’x30’ plot.
The Huruma-J cooperative group consists of 35 members. It is one of many small groups
within a larger group called the Huruma Housing Co-operative Society, which is affiliated with
the National Housing Co-operative Housing Union (NACHU). Over time, they have developed
their houses on their plots. As a group they save, invest, build, and repeat to build houses for
group members using small loans from the GoK, (Huruma-J; NSA 110).
The Huruma-J self-help community has used a non-conventional finance approach
through small government loans since 1973. They focus on one household at a time. Once the
community has saved half of the money required to purchase the materials to upgrade and to
purchase the title for the plot, the community pays the GoK-run NACHU half and receives twice
the amount back – the full cost of the project. The money is invested in the next agreed-upon
household, both to buy the title of the plot from the GoK for 20,000 Ksh ($280) and to buy
materials (mainly cement to make blocks). Repayment of the loan takes about four-years. The
community cannot receive another loan until the previous is paid back. Although this housing
scheme is very slow (in 2003 not all community members had built their improved houses yet
from 1973), this strategy is providing real improvements in the community’s well being.
Additionally, this project has fostered a strong bond and sense of unity among stakeholders as
well as a sense of ownership among the members that has prevented the gentrification so
common to other non-financed site and service projects.
Yet despite the successes of this site and service/alternatively-financed project, Huruma-J
also has its negative points beyond its long time frame. Garbage collection was originally
provided by the NCC as part of the provision of free basic services. However due to financial
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constraints caused by NCC mismanagement, there is no funding to provide this service anymore
(which is the case for most of Nairobi). Other smaller organizations now provide the service at a
cost.
More importantly, exemplifying the typical over-designing failure of site and service
schemes, Huruma-J’s original plots of 20’x 30’ were larger than necessary for many families.
Families then subdivided their plots or rooms if their house had already been constructed, to
informally and illegally sub-let their extra space to additional families. This has happened not
only on the Huruma project area, but also in working-class estates (neighborhoods) all over
Nairobi. Since significantly more people are living in Huruma than it was designed for, the
result of this sub-leasing trend has been the over-use and over-capacitating of the governmentprovided sewer system, water supply, and the dilapidation of the neighborhood roads.
While the GoK blames the residents for being irresponsible to over-populate their
neighborhood,22 residents blame the government for having a lack of responsibility to face reality
and live up to their duty to maintain public services.23 Sewage now flows in open dirt ditches in
Huruma, much like in Kibera. While both sides’ points are relevant, the underlying reason for
the sub-dividing of the Huruma plots is the original allotment of overly large plots by the GoK.
This happened due to the lack of input of the target beneficiaries through a participatory planning
and design process to identify the plot size and design best suited for the needs of the Huruma-J
cooperative group.
Although Huruma-J residents have certainly benefited from rent income generated by
their extra space,24 had the intent to rent out portions of their plots been expressed to the
government, a larger sewer system could have been installed. The draw back to this is the
probability that the GoK would not have allowed the group to have the site after expressed
interest in informal landlordism. Unfortunately, many Nairobians hold little respect for such
government laws and regulations because they are not practical to the reality of Nairobi’s acute
housing shortage. While the formal legal system cannot be expected to simply formalize the
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From the author’s personal interview with Titus Agwanda of the Ministry of Lands and Settlements.
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From the author’s interview with the Huruma-J housing cooperative group.
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dominant informal sector, the GoK must give cognitive respect for the unique reality of specific
population groups in both policy formation and project coordination.
One of the key components of this site and service scheme project that could and should
be used today is the small (micro) loans that were provided to a community housing cooperative
on very favorable and sensitive terms. While normal housing loans and mortgages are common
avenues for middle and upper-income groups to purchase housing in Nairobi, most of these
opportunities are unavailable to low-income groups in areas such as Huruma-J and KiberaSoweto simply due to their inability to pay them back on the given terms. On a positive note, the
GoK’s 1997 Sessional Paper on Housing called for the expansion of such unconventional finance
loans to more low-income groups, (NSA 111).

3.3.2 Failures of early Slum Upgrading Schemes
The original slum upgrading scheme also ran into failures similar to those of the site and
service projects. While upgrading public infrastructure in existing slums certainly improved the
environment and provided healthier living conditions for the slum dwellers, these improvements
also increased the land value. In addition to the public improvements, the individual
improvements of existing housing stock created and will continue to create higher rents, unless
substantial measures are taken to freeze the rents of upgraded housing.
This rise in values is of course completely normal within a free market. Since there is
such an acute lack of housing within legal standards in Nairobi, especially the lack of middleincome housing, it becomes understandable why the GoK and UN-Habitat are seeking such a
large-scale slum upgrading programme. In terms of the citywide housing market, the economic
forces are simply too strong for brand new housing stock (as the KENSUP through the SSUP
might produce) to not find its way into the hands of higher-income people. This has been the
result in several recent “upgrade” projects discussed below.
Ultimately, the best response to these complexities of improving slum conditions must
combine the positive points exemplified in the Huruma-J alternatively financed site and service
project with those positives of slum upgrading, and then some. Slum upgrading is a great
mechanism that can help a large number of people in a very tangible way in a relatively short
amount of time. Pair this with characteristics seen in Huruma J – strong bonds of community
due to a mutually-dependent, self-run housing cooperation group where residents have been
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empowered to invest themselves in the improvement of their own community by having security
of tenure and mutual economic dependencies – and the result begins to look like the ultimate
housing development. While all of these components need to be included in a comprehensive
slum upgrading theory and strategy, there are other critical components such as the development
of income generating activities and access to assets, which are all included in the current
upgrading theory, the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), discussed in the following chapter
(4.0) on the KENSUP and SSUP.

3.4 The 1980s: The Enablement Approach and Structural Adjustment Programmes
With the general failure of the self-help schemes in Nairobi’s informal settlements (and
other slums throughout the developing word) becoming apparent due to the sustained increase in
slum growth throughout the 1980s, building international pressure provided a catalyst for the
development of new urban governance strategies. The Bretten Woods international economic
organizations – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – led the global
development paradigm shift based on neo-liberal market theory, which continues to form a large
part of the theoretical foundation of current urban development strategies.
After development attempts with just two major stakeholders leading the initiatives were
attempted and failed (public housing provision by the GoK followed by self-help by the people),
the neo-liberal-based Enablement Approach attempted to involve an over-looked third party: the
private sector. The main idea is to reduce the level of public or governmental involvement in the
delivery and management of urban services since governments are largely inefficient without
strong economic incentives to be otherwise. In place of a centralized governmental approach to
development, the theory holds that the privatization of previously public provisions will increase
efficiency, productivity, and will ultimately boost national economies of lesser developed
countries (LDCs) to enable them to repay development loans to the World Bank, IMF, and other
American and European financial institutions. This global foundational theory brought the
Enablement Approach and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to Kenya, both
incorporating the ideas of decentralization, good governance, coordinated multi-lateral
stakeholder networking, and increased community participation in development initiatives.
Kenya received its first heavy dose of SAP requirements in 1986. While the neo-liberal
institutional changes within the GoK were implemented in the hope of national economic
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growth, it was the informal settlements that bore the brunt of the burden and ultimately received
very little if any actual benefit from the SAPs. Unlike the current Sustainable Livelihoods
Approach, SAPs are not people-focused; they cut human services. Unfortunately during this
period in Kenya’s history, economic gains were allowed to take precedence over the human right
to basic services.
SAPs required the GoK and NCC to withdraw from service and subsidy provision. Key
services and subsidies for garbage pick up, sewage and water, road maintenance, housing, health
care, and education that were depended on by slum dwellers were no longer available or
significantly downsized at best. It was expected by the IMF that these voids would encourage
growth in the private sector to fill them. For a while, the expected growth did materialize for
several years in the early and mid 1990s when Kenya was viewed by the West as the beacon and
model of African development. However this economic growth tended to disproportionately
favor Kenya’s middle and upper-income groups. While these groups could afford the extreme
transition to sole dependence on new private sector services, the lower-income majority was
barred from receiving these benefits due to high costs and hence witnessed the deterioration of
what minimal service provision had existed in their informal settlements before the policy shift.
Similarly but in direct relation to housing during this time (late 1980s to the present), the
Enablement Approach came to the forefront of informal settlement policy in Kenya. The push
was in keeping with the reduction of the direct governmental provision of anything. Instead of
directly providing housing,25 LDC governments were advised to concentrate on their role as
policy makers to provide a legal and economic environment with incentives that would “enable”
other stakeholders to actually provide housing, infrastructure, and basic services. The approach
depends on market competition to boost efficiency and quality – the basis of neo-liberal reform.
In addition to the new government role of “enabler,” the title of “facilitator” also joined
the GoK’s new job description. According to Syagga, et al. in the NSA, “Governments were
from now on expected to facilitate action by their citizens, private firms and non-governmental
organizations [NGOs] to provide for themselves such services and at such standards as people
themselves may choose,” (19). Basically the Enablement Approach calls the Kenyan
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The Kenya National Housing Corporation was still building low and middle-income housing not directly intended
for slum dwellers during the 1980s.
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Government (then and now currently) to be a coordinator or a manager of the many different
stakeholders in development work. This is certainly a profoundly difficult task, especially given
that it is hard for a government to manage projects without being biased to its own interests.
This is clear in the case of the Kibera-Soweto upgrade project. The competing interests of the
stakeholders are examined below in Chapter 5.0. Unfortunately this mandated task appears to
have been too difficult for the GoK.
Ultimately, through the late 1990s to the present, the Kenyan economy has worsened.
This has unfortunately largely undermined the current neo-liberal privatization theory and has
rendered the large-scale achievement of its objectives, including poverty eradication, impossible.
According to Syagga, et al., difficulties and failures of the GoK as “enabler” include an
inadequate partnership system, poor coordination and networking between partners and
stakeholders, with inherited “lopsided land policies inherited from colonial times” being the
chief road block for the Kenyan Government. Without clear land or informal settlement policy,
many donors had and still have no clear approach to working with informal settlements.
Additionally, a widespread pattern of corruption permeating all levels of (predominantly urban)
Kenyan society has helped erode Kenya’s initial prosperity.26
This illustrates that despite all the external causation factors of slums, it is ultimately the
response and decisions of the Kenyan Government (GoK) and other governing bodies that
determine economic and social opportunities. Poor decisions made by governmental officials
over Kenya’s brief independent history, specifically during the 1990s, have largely undermined
the benefits and economic achievement that Kenya was able to initially achieve through the
Enablement Approach and the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies via SAPs. This
occurrence of poor governance stems in part from a tendency of many Kenyan elites (both
political and business) to focus on personal objectives centered on economic and/or political gain
by standing upon the shoulders of the majority poor.27
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This is discussed further in Chapter 6.0, section 6.1.

This is the major theme of Ngugi’s novel, Devil on the Cross – the huge disparity between rich and poor and the
abuse the poor receive from the rich both nationally in Kenya and internationally through economic imperialism.
See pages 115-118 as pertaining to slum housing in Kenya. It is a speech by one of the many “robbers and thieves”
gathered for a competition to prove themselves worthy to the international leaders of robbers and thieves, also
known as Western financial firms.
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Many Kenyans blame the decay of their economy and country during the 1990s in large
part on their former president Moi and the rampant corruption that thrived under his authoritarian
administration. Several major government scandals involving large sums of money have come
under scrutiny of the law in court since President Kibaki took office in January 2003. Included
cases are the Goldenburg Scandal, and several government officials flooding Kenya’s sugar
market with cheaper smuggled sugar from other African nations still under the Kenyan label. In
the latter case, a once major industry of Kenya has been strangled to death, hurting tens of
thousands of sugar farmers and ultimately contributing to rural-urban migration and the growth
of Kenya’s informal settlements. Contributing to this, during the 1990s the Nairobi City Council
(NCC) developed a serious lack of funding due to mismanagement. Due to the failure of their
revenue collection scheme and some city councilors’ misuse of what little funds were available,
the NCC has been unable to play a strong role in helping Nairobi’s housing crisis. The NCC has
failed to directly provide basic services and affordable housing to many, and has failed to enable
other stakeholders to provide these.
While it is unreasonable to blame all of Kenya’s problems on Moi, he and his
administration must be given due credit for the economic consequences of their actions that stole
billions of shillings from the Kenyan people. Supporting the call of responsibility to the
government, the Honorable Minister for Roads, Public Works, and Housing, Raila Odinga,
placed most of the blame for the causation of Nairobi’s slum crisis on the former KANU (Moi’s
party) administration for its decades of neglect to the housing sector, (Mutiga 1).
Despite the failures of the Enablement Approach in practice, these ideas helped lay the
foundation of the current Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). In response to the
shortcomings of the GoK to sufficiently fill the role of facilitator and coordinator between
diverse stakeholders involved in upgrading in the 1980s, the 1990s saw slum upgrading evolve
into a strategy quite different than Turner’s original self-help scheme.

3.5 The 1990s: What is Slum Upgrading today?
Recently, slum upgrading has seemingly taken on a slightly different and expanded
definition for the GoK compared to John Turner’s 1973 minimized state theory. Syagga, et al.
note that Kenyans were questioning what slum upgrading really was in the 1990s, as relocation
and newly constructed housing schemes became associated with slum upgrading projects, (2).
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This evolution has affected the nature of Kenya’s “upgrading” projects in the 1990s and is
affecting the way the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing is handling the current
KENSUP and SSUP.
Instead of gradual self-help improvements to existing housing stock with outside
organizations simply focusing on public infrastructure improvements and the GoK granting
secure land tenure as Turner’s original mechanism calls for, “slum upgrading” in Kenya has
come to include the actual provision of new housing units with the affiliated temporary relocation
component. This extension of the strategy is noted in the NSA (22), but was also implied in
conversations about slum upgrading between the author and Kenyans from all stakeholder
groups and sectors. The transition in “slum upgrading” from improving existing housing to
providing new housing is evident in recent upgrading projects in Nairobi from the 1990s, such as
the Kibera Highrise project, and in the current SSUP. The Kibera Highrise “upgrade” project
(described further in the next section) provided new housing units and involved resettlement
when the old structures were demolished, instead of only focusing on basic public services and
infrastructure improvement. As for the SSUP, comments and speeches by the GoK head of the
KENSUP and SSUP, Minister Raila Odinga, during 2003 strongly suggest that the SSUP is also
headed down the resettlement and direct new housing provision path as well, which will be
discussed in greater depth in the following chapters.

3.5.1 Lessons from four Slum Upgrading Initiatives from the 1990s
Despite several great ideas and strategies that have been developed over the last three
decades such as Turner’s self-help schemes and the enabling role of government, the successful
implementation of slum improvement projects in Kenya is nearly non-existent. Common
shortcomings of recent Kenyan upgrades revolve around a lack of affordability resulting in
instant gentrification due to high building standards and administrative inefficiency, (NSA 181).
At the heart of the matter, most urban housing and slum upgrade projects in Nairobi that have
failed have one thing in common: a lack of community participation and input from the target
beneficiaries about their views, needs, and aspirations. Okwemba notes, “Mr. Akech [Nairobi
Deputy Mayor] admitted that the proposed upgrading of city council houses in various Nairobi
estates backfired because the residents were not involved in the process.” It is quite clear that
most of Nairobi’s settlement upgrading projects have been developed from the top-down, only to
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end up too far removed from the target beneficiary community to actually improve their well
being (connecting to Scott), which is clearly the underlying central objective of every settlement
project.
These common failures of the GoK and NCC are extremely important to watch for in the
KENSUP/SSUP. Breaking the Government’s and the Council’s bureaucratic patterns and habits
of top-down slum upgrading will require special efforts. Unfortunately, despite the inclusive,
diverse, and SL-based consultative efforts of the KENSUP to brainstorm and develop strategies
for the KENSUP during its Inception Stage (2001-2002) with the direct purpose to thwart these
previous upgrading failures, the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing (MoRPWH) of
the GoK is leading the KENSUP down the same failing path with a lack of community
participation on the SSUP. Thus, in examining four past slum upgrading projects in Kenya
(Kibera Highrise, Mathare 4A, Voi Kenya, and The Kibera Urban Environmental Sanitation
Pilot Project [KUESP]), the lessons will become clear of what ought not to be done and what has
the promise of possible success in slum upgrading projects in tackling the current central
challenge of eliminating gentrification through community participation. A look at these past
initiatives will also allow the recognition of some of these old mistakes that are now present in
the SSUP.
The most relevant example to the SSUP and for the residents in Kibera-Soweto is the
Kibera Highrise project.
3.5.1.1 Early-mid 1990s: Kibera Highrise/Nyayo Highrise28
Nyayo Highrise estate was built in the mid-1990s by the GoK-controlled National
Housing Corporation. It was built on land that had been part of Kibera informal settlement that
now borders Kibera-Soweto. This slum upgrading initiative has a special connection to the
current residents of Kibera-Soweto, as many of them are those who were displaced by the
building of the new Nyayo flats.
The GoK promised that Kiberan poor would benefit from the project and would inhabit
the new structures. Residents were told that after they moved to their new temporary residence,
their old neighborhood would be destroyed and rebuilt, after which they would be allowed to
28
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move back into the upgraded housing. Unfortunately, although the neighborhood was rebuilt as
the Kibera Highrise flats, the originally displaced Kiberans never moved back in.
Instead, due to economic forces and possible political underpinnings, middle-class
residents paying 10,000 Ksh ($140) a month presently occupy Nyayo Highrise, (Christ the King,
Memorandum). 10,000 Ksh is far too expensive for the majority of Kiberan slum dwellers who
make on average 2000-3000 Ksh per month or about 100-150 Ksh per day ($1.40-$2.10).
Contributing to the poor not benefiting from Kibera/Nyayo Highrise is the fact that
Nairobi’s middle-income group is also experiencing a lack of housing. This has created
competition between them and the lower-income groups for housing produced by slum
upgrading projects, (Syagga, et al., NSA 95). Due to the high demand from middle-income
earners, it is only natural for the housing market to be unable to artificially hold the cost of
upgraded housing down for the target beneficiary groups.
Another major factor in the failure of this upgrade to benefit Kiberan slum dwellers is the
economic and political corruption that was rampant and characteristic of former president Moi’s
regime (1978-2002). There are much higher rents to be made from brand new flats than the
majority of slum dwellers are able to pay. The moneymaking opportunity on Kibera-Highrise
proved to be too lucrative. After receiving control over the flats from the National Housing
Corporation, the GoK Provincial Administration, likely involving political patronage, sold the
new flats to other wealthier individuals and families.
Other major residential estates were also constructed on Kiberan land originally occupied
by the Nubians. Built between 1962 and 1988, they include: Jamjuri, Otiende, Ngei, Onyonka,
Fort Jesus, Salama, Soko Mjinga, Olympic, and Ayany. All of these replaced Nubian villages in
Kibera however did not benefit most Nubians according to the Kibera Land Committee, (Mbaria,
Kibera). What these new residential housing areas did do, similar to Kibera Highrise, is to
reduce Kibera’s land size,29 displace residents thereby perpetuating and spawning the creation
and growth of other slums, and to increase Kibera’s population density.
All too often slum dwellers have never become the rightful beneficiaries of these
“upgraded” developments. Whole communities have been left dismantled and dispersed at a
distance from their original neighborhood, forced to make a new life and build new community
29

According to Mbaria’s research, Kibera was 4,197 acres in 1918 cut down to 550 acres in 1971.
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relationships in a new slum. This is why the residents of Kibera-Soweto, especially the tenants,
are highly skeptical of the SSUP while fear, anxiety, tension, and confusion are so easily
elevated there.
If the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) proceeds in a similar manner of
simply building new flats after temporarily relocating the slum dwellers on that land, the
possibility of achieving this same unsatisfactory result is highly probable.

3.5.1.2 1989-2000: Mathare 4A – A Case Study
The Mathare Valley is similar to Kibera in that it is one of Nairobi’s oldest (1924) and
largest (73.7 hectares/180 acres) informal settlements. Mathare 4A is one area of the slum
valley, comprising approximately 23,000 people – less than half of Kibera-Soweto – having a
typical Nairobian slum density of about 250 housing units per hectare (compared to 25 in
middle-income estates), (Otiso no pag.).
The upgrade project in Mathare 4A was initiated in 1989 by the Catholic Church lead by
Fr. Klaus Braunreuter, (Opiata and Bodewes). The project was based on the tri-sector
partnership model that has become common in development initiatives and is strongly advocated
by Otiso. The three sectors included in this model of development are state (public), voluntary
(NGOs), and private sectors. The five-year project (by plan) started in May 1992 after
Braunreuter established funding from the German Government (specifically the Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufbau), and convinced the GoK to provide land for the project and to relax building
codes to keep costs down to suit the local economy better (i.e. smaller rooms, higher population
density, and non-concrete building blocks). Relaxing building codes is an important point of
debate for all slum upgrading projects. While it is critical that intended beneficiaries are not
displaced by high costs, safety ought to not be over compromised. Additionally, Werlin points
out that lower standards and quality causes facilities to quickly deteriorate, requiring regular
maintenance from residents. Thus, if residents own their upgrade project by being engaged in
the whole process, this need not be a stopping block for Mathare 4A or any other project.
The actual physical upgrading included the following: construction of 8,000 rooms for
housing, business stalls, and schools using non-concrete blocks and tiles with Approtect’s (an
NGO) technology. Infrastructure improvements included streetlights, a footpath and road
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network, a water and sewer system, and a toilet/shower/clothes washing concrete slab with water
for every ten housing units, (Otiso no pag.).
Whereas the Enablement Approach typically gives the national government the role of
project facilitator between stakeholders in the other sectors, in this project the Catholic Church
filled this role. The title deeds for the land in question were actually issued to the Church for
ninety-nine years as a temporary means of regularizing land tenure for the project, (Opiata and
Bodewes 1). The Church went on to also become project manager and implementer through its
affiliate, Amani Housing Trust, created in 1996 by the Catholic Archdiocese specifically for the
Mathare 4A project. The Catholic Church filled this role since Fr. Braunreuter initiated the
project and because the German Government did not want the GoK to implement this project due
to its poor housing provision history, (Otiso).
According to Otiso, the main success of the project is that most of the target beneficiaries
were not displaced and actually benefited from the upgrade. However Opiata and Bodewes
disagree on this point stating, “Many of the tenants in the upgraded areas are in fact nonresidents who have been allocated structures because of bribes paid,” (4). One factor that may be
behind this discrepancy is that Fr. Klaus and the Amani Housing Trust (the project leaders) were
found to be making exaggerated or inaccurate representations of the project, (Opiata and
Bodewes 4), which Otiso likely relied upon.
With this in mind, Otiso identifies four factors that contributed to the success of the
project based on the high retention of the original target beneficiaries. First, although frustrating
structure owners and other would-be landlords, a renter-occupied scheme (renting from the
Archdiocese) instead of a tenant-purchase scheme was adopted. This thwarted the economic
incentives for target beneficiaries to sell or sub-let upgraded units to wealthier individuals.
While it is positive to ensure that the target beneficiaries actually benefit by living in the
upgraded housing built for them, Opiata and Bodewes found that residents had originally
accepted the project in its earlier form: as a tenant-purchase scheme. The plan would have given
each family three rooms, allowing the family to rent out the other two. After twenty to thirty
years, money received from rent would be enough to purchase their home, (3). The plan was
changed to make the 4A community life-long tenants of the Archdiocese without their input.
This led to “residents [who] consequently feel they have been lied to and used by the Project,”
(Opiata and Bodewes 3).
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The second factor contributing to target beneficiary retention was that pre-upgrade rents
were maintained after the project. Rents were determined by the ability of the tenants to pay, in
some cases being lower than structure owners’ rents. A flexible payment plan throughout the
month helped tenants finance their new housing, (Otiso). Opiata and Bodewes however found
many tenants paying more than they had previously and for smaller structures due in part to
additional separate utility bills for water, toilets, and security that residents cannot afford, (4).
Thirdly, as will be important in the Kibera-Soweto Upgrade Project (SSUP), a strict
allocation system was used to ensure that only bona fide Mathare 4A residents received upgraded
units (instead of recent migrants or higher income groups seeking to take advantage of the
project.) On the issue of community participation, residents were required to sign a legally
binding contract stating that they would participate in the project beforehand, (Ostiso).
Fourthly, dislocation was also kept low (in keeping with the traditional Turner slum
upgrading mechanism) by the building of some new units on open land before old units were
demolished.
Finally, the fact that infrastructure has been improved and added in Mathare 4A shows
rather concretely that some good did come of the project. This is what David Kithakye of UN
Habitat focused on when asked in an interview with the author about the failure of the Mathare
4A project. He said it is not a failure. Kithakye’s manner of speaking about this project gave the
impression that everything went smoothly making it a good model for future upgrades.
Although some of the above points could be used as models for future projects, the negative
outcomes of this project also provide counter-examples of what not to do.
Beyond the questionable successes, there were a number of challenges and outright
failures to the 4A upgrade revolving around structure owner-led opposition. On a positive note,
although the Land Acquisition Acts and the current Constitution of Kenya state that there is no
compensation for acquired private property, the Mathare 4A project set a different precedent by
providing structure owners compensation (who had acquired land which they did not legally
own), (Gitau, Olima ii). However, the amount of compensation was decided unilaterally by the
project leaders based only on the structure, was often below its real value, and did not allow an
appeal process to debate compensation, (Opiata and Bodewes 3).
Beyond structural compensation, the Catholic Church (via Amani Housing Trust) did not
seek to dialog, involve, and benefit structure owners with the project. Instead, this key sector of
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the target beneficiary group was written off as a minority group that did not need to be listened
to, (Opiata and Bodewes 6). Therefore, despite receiving compensation for their structures, there
was no attention paid to the larger issue of the elimination of structure owners’ livelihoods from
rent payments, illegal though they were. Unlike Kibera (less so in Kibera-Soweto), wealthier
politicians and business people do not comprise a significant proportion of the structure owners
in Mathare 4A. According to Opiata and Bodewes, single mothers who rent out a spare room or
two of their houses constitute the majority of 4A’s structure owners, (3).
The project’s threat of income and security disruption understandably provided strong
incentive for structure owners to oppose the upgrade project. This is a common trend in
upgrading that has already been at work in Kibera. It was easy for the 4A project implementers,
as in other projects, to ignore the rights and needs of structure owners since most have enjoyed
years of illegal and tax-free rent income. However this does not justify ignoring the unique
losses and interests of structure owners. In fact, as illustrated in this case study, structure owners
actually require special attention and involvement to gain their support for urban development
projects since they tend to be the losers of upgrade projects by default.
Unfortunately the Amani Housing Trust did not handle the structure owner-led
opposition well. Instead of working with the opposition, the Trust and the funders pushed the
project through. Okwemba reported in Nairobi’s newspaper, the Daily Nation, “…the Catholic
Church slum upgrading initiative in Mathare 4A has been marred by violence because the slum
dwellers perceive the programme as a ploy to evict them from their homes.” Hired thugs would
threaten, intimidate, and in some cases rip off roofs and doors in the middle of the night of those
in 4A who opposed the project or had trouble paying rent, (Opiata and Bodewes 3). After these
residents moved, their structures would be demolished to open up land for the project’s new
housing and infrastructure. Needless to say, this violent confrontation resulted in growing
opposition.
In May 1998, the NGO legal agency, Kituo cha Sheria, filed on behalf of 4A’s residents
with approximately 1,000 plaintiffs for an injunction to ban the forceful and violent demolitions
of houses in Mathare 4A, (Opiata and Bodewes 4). However Kenya’s High Court responded that
the 4A residents had no standing to sue.
November through December 1998 saw violence in Mathare 4A escalate as the project
administration pushed on with occasional bloody confrontations between project demolition
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gangs and opposition houses. After several human rights groups requested the halting of the
project, Archbishop Ndingi declared the project ought to halt and be implemented in a manner
favorable to the residents, (Opiata and Bodewes 5). Although the Provincial Commissioner
(GoK) formed a task force in January 1999, the result was a report based on one day of random
interviews with Mathare 4A non-structure owner residents, which recommended that the project
continue as planned since the opposition was a minority group. As of August 2003, the project
remains incomplete and the Catholic Church remains the landlord of the upgraded facilities.
The underlying and most important reason for the conflict and violence that surrounded
the Mathare 4A upgrading is that residents were not allowed to participate in the decision
making for this project. Both the GoK and the German Government allowed the Amani Trust
(tied to the Catholic Church) to be the main decision maker. Although residents were technically
on the Consultative Advisory Board for the 4A upgrade (similar to the Settlement Project
Implementation Units of the SSUP), it was actually only two residents who were not elected by
the community, (Opiata and Bodewes 3). This upgrade was lead by an administrative body lead
by the Catholic Church, who thought it knew what would be best for 4A residents. Although the
Amani Housing Trust did guess right to benefit some tenants who did not experience a rise in
rent, structure owners were completely ignored. Although undoubtedly having the best of
intentions, by not adequately allowing for community participation in making decisions directly
affecting them, the Archdiocese and the Amani Housing Trust alienated and marginalized some
of the very people that the project sought benefit.

3.5.1.3 Mid 1990s: Voi, Kenya – The Tanzania-Bondeni Project
An alternative to the Catholic Church (or other organizations) playing the rather awkward
role of temporary landlord for a slum upgrading project as in Mathare 4A, is the community land
trust scheme. Eric Makokha, the Chief Executive Officer of the Shelter Forum, finds community
land trusts to be one of the best land tenure options available to slum neighborhoods. In
community land trusts, land title is given to the collective community while residents
individually own their structures. Individuals can only sell their home and land with the
approval of the community. This tenure system tends to be sustainable by creating
accountability, trust, and initiative within communities, as well as minimizing the negative
effects of the land market on low-income residents. The Tanzania-Bondeni Project in the small
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town of Voi used this new land management model and has proved to be one of the most
successful upgrading projects in Kenya.
The Voi project was based on three principles: community empowerment,
professionalization of the support agencies (in particular local agencies), and an establishment of
a partnership between beneficiaries, the local government and the collaborating NGOs, (MIT
Web). Interestingly, these principles comprise the main components of the current Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach (SL) to development discussed in the next chapter, which is the theory
supposedly guiding the SSUP.
Due to the community emphasis, the Voi project was on a much smaller scale than
Mathare 4A and other previous GoK upgrading initiatives. In fact, the GoK had no significant
role in the project, (Makokha). Leadership centered on the small town’s city council. Syagga, et
al. note that Voi’s success was largely due to the fact that the community (target beneficiaries)
determined the degree of infrastructure improvements and made their decisions based on what
they could afford, (NSA 182). This speaks loudly to the SSUP: it is clear that local leadership
and strong resident participation in the planning and design phase as well as the implementation
phase are necessary for a successful slum upgrading project.

3.5.1.4 1997-2001: The Kibera Urban Environmental Sanitation Pilot Project (KUESP)
This recent project is interestingly more along the lines of the original 1970s slum
upgrading scheme than other recent “upgrade” projects. The Kibera Urban Environmental
Sanitation Pilot Project (KUESP) was being planned by the World Bank, the Department of
International Development, and the French Development Agency from 1997-2001 and was to
focus on physical infrastructure based on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) World Bank Strategic Sanitation Approach instead of on housing, the focus of the SSUP.
Although the project acknowledged Kibera’s complexity and the need for community
participation, the project has been stalled if not killed due to its unpreparedness to
comprehensively ameliorate the very complex and volatile land situation the project leaders
know exists in Kibera but do not fully understand. The situation in Kibera revolves around the
lack of secure tenure and residents’ corresponding fear of forceful eviction and demolition by the
GoK or outside organizations. This fear is often exploited by powerful individuals who have an
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economic or political stake in Kibera to manipulate residents against upgrading projects by
misleading them to believe that a project will harm them when the opposite may be true.
We can therefore understand why this project, similar to the SSUP in 2003, created
immediate hostility in Kibera with just the mention of temporary or permanent relocation
(eviction) of housing units and business kiosks as part of the strategy. Even though relocation is
sometimes necessary to make land available for settlement reorganization and de-densification,
relocating either housing units or business kiosks carries with it the potential for violence and
death that no development agency wants to be responsible for. This is why the KUESP has not
gone forward. Some residents are willing to violently fight against projects like the KUESP that
often threaten to take away homes through temporary or permanent resettlement. However
violence is also not often spurred by residents but rather by youth thugs hired by politicians or
structure owners who oppose a given project due to personal economic or political interests.
Violent opposition results only in loss, confusion, bloodshed, and death, which Kibera knows all
too well. The violence that Kibera and other Nairobian slums such as Mathare 4A have
experienced in the past from forced eviction resulted primarily from a lack of information on
both sides: those opposing and implementing the projects. The lack of information is ultimately
a symptom of a non-participatory-focused project that fails to assign the importance to grassroots
information gathering that it deserves.
The KUESP was in many ways on the right track to providing a real improvement in
living conditions in Kibera through its sewer and road infrastructure focus. However the project
leaders were not prepared to meet the challenges of coordinating and facilitating the kind of
participatory scheme Kibera requires to avoid project-crippling opposition. In addition to noting
that the main constraint in Kibera is indeed the lack of secure tenure, Gitau and Olima highlight
the importance of the globally recognized key participation component for current slum
upgrading initiatives in their report titled, “Land Tenure and Tenancy Concerns and issues in
Kibera,” prepared for the KUESP project planners:

Notwithstanding the tenure concerns, any implementation of an upgrading programme in the informal
settlements will only be successful in realizing its objectives and be both sustainable and replicable only if
there is community participation, (iii).
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This advice hits home with the SSUP both in timing and place, affirming the
participatory SL process the KENSUP/SSUP is advocating on paper.
In addition to the KUESP effort and the SSUP to upgrade Kibera on a large scale, many
smaller-scale infrastructure projects have been completed in Kibera as well. For example,
Oxfam headed a project to build toilets (latrines) and bathing facilities in Kibera, as did the
World Bank in several locations. The World Bank and other organizations have also put in
cement drainage ditches to replace dirt ditches. While smaller infrastructure projects are not a
cure-all to the proliferation of slum conditions in Kibera, these projects serve a very important
purpose by providing real and tangible improvements in Kiberan communities quickly. Due to
their smaller scale, they are much easier to plan and implement than all-inclusive slum upgrading
programmes like the SSUP.

3.6 Conclusion
After considering the above slum upgrading initiatives it is clear that slum upgrading
initiatives that focus only on providing new infrastructure and housing are as ineffective as
treating skin cancer with band-aids. While it seems like building new housing for slum dwellers
will solve the problem of slums, in reality the problem spreads and multiplies under the
inappropriate treatment resulting from a mis-diagnosis caused by a poor patient-doctor
relationship. Time and time again non-comprehensive upgrade initiatives have failed to directly
benefit target beneficiaries, and more importantly and specifically, have failed to improve slum
dwellers’ long-term quality of life – the principle objective of every human settlement project.
The initial cause of these failures is economically based. Nice housing and infrastructure
is the most concrete and obvious improvement in slum dwellers’ well being.30 However this is
only one component of any family’s well being, and a component that is not necessarily the most
important, just the most obvious. A slum family that receives a new flat to live in within a
neighborhood that does not have sewage running in open ditches along narrow pathways has
outwardly improved its well being – the band-aid that covers the real problem. If that family
cannot or at best struggles to make financial ends meet, then having a nice(r) place to live has
30

This is the reason this kind of slum upgrading is luring to many governments, such as Kenya, who are interested
in providing tangible results fast, both to their donors and to their slum dwellers to win their financial and political
support respectively. A further discussion of this issue follows in Chapter 5.0, section 5.4 on the GoK.
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actually not improved that family’s livelihood since living in their new housing is not
sustainable, that is they will have to move out when they are pushed beyond their budget for rent.
Furthermore, a poor family living in a brand new flat is completely counter to the natural
economic forces at work in Kenya’s free-market capitalist economy, which controls rent rates.
Inherent market pressures exist on upgrade beneficiaries that often result in wealthier
families living in the improved housing (gentrification), making it no mystery why it has been so
difficult for some upgrade initiatives to actually help a large percentage of the project’s original
target beneficiary group. Either market forces put the rent of a flat in an upgraded neighborhood
at too high a price for slum dwellers to afford due to the lack of sufficient regulation and
subsidization (as was the case in the Kibera Highrise “upgrade”), or gentrification occurs: even
when slum dwellers are ensured to live in new housing built by an upgrading project, the option
of selling their rights to their flat to a wealthier family in order to make hard cash appears too
good and economically logical not to do.
Yet these economic forces are not new and need not thwart the Kibera-Soweto Slum
Upgrading Project (SSUP) and future slum upgrading projects of the KENSUP. A proper
diagnosis can be given if there is good dialog between the patient and doctor. Every community
has unique needs and interests that must be communicated to project facilitators, making every
slum upgrading project one of a kind. The best way for this information exchange to happen is
through a participatory process that not only involves but empowers the target beneficiary
community to take ownership in their project and engage in the decision-making process of
planning and designing their project, in addition to being highly involved in the project
implementation. This is at the heart of the current Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL).
Syagga, et al. support these conclusions, stating, “…most [upgrading] projects…have been
undertaken with minimum involvement of the beneficiaries in projects that were proved to be
economically and socially unsustainable. Thus, the challenge is to upgrade settlements in a way
that lends to social environment and economic sustainability at appropriate standards and in a
participatory fashion,” (NSA 22).
Therefore the focus of the KENSUP/SSUP ought to include an economic development
component and a participatory process involving strong dialog between the target beneficiaries
of Kibera-Soweto and the facilitating body, the GoK, which is certainly much easier said than
done. Fortunately, the KENSUP/SSUP do indeed state these objectives in their respective
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programme documents. The next chapter examines the plausible solution that the KENSUP
offers the 60,000 slum dwellers of Kibera-Soweto through the SSUP on paper, rooted in the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) that has recently (2000) become globally-accepted as the
best approach to human settlements upgrading.
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4.0 The new Initiative: The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) &
The Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP)

“The most significant and innovative aspect of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme is
the enabling of the slum dwellers and other stakeholder[s] to be fully and actively
involved in improving their own livelihoods and neighborhoods.”
-Hon. Raila Odinga, Minister of Roads, Public Works and Housing31

The preceding chapter gave a brief overview of the Government of Kenya’s previous
efforts to address the complex problems of Nairobi’s informal settlements. Although many
smaller scale projects have contributed to improving life in Kibera in small ways by providing
new pit latrines and concrete drainage ditches, few large scale slum upgrading projects both in
Kibera and the whole of Kenya have been successful at sustainably improving the lives of the
original target beneficiaries. The few that have been more successful, such as the project in Voi,
Kenya, have been smaller in scale and focused on community empowerment through a
participatory approach, building strong partnerships between stakeholders, and employing
community instead of individual land tenure schemes. This raises a critical eye to the current
KENSUP/SSUP initiative, which is attempting the largest comprehensive slum upgrading
programme Kenya has ever seen, motivated by the looming shadow of an ever growing slum
population in Nairobi and Kenya’s other urban centers.
This chapter explores what the KENSUP and SSUP are on paper and in theory, according
to the programme documents, press notices, and minutes from meetings between officials
involved in the project. The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), which is fully endorsed by
UN-Habitat and Syagga, et al. in the 2001 Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA), appears to be the
guiding theory behind the SSUP. This theory is summarized in the first section below in a
continuance of the policy timeline from the previous chapter. This chapter provides a basic
understanding of the KENSUP and leads into its critical analysis in the following two chapters.

31

From the 8 August KENSUP press notice in Nairobi’s East African Standard, (GoK and UN-Habitat P3).
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4.1 2000-Present: The Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) Approach to Slum Upgrading
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is the evolution of the 1990s development
experts’ questioning of what slum upgrading ought to entail. Encompassing components of past
strategies including participation, enablement, and privatization, SL wraps up the best of these
concepts with the notion that people are the starting point of all slum upgrading projects.
Moving away from John Turner’s original 1970s self-help slum upgrading mechanism
that gave the government a minimal role, in recognizing the value of every stakeholder in slum
upgrading, SL follows in line with Werlin’s theory that realizes the importance of a strong32
governmental role in slum upgrading to compliment the grassroots effort. Werlin thus advocates
a “bottom-up/top-down” development strategy in full realization of the weaknesses of a purely
self-help (bottom-up) urban upgrade scheme that lacks stability, policy foundation, and resources
that only a national government can provide for true sustainability. This approach also
recognizes the inadequacy of the private sector, NGOs, and international organizations in serving
the housing needs of the poor alone. Balance between the top and the bottom is key, however.
SL warns against government involvement becoming too centralized and authoritarian, which is
reminiscent of Kenya’s past upgrading failures.
SL realizes the complexity of slum development and the need for comprehensive
upgrading. The UN-Habitat affiliate, Cities Alliance, defines slum upgrading as a mechanism of
improving the well being of slum dwellers by focusing on “physical, social, economic,
organizational and environmental improvements undertaken cooperatively and locally among
citizens, community groups, businesses and local authorities.” Although physical upgrading of
infrastructure and housing remains a major component of slum upgrading and certainly improves
the quality of slum dwellers’ lives in a very real and tangible way, long-term sustainability of
poverty reduction requires social and economic development through education, training, and a
focus on supporting the growth of more income generation initiatives to allow households to
afford to stay in their upgraded neighborhood and maintain any new facilities constructed
through an upgrade.
Following SL’s key idea that people are the starting point, SL recognizes that every
community is different with unique needs and interests, meaning no two slum upgrading projects
32

This means better governance not bigger governance.
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will or should be the same. Therefore according to SL theoretical underpinnings, the only way a
slum upgrade project can be fully and completely successful is through a strong participatory
spirit of the residents that focuses much of the project’s time and energy on the preliminary
planning and designing phase since it is impossible for government officials to know a
community’s unique needs and interests without asking. This lines up with development
theorists James Scott, a Yale anthropologist and political theorist, and Peter Berger, a
sociological expert in social ethics.
Scott is against large-scale, state-run projects. His criticism is that these projects are
developed in a vacuum by “officials of the modern state” who are removed from the society they
govern. They therefore must rely on limited typifications of reality to make policy and project
decisions outside the specific interests and needs of the beneficiaries, (76). Leaders cannot lead
a project, programme, or a country for that matter without accurate information of what is
happening on the ground. In the case of the KENSUP and SSUP, that information resides with
the slum dwellers for whom the project is for.
Connecting to these ideas, Berger emphasizes and affirms the necessity of target
beneficiaries to play a major role in preliminary planning and decision-making processes. He
states, “Those who are the objects of policy [sh]ould have the opportunity to participate not only
in specific decisions but in the definitions of the situation on which these decisions are based,”
(xiii).
During project planning a given community’s unique situation ought to be examined by
both the project facilitators and the community. Possible solutions may be proposed and
discussed with all stakeholders in the community to identify the best way forward. At this time
local organizations such as NGOs and CBOs may step forward and offer leadership, facilitation,
guidance, and education when necessary to slum dwellers in the process of problem
identification, goal setting, assessment of available choices, and the process of community
decision making. In this manner of strengthening community relationships, slum dwellers are
supported and encouraged by the government (typically through local government) and other
stakeholders to step forward, to rise to the occasion, and are empowered with new capacities to
address and manage their own community upgrade project to improve their own livelihoods to
the fullest extent realistically possible. Ultimately, residents will counteract the vices of poverty
and poverty itself, which is the ultimate objective of comprehensive slum upgrading. Not only is
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slum dweller capacity building important for successful project completion but it is also vital for
its sustainability, as Saxena asserts, “The essence of participation is exercising voice and choice
and developing the human, organizational and management capacity to solve problems as they
arise in order to sustain the improvements,” (qtd. in Cornwall 6).
These main ideas and concepts comprising SL have been presented to the GoK and other
stakeholders in the massive 200 page Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA) document, which was
researched and written especially for the KENSUP in 2001. Moreover, the GoK has their own
policy driving the participatory approach to the KENSUP. Kenya’s 1996 Physical Planning Act
includes the provision that residents must be involved in the planning process for physical
development of their area, (Acttoki).

4.2 Objectives of the KENSUP and the SSUP
The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) is the current (2003-04) major
collaborative effort by the GoK and UN-Habitat to directly and systematically address the
informal settlement crisis in all of Kenya’s urban centers beginning in the capital, Nairobi.
Specifically, the village of Soweto within Kibera (one of thirteen villages housing about 60,000
people) was selected by a site selection committee in 2002 to be a possible starting place for this
nation-wide programme.33 Consequently, the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) is
the current and single major venture of the KENSUP and is therefore the focus of this analysis.
In addition to national social and development incentives, the KENSUP/SSUP is globally
motivated by the UN Millennium Development Goal Number 7, Target 11, to achieve “a
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020.”34
In initiating the KENSUP, the GoK acknowledged the existence of Kenyan slums and
their deplorable living conditions, the negative social and economic effects they have on the
country, and their failed past housing policies. In developing the KENSUP, the GoK stepped
forward to make a long-term commitment with the support of UN-Habitat to show its dedication
to achieving the programme’s principle objective:

33
34

For further discussion about how Kibera-Soweto was selected for the KENSUP, see Chapter 6.0, section 6.5.

Unfortunately with UN reports showing the number of global slum dwellers to double by 2030 to nearly twobillion people, even if this noble goal is achieved (which is unlikely), its gains will be immediately lost.
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“…to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in slums and informal
settlements in the urban areas of Kenya through promoting, facilitating, and where
necessary, providing security of tenure, housing improvement, income generation,
physical and social infrastructure, including addressing the problems and impacts of
HIV/AIDS,” (Government of Kenya and United Nations Human Settlements Programme,
KENSUP programme document).

The SSUP principle objective is the same as above but without the phrase “where
necessary,” as all of the points that follow that phrase have been deemed necessary in KiberaSoweto, (Government of Kenya and United Nations Human Settlements Programme, SSUP).
In accordance with SL, the KENSUP’s comprehensive approach incorporates six major
objective areas within the primary objective: secure tenure, housing improvement, income
generation, physical infrastructure, social infrastructure, and HIV/AIDS. Behind each are a
multitude of challenges and essentially individual projects, all slated to be addressed by the
SSUP.
As discussed above in relation to The Kibera Urban Environmental Sanitation Pilot
Project (KUESP) and John Turner’s original self-help slum upgrading mechanism, establishing
security of tenure is the most important component of any slum upgrade. Most housing-focused
organizations around the world agree that the provision of secure tenure is one of the most
important and fundamental steps in improving living conditions and protecting the human rights
of slum dwellers worldwide. In their Kibera report for the KUSEP project, Gitau and Olima note
that if the multitude of problems and conflicting interests on Kibera’s land are not directly
“addressed at the initial stages and carefully planned for and considered in the actual project,”
any upgrading project in Kibera would not only face problems and constraints in the
implementation phase, but would also jeopardize the project’s sustainability. Remembering
Kibera’s past violent conflicts due to insecure tenure revolving around forced evictions triggered
by the lack of rent payment by tenants allegedly between structure owners and tenants on rent
rates, Kibera is in more urgent need of secure tenure than some of Nairobi’s other informal
settlements. Recognizing this, a major goal of the KENSUP/SSUP is to give slum dwellers
secure tenure.
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Providing secure tenure in Kibera-Soweto is easy to write but extremely difficult to bring
to fruition. The programme documents state that Kibera-Soweto (and future KENSUP
settlements) “will be designated as ‘tenure secure Zone[s]’,” (Government of Kenya, KENSUP
8). This will only be an early temporary state until a consultative process with residents,
structure owners, and other stakeholders determine the most appropriate tenure system for
Kibera-Soweto. The main objective of the temporary “tenure secure Zone” is to “eliminat[e]
unlawful evictions and provid[e] certainty of residence,” (KENSUP 8). This is a very welcomed
position of the GoK by tenant slum dwellers and NGOs. A moratorium on all evictions in
Nairobi’s slums has been the long standing primary recommendation to the GoK by numerous
organizations, of note including the Federation of Slum Dwellers (Nairobi-based), Kituo cha
Sheria (legal service NGO), and Christ the King Church. However the provision of secure
tenure is not an end in itself. In staying consistent with the current Sustainable Livelihoods
Approach (SL) while also remembering the shortcomings of the minimized government role and
self-help focused schemes of the 1970s (site and service, and slum upgrading), the SSUP seeks
to be comprehensive by addressing the other components of sustainable settlement improvement.
Housing improvements will be aided by relaxing building standards and by-laws to allow
the use of locally available low-cost materials and technologies and encouraging co-operatives
for communal resource pooling. This point follows the example given by the Mathare 4A
project, discussed in the previous chapter.
A focus on income generation is one of the most important components of KENSUP’s
primary objective that sets it apart from past initiatives in following SL. Keeping in mind that a
major failure of past housing projects in Kenya is that they have been unaffordable for target
beneficiaries, recent development discussions have emphasized a focus on developing new and
creative methods for residents to generate higher incomes. Strategies to achieve this goal of the
SSUP include not restraining the informal economy, providing loans that have easy terms that
are both accessible and realistic to slum dwellers, using micro finance institutions to provide
these loans to help create new and grow existing small and medium enterprises in KiberaSoweto, and investing in human resource development through business support services,
(Government of Kenya, SSUP 7).
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Elements of the physical infrastructure objective include roads, water, sanitation and
storm water drainage, and security through means such as street lighting. These make up a large
part of the concrete improvements that beneficiaries as well as international donors like to see.
Included elements of the social infrastructure objective may include schools, health
clinics, social halls, and playgrounds. While these larger structures are possible avenues for
future KENSUP projects, the SSUP appears to be focused on housing and physical infrastructure
instead of schools, clinics, etc.
Part of the SSUP social component realizes Kibera’s own unique struggle with
HIV/AIDS. In 2001, UNICEF reported 50,000 AIDS orphans in Kibera alone. By specifically
mentioning HIV/AIDS in the KENSUP and SSUP programme documents, the GoK and UNHabitat create positive awareness and formal recognition for the complications of HIV/AIDS in
Kibera. However, comprehensively handling the HIV/AIDS issue in Kibera is beyond the scope
of the SSUP. Any real focus on these issues will need to continue coming from separate
government and UN initiatives, NGOs, CBOs, religious-based organizations, and other
international organizations. Several HIV/AIDS efforts are already established in Kibera
provided by various organizations. Providing more clinics and special treatment for HIV/AIDS
patients and families will not likely be the focus of the KENSUP Programme Secretariat (GoK)
in Kibera, while housing and infrastructure will.
Beyond the objectives directly geared towards the target beneficiaries, other SSUP
objectives revolve around improving the slum upgrading process for the KENSUP Replication
Phase, or future projects. Specific objectives include building the capacity of the KENSUP
institutional structure, strengthening the partnerships between stakeholders for future citywide
slum upgrades in Nairobi, and consolidating a range of upgrading policies and mechanisms to
streamline the process, (SSUP 3).
The key remains how the GoK will go about meeting all of the above objectives.
According to the programme and project documents, the KENSUP/SSUP Secretariat vows in
true SL rhetoric that, “All these [objectives] will be done through engaging full and active
participation of stakeholders,” (Government of Kenya, SSUP 3; KENSUP 5). As we will see in
Chapter 5.0, this is unfortunately very difficult to do.
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4.3 Background
Although the new National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) administration was swept into
office on the winds of change in January 2003 to peacefully oust the previous 24-year corrupt
and authoritarian KANU administration, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) was
actually initialized by the former President himself, Daniel arap Moi. The original slum
upgrading programme was called the “Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative.” This
came about from an initial meeting in November 2000 between former President Moi, and the
Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka. Resulting from this meeting were a
committee and a task force, created respectively by the GoK and UN-Habitat to discuss the
benefits of a partnership.
Upon the meeting of these two bodies in January 2001, it was decided to pursue the
development of a joint comprehensive slum upgrading initiative. The Joint Project Planning
Team (JPPT) was established to lead the effort until further institutional structuring developed.
Comprised of four members from both the GoK and UN-Habitat, the JPPT remains a key branch
of the current institutional framework of the KENSUP and SSUP.
In February 2001, President Moi officially announced the Collaborative Nairobi Slum
Upgrading Initiative. This later evolved into the Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading
Programme, which then developed into the current Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme
(KENSUP) that has a national scope.
Shortly after Moi’s announcement, the JPPT designated four phases of the initiative,
including the Inception Phase, the Preparatory Phase, the Implementation Phase, and the
Replication Phase. Despite the previous two years that the Collaborative Nairobi Slum
Upgrading Initiative was operating at the administrative level in the Inception Phase, the
KENSUP did not become official until 16 January 2003 with the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding between the GoK and UN-Habitat. The two leading bodies were represented by
Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, and Honorable Raila Odinga, both
the Minister of Roads, Public Works, and Housing, and the Member of Parliament (MP) for
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Kibera.35 It was at this signing that Minister Raila announced that Kibera-Soweto would be the
first slum to be upgraded under the KENSUP.36
Nonetheless, the effort that became the KENSUP produced numerous key documents
during the Inception Phase. This phase ran for the first year (2001) after the GoK and UNHabitat agreed on the collaborative upgrade initiative in January 2001. In line with the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), the Inception Phase focused on an effort to gather
information from diverse stakeholders in Nairobi to identify or develop the best strategies to be
used in this slum upgrading programme. Of these documents, the Nairobi Situation Analysis
(NSA) by Syagga, Mitullah, and Gitau (2001) is the largest (nearly 200 pages) and most valuable
to the programme. It examines nearly all angles of Nairobi’s informal settlements, including a
history and review of past and current upgrading strategies, providing invaluable information to
slum upgrading stakeholders. The NSA authors used a consultative process in gathering the
information for their report, but more importantly circulated a consultative version of their report
to all potential stakeholders and interested parties in Nairobi to stimulate debate and discussion
while generating diverse input on the city’s slum situation and how the KENSUP may address its
challenges in a sustainable manner. Input from this was incorporated into a finalized version of
the NSA.
Other documents include the Policy Framework for Slum Upgrading paper, which sought
to redress the shortcomings of the National Housing Policy and highlights the need for an
integrated development approach with special emphasis on the benefiting communities,37 the
Pilot Site Selection Process papers, and the Media Strategy paper.38
The Slum Upgrading Policy Report (2001) by the Task Force on Policy Framework
provided the GoK further key guidance on the importance of a SL development approach for the
35

Before President Kibaki and the NARC administration took over power in the GoK January 2003, Raila had
served as the Secretary General for NARC’s opposition, the KANU party, under Moi.
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Many NGOs involved in Nairobi’s informal settlements and the KENSUP are concerned about the political
implications of the KENSUP’s first upgrade taking place in Minister Raila’s own parliamentary constituency. See
Chapter 5.0, section 5.8.1 for further discussion.
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These ideas parallel those of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) endorsed as the best way forward by
Syagga et al. in the NSA.

38

It is quite amazing to know this document exists after this analysis has identified (below) the utter lack of
information on the ground in Kibera-Soweto throughout 2003 to be one of the main factors working against the
success of the SSUP.
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KENSUP. According to the report, “The improvement of shelter and [the] alleviation of poverty
[by] incorporating sustainable livelihood strategies, are recognized as crucial measures for
people living and working in slums and informal settlements,” (5). The KENSUP Task Force
suggested several key SL policy recommendations to the GoK including:

-Advancing local economic development through the promotion of income-generating
activities, access to credit, the strengthening of community-based financial systems, and
by providing the regulatory framework within government agencies to enable and
encourage small-scale industries and businesses (in the informal sector) to operate in
upgrading and resettlement areas. Furthermore, locally available materials and laborintensive methods shall be used for the whole upgrade.39

-The commitment that, “Beneficiaries will be involved and empowered in deciding their
priority needs to facilitate cost recovery once initial services are provided,” (5).

Although all the thinking, brainstorming, and theorizing that has gone into these
documents by numerous committees composed of people from diverse organizations and
stakeholder groups since 2001 is excellent, what really matters is the effectiveness in turning all
of these good ideas into concrete improvements. To this end, the GoK and UN-Habitat have
arranged an institutional structure for the KENSUP and its first project, the SSUP.

4.4 Institutional Structure
Given the complexity of the SSUP’s comprehensive nature and its responsibility of
managing a potential major transition of 60,000 individuals in Kibera-Soweto, an efficient and
agile institutional structure is mandatory for achieving the strong partnership and unity among
the SSUP stakeholders that SL and lessons from past projects identify as being critical for
sustainable success. The KENSUP institutional structure follows the tri-sector partnership

39

However it should be noted that this report and other reports do not call directly for the labor for the upgrade
construction to come from the community being upgraded. Although this was a provision of Turner’s original selfhelp slum upgrading mechanism used by the World Bank in the 1970s, the KENSUP recognizes the need for skillful
construction workers from private construction firms who may or may not live in the project area.
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strategy endorsed by Otiso (similar to the Mathare 4A project), involving the three major sectors
of public, private, and voluntary organizations. Based on the KENSUP and SSUP programme
documents, the following summarizes the institutional structure for this programme and project:

-Programme Secretariat – Established in the GoK Housing Department under the
Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing. The Secretariat is in charge of coordination and facilitation of project planning, implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation between the stakeholders, and will be the link to UN-Habitat.

-Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT) – Working with the Secretariat, this technical
team has been the center of activity and forward motion on the KENSUP.
Representatives comprising this team come from UN-Habitat, the Nairobi City Council
(NCC), the National Housing Corporation (GoK), and Shelter Forum (an NGO). They
have been in charge of defining the scope of the programme and the Kibera-Soweto
project thus far, of preparing schedules, proposals, budgets, and other “technical” aspects
of the KENSUP/SSUP.

-Project Implementation Unit (PIU) – Based in the Nairobi City Council (NCC)
Housing Development Department. This is to be the primary implementation body.

-Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) – This body will be the main
connection to and inlet for Kibera-Soweto resident participation in their slum upgrading
project. The unit will be composed of selected representatives from the Kibera-Soweto
community. Responsibilities include identifying all settlement stakeholders (such as
grassroots organizations) in their community and project needs. This unit will mobilize
grassroots participation, discuss land tenure arrangements, and outline procedures for
community involvement in carrying out the slum upgrading project. The SPIU(s) will
work closely with the PIU and Programme Secretariat.

-Inter-Agency Co-ordinating Committee (IACC) – The IACC works through subcommittees, working groups, and Ad Hoc task forces to provide policy and programme
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direction to the KENSUP/SSUP. The site selection sub-committee was one of these subcommittees. It will also establish “innovative ways” of facilitating the implementation of
KENSUP’s Slum Upgrading Projects.

-The Inter Agency Steering Committee (IASC) – This group will provide additional
guidance, facilitation and support to the Programme. It will specifically advise the two
head executives of the KENSUP/SSUP, the Minister of Housing, Raila Odinga, and the
Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Anna Tibaijuka.

-The Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG) – This component of the
KENSUP/SSUP institutional structure has played a key role of being the vital though
weak link to the community level in Kibera-Soweto by disseminating what information
MSSG members could about the KENSUP and SSUP. Members include representatives
from NGOs, the GoK, development agencies, private organizations, donors, and one
Kibera-Soweto community representative. As stated in the SSUP document, the MSSG
“provides a powerful mechanism for participatory decision-making and information
sharing,” (5).
-Adapted from the SSUP document, (5).

It should be noted here that this full institutional structure for the SSUP has not yet been
created as of April 2004. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the SPIU for Kibera has not
been formed nearly a year after the launch of the SSUP and the MSSG has been rendered
inactive by the GoK.

4.5 Funding
Funding for the Preparatory Phase of the SSUP (post January 2003) is coming primarily
from the Cities Alliance, a joint initiative between UN-Habitat and the World Bank including ten
donors comprised of international bilateral agencies.40 The initial grant of $240,000 meant for

40

Included are donor agencies from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, (GoK and UN-Habitat sign).
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preliminary procedures will not go towards actual provision of new or upgraded housing and
infrastructure. The GoK was to contribute an additional $60,000 to the Preparatory Phase
according to the SSUP document, and it is hoped that Soweto residents will mobilize funds to
contribute as well. All SSUP funds will be placed in a Trust Fund managed by a board of
directors yet to be determined.
Other international agencies and governments have funded past components of the
KENSUP Inception and Preparatory Phase,41 while others will step forward for the later
Implementation Phase. The Implementation Phase is estimated at US$2.1 million in the
KENSUP document or US$3.5 million in the SSUP document, interestingly both released in
March 2003 concerning the project in Kibera-Soweto. Either way, according to Makokha, as of
28 July 2003, donors for the SSUP Implementation Phase had not yet been sourced.

4.6 Favela Bairro, Rio de Janeiro: A comparative slum upgrading programme
The KENSUP is certainly not the world’s first large-scale urban informal settlement
upgrade programme. Favela Bairro42 is currently the largest upgrading programme in Latin
America, seeking to upgrade all medium-sized informal settlements in Rio de Janeiro by 2004,
(Riley et al.). Although this goal seems quite lofty and similar to that of the KENSUP, Favela
Bairro was launched in 1994, which gives an idea of the timeframe involved with this kind of
large-scale slum upgrading programme. Unlike the KENSUP, Favela Bairro is focused on one
city alone and is thus headed and facilitated by the Municipal Government of Rio de Janeiro
instead of the national government. This helps keep the programme decentralized and managed
closer to the target beneficiaries.
Of key interest, the programme has a specific focus away from Rio’s largest slums. The
programme leaders realize that their chances of success are significantly reduced in Rio’s largest
slums. Unlike the KENSUP, the Favela Bairro upgrade coordinators sought to begin with an
easier and more manageable pilot project before mustering up the confidence and gaining the
experience necessary to tackle Rio’s worst informal settlements in a separate initiative. This
suggests that the KENSUP’s site selection of Kibera-Soweto for the KENSUP’s starting point
41

For example, the August 2002 Nairobi Situation Analysis Supplementary Study: A Rapid Economic Appraisal of
Rents in Slums and Informal Settlements, (Syagga et al.) was funded by the Government of Belgium.
42

Favela is the term for informal settlement in Brazil.
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may not have been best due to Soweto’s intimate connections to greater Kibera, one of Africa’s
largest and most politically complex informal settlements.43
Both the Favela Bairro programme and the KENSUP are examples of a current global
trend towards complex large-scale slum upgrading projects. The KENSUP will ultimately
encompass all of Kenya’s slums under one programme. In the past, previous initiatives have
been more localized, especially during Kenya’s 1960s and 1970s self-help era.44 It appears that
the rising urgency and magnitude of urban poverty around the world has caused governments
and international organizations alike (such as UN-Habitat and the World Bank) to feel obligated
to respond to this massive crisis with equally massive programmes. The GoK must not,
however, take any of the alluring short cuts to a genuine SL approach that exist; the risk of
failure in Kibera-Soweto if short cuts are taken is simply too great.

4.7 Conclusion
From 2001 to 2003 the GoK and UN-Habitat created the KENSUP on paper to be a list of
noble and ambitious objectives, involving complex institutional arrangements based on globally
shared policy ideas, development theories, and urban poverty reduction strategies. These
development ideas, specifically those of slum upgrading, are shared by organizations large and
small ranging from UN-Habitat to small NGOs working in development. Although global
agreement and consensus on slum upgrading via SL is certainly a good thing for poverty
reduction efforts around the world, Riley, Fiori, and Ramirez note upon evaluation of the Favela
Bairro programme in 2001, “[there is] a widespread failure to explore the complexity of the
approaches they advocate,” (Sec.5). The KENSUP and SSUP have experienced just this. The
difficulties, conflicts of interest, and contradictions that have existed, currently exist, and will
exist in future stages of the large-scale, multi-sector KENSUP programme and SSUP project are
very real, and more importantly pose significant threats to their success in both Kibera-Soweto
and beyond. These difficulties and conflicting interests of the KENSUP/SSUP stakeholders are
examined in the next chapter.

43

The political underpinnings of Kibera-Soweto’s selection as the pilot project for the KENSUP are discussed
further in Chapter 6.0, section 6.5, “The KENSUP’s Site Selection Controversy.”
44

This is referring to countless other self-help development initiatives not specifically mentioned in this paper.
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5.0 Stakeholder Analysis

“…slum upgrading is ultimately about reaching consensus among groups with highly
divergent interests. That is, balancing the incentives and investment capabilities of the
structure owners, with the basic needs and human rights of the very poor, while at the
same time engaging the political will of the provincial administration and local
municipal council,”
-Syagga, Mitullah, and Gitau45

The KENSUP and SSUP were introduced in the last chapter as the current slum
upgrading initiative in Nairobi through an overview of both the programme (KENSUP) and its
pilot project (SSUP) as they existed on paper in 2003. This chapter comprises the first and
primary half of the analysis by individually examining each major stakeholder group in the
KENSUP/SSUP. Each stakeholder’s role, interests, motivations, and relative power as they
relate to the SSUP and larger KENSUP are examined. It will soon become clear how
contradictory various stakeholders’ interests are and why the SSUP has correspondingly
struggled in its early stages.
Building trust and unity within a common vision between all stakeholders is very
important for a truly successful and sustainable slum upgrade project. Trust and unity are also
vital concepts for good urban governance, (Rakodi, et al. 26). UN-Habitat Executive Director,
Anna Tibaijuka, states, “There is now an emerging international consensus that good governance
is a crucial pre-requisite for poverty eradication.” A successful participatory urban governance
process requires the inclusion and understanding of all relevant stakeholders, including their
interests, roles, and potential contributions, (UN-Habitat, Tools 22).
Cooperation that pushes becoming a kind of camaraderie between the various
stakeholders involved in the SSUP, and the KENSUP on the larger scale, is needed to achieve
the shared objectives of all involved in the SSUP. Fractured actors will inevitably work counter
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From: Nairobi Situation Analysis Supplementary Study: A Rapid Economic Appraisal of Rents in Slums and
Informal Settlements, (5).
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to the benefit of Kibera’s poor. As an old African parable goes, “It is the grass that suffers when
two elephants fight.”

5.1 Tenants
“If there are international organizations that wish to help build houses in Kibera through
the Government, let the Government accept, if the Government first empowers the
citizens.”
-Ignatius Namenje, Kiberan Tenant46

Of all the SSUP stakeholders, it ought to be quite clear that the urban poor of KiberaSoweto, as the target beneficiaries, are the most important of all the stakeholders. They are the
reason that the GoK and UN-Habitat have spent over three years developing and preparing for
the KENSUP during its Inception Phase. UN-Habitat affirms this logic throughout their
publications.47 As it is, tenants comprise the clear majority of Kibera-Soweto’s residents – 80%
according to Bodewes, (Social and Cultural Analysis no pag.). Out of this majority,
approximately 60% are between the ages of 10 and 24, according to Khasiani of Kenya’s
Population Studies and Research Institute. Tenants pay monthly rent to structure owners who
usually hire agents to collect rents.
The main interests of Kibera-Soweto tenants include fulfilling their basic human rights to
adequate shelter, security, and freedom from forceful eviction, all of which are not presently met.
Related priority interests are having inexpensive rent rates to allow enough money for other
living expenses, and living in a location that allows walking to work to cut out transportation
costs. The fulfillment of these latter two interests is why most people are living in Kibera slum
in the first place.
Tenants are the poorest group in Kibera, making an average of $1.00-$3.00 a day.48
According to Bodewes and Goux, only about 17% of Kiberans are formally employed, leaving
the majority of slum dwellers to work in the informal sector as casual workers. These residents
46

Interview with the author, 27 June 2003.
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One document, for example, is Guidelines on how to undertake a National Campaign for Secure Tenure, (6).
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From Bowdewes, Social and Cultural Analysis (no pag.), however these figures are popularly accepted as
Kibera’s average by multiple sources.
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work without employment benefits as welders, painters, housemaids, food and consumer product
venders, etc. Since the average Kiberan family spends approximately $1.40 (100 Ksh) on food a
day (between 50-100% of an individuals income), even with multiple income earners, families
are left with a very tight budget to cover other living expenses like rent, (Bodewes, Social and
Cultural no pag.). These numbers make it clear that any fluctuation in rent rate can seriously
disrupt a family’s budget.
According to a 2003 study by Goux, a UN-Habitat researcher, rents in Kibera-Soweto
were cheaper than Kibera’s average, which is $8.00-$16.00 or 575-1150 Ksh per month. Most
tenant families in Soweto paid between $7.00-$9.00 or 500-650 Ksh per month for a ten square
foot single room, (9). An average single room houses five to eight people, the size of most
families. However in tough times, residents are always willing to help family and friends by
sharing their space if they are collectively able to pay rent. The bottom line is that tenants will
oppose the SSUP if they think their rents will go up. Therefore, the SSUP must be designed in
such a way to avoid this natural economic tendency of improved housing.
Unfortunately, rents in Kibera-Soweto have already risen due to people wishing to
benefit from the SSUP. Gentrification slowly began after Minister Raila’s 11 February 2003
announcement that new housing in Athi River (35km from Nairobi) was becoming part of the
Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP). According to Goux’s study for UN-Habitat, as
of June 2003 (before the Preparatory Stage of the SSUP officially started), some Soweto
structure owners were already asking $2.80 (200 Ksh) or 35% more per month for a one-room
rental, (12). Although the Athi River component of the SSUP has since been dropped,49 some
original tenants have already been displaced, which deserves special attention by the
KENSUP/SSUP Secretariat and other top officials. As difficult as it may be to enforce, the
SSUP ought to limit project benefits to tenants who have been living in Kibera-Soweto before
January 2003 when the pilot project site of Kibera-Soweto was first announced.
A major advantage to tenants living in Kibera is its prime location between Nairobi’s city
centre and the industrial area, where most Kiberans with formal employment and some casual
laborers work. Nearby, higher income residential areas provide residents with other jobs such as

49

See the section 6.3.4 of Chapter 6.0 titled, “The Athi River Controversy,” for further discussion of this old project
component.
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house cleaning, cooking, and security. Being close enough to walk to work, Kibera provides a
special attraction to both migrants and residents of other informal settlements, which keep its
population growing and stress on its people and resources building.
Politically, tenants tend to give their vote and support to those politicians who simply
provide some type of short-term incentive. This rampant use of bribery makes tenants
particularly vulnerable to extensive political exploitation. In the past, tenants and resident
structure owners alike in Kibera have been politically manipulated or pacified with 500 Ksh
notes (about $7) to vote a certain way or to not protest an issue, (Darr). In an interview
regarding his 2001 song criticizing corruption in Kenya, songwriter Eric Wainaina said, “Nchi ya
Kitu Kidogo, if there is one thing that Kenyans live under it’s the fear of challenging authority.
By singing, I showed that it’s possible to stand up and speak without putting your life in danger,”
(qtd. in Lacey). It is this fear that Wainaina talks about that has kept Kiberans quiet and pacified
by their own supposed freely elected representatives.
Kibera’s key political figure is their Member of Parliament (MP), who also happens to be
the Minister for Roads, Public Works, and Housing, and the head Government executive for the
KENSUP, Honorable Raila Odinga. Raila is from western Kenya, which is the same region most
of Kibera’s tenants call home. In the past, Raila has typically favored tenants over structure
owners in his constituency. At times this has benefited tenants. Yet it is argued by some that
this is just a way to exploit Kibera as a voter bank. Although this may be an unwarranted
assumption at present since the author does not know Raila’s true intentions, the Minister’s
political connections to Kibera ought to be an area of major concern for all involved in and
monitoring the SSUP. The NGO Coalition on Urban Land/Housing Rights Campaign expressed
its awareness and concerns on this matter at a July 2003 meeting.50 These political
complications will be further discussed in various sections throughout the rest of this paper.
The economic power division between tenants and structure owners runs deep. Since the
“tenant-landlord” scheme in Kibera is unofficial and illegal, structure owners resort to the threat
and use of forced eviction to enforce rent payment from their tenants, often with the help of local
authorities (including chiefs [national government] and city councilors) and their incited youth
thugs. One eviction victim, a single mother of three named Jael Mutiso, explains her situation as
50

The NGO Coalition’s meeting will be further discussed below in the NGO stakeholder section, section 5.8.1.
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quoted by the Daily Nation, “They burnt down my house at night with all my belongings. I
cannot go back and have nowhere to go…,” (qtd. in Onguje 24).
Since the demand for inexpensive housing is so high in Nairobi, tenants often feel
exploited by their structure owners. Tenants’ housing structures are congested, have no running
water or electricity, often have leaking roofs, and usually have grossly inadequate sanitation
through shared pit latrines. Moreover, structure owners in Kibera typically do not invest in
improvements to their shanty structures, allowing them to reap large profits, (Syagga, et al., NSA
Supplement 44). Indeed, many tenants are powerless and must “take or leave” whatever shelter
is offered. Kiberan resident and tenant, Jacob Amayo Mack’Amayo, explains his take on the
political-economic difficulties between Kiberan tenants and structure owners shortly after
tension boiled over into violent clashes in December 2001:

Structure owners have oppressed us so much and the anger you see here is of the exploited tenants. In the
first place, you live in trenches (mtaro) with no toilets but the owner wants some deposit as conditionality
for moving into their structures. Once in the structures, KANU [the ruling government party at the time]
youths are hired to evict you, the tenants for any delays in monthly rental remittance. They brutalize and
cut people at night, (qtd. in Onguje 45).

Supporting Amayo’s experience, Christ the King Church notes, “we have also observed
the formation of groups who are primarily engaged in criminal activity and thuggery, with many
having close affiliation to political parties and local authorities in Kibera,” (Memorandum 9
Oct.2003). It is usually these groups, incited by the political authorities they are connected to,
that are responsible for forceful evictions of tenants and other violent encounters within Kibera.
The authorities’ motivations for inciting violence revolve around both maintaining the politicaleconomic status quo by keeping order by any means possible in an otherwise chaotic living
situation, and the desire to build additional political power. These local political groups,
composed primarily of young men, play a key role in Kibera’s political power structure, explored
further in the next chapter. Although positive groups have also formed, such as those discussed
below in section 5.9, “Community-Based Organizations,” Christ the King Church has observed
the negative groups to be more prominent within the Kiberan community.
As is common in all of Nairobi’s slums, in addition to being economically divided,
tenants in Kibera-Soweto are also ethnically divided from their structure owners. According to
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Goux, tenants in Kibera-Soweto are primarily Luyha and fewer are Luo, both from western
Kenya, (7). As for Soweto’s structure owner composition, Goux found most to be Kikuyu, with
a small proportion of Kamba and Luyha, (11).
Many Luos and Luyha have moved to Nairobi within the past two decades. Similar to
most of Kibera, Bodewes’s 2003 study found 80% of Kibera-Soweto’s residents to have moved
directly from rural areas, most from western Kenya, with the rest having moved from other
slums within Nairobi, (Social no pag.).
The Luo and Luyha ethnic groups of western Kenya, among others, retain strong
connections to their rural home area. In fact most tenants of Kibera-Soweto do not identify their
urban houses as their homes even if most of their time is spent in their city houses. In their view,
their rural residences in the up-country are their true homes. Some tenants view their time in
Nairobi as only temporary; they plan to work for several years to make and save money to then
go back to their rural homes. Many send part of their earnings back to their rural home areas
where hard cash is in extreme shortage. Like most Luos, in an interview with the author Kiberan
tenant Namenje explained that he would prefer to live back “home” if his rural area in western
Kenya was more developed and had job opportunities. He proposes that businesses in Nairobi
could de-centralize and move to the rural areas to aid economic development outside of Kenya’s
major urban centres.
As Namenje implies, urban and rural development are directly linked. For example,
some tenants have a house or plans to build a house in their rural home area, preferring to invest
their income and energy there instead of in Nairobi. As slum dwellers this makes their living
conditions more tolerable, causing them to have less concern over the condition and maintenance
of their urban house than they would otherwise. This is an interesting fact that must be taken
into account as the urban poor’s contribution to the perpetuation of Nairobi’s slums. This
cultural aspect of some of Kibera’s tenants could limit their willingness to participate and take
ownership in the SSUP process. Yet it must also be considered that most slum dwellers simply
do not have the option of investing in an urban home. High expense and the unavailability of
land make legal urban home ownership an unreachable goal for nearly all Kiberan tenants. The
urban poor entertain goals of returning to their rural homes because those areas offer real
possibilities for an autonomous life, above all including ownership of land and a house. While
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these rural-urban linkages are very important to consider for the slum upgrading process in
Kibera, further exploration of them is beyond the scope of this paper.
Most Kiberan slum dwellers maintain fears that any new slum upgrading initiative will
have negative effects on their lives. This fear is warranted and comes directly from the
experience and outcomes of several previous housing projects that have left other slum dwellers
not only with empty promises of an improved life, but actually in a worse state than before the
upgrade attempt.
Of special relevance to the tenants of Kibera-Soweto is the Nyayo/Kibera Highrise
upgrade project, which was completed in the mid-1990s.51 As discussed in further detail above
in Chapter 3.0, section 3.5.1.1, this housing project borders Kibera-Soweto village. Many of the
current Soweto tenants were permanently displaced by the Kibera Highrise project that never
fulfilled its initial primary objective to benefit them largely due to unaffordable rent prices.
Moreover, those who relocated for the new Kibera Highrise flats had to go through the hassles
and insecurities of relocating to a new slum or finding space in a different part of Kibera without
a resettlement plan. This has made the tenants of Kibera-Soweto especially leery of governmentled slum upgrading projects.
More detrimental to a displaced family’s survival than having to find new housing, is the
disruption to their source of income. As mentioned above, most Kiberans earn their living
through small informal businesses, making the effect of the upgrade on their businesses a special
concern for the majority of tenants. Some of the additional difficulties of temporary relocation
for informal sector entrepreneurs come to light when considering kiosk owners who retail food
and many other goods. While some run their small businesses from their residences if they have
a good location on a busy pathway, many have a separate kiosk space that requires additional
rent. For the latter group, upon relocation they must also relocate their kiosk (if demolition and
new housing construction takes place as it did with the Kibera Highrise project), which means
the challenge of finding a new space and structure owner from whom to rent. Location is
naturally one of the most important factors of business success, and upon relocation, both
residential and kiosk rental entrepreneurs must struggle to establish a new clientele, taking a
major hit on an already fragile income source.
51

See photo six on page v for an image of the Kibera Highrise project.
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Furthermore, if an upgrade or housing project that provides brand new living units is
successful, tenants will have to move a second time from their temporary resettlement site into
the new housing, meaning also a second re-establishment of their businesses. For those who
depended on selling from their residential locations, further difficulties will be found in living on
the second or higher floor of a new apartment building where customers are not likely to come.
These are just a few of the issues facing Kiberan tenants, which clearly exemplifies the absolute
necessity for the SSUP Secretariat to consult the Kibera-Soweto residents for their input into the
project and ensure their genuine participation during the planning and design phase. KiberaSoweto tenants have unique and specific needs and interests, both in terms of desired housing
architecture and in business location options.
A group of Kibera’s entrepreneurs actually put their needs forward to the GoK. After
Minister Raila’s August 2003 announcement of the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project
(SSUP), tenants and structure owners alike with small businesses that will be disrupted by the
SSUP asked the Government for alternative sources of income and a guarantee that they will get
the new structures after the upgrading is finished, (Amran 2). According to Amran, the tenants
were in agreement with the structure owners in vowing not to move until the GoK met their
conditions. To the author’s knowledge, the GoK had not developed a plan to specifically address
this issue as of April 2004.
Another important issue that the SSUP must address is the economic incentives facing
tenants that threaten to derail the achievement of the project’s principle objective. If an upgrade
programme were successful in offering slum dwellers brand new housing units based on Kenya’s
housing policy standard of two rooms plus its own kitchen and toilet52 instead of improving
existing housing stock, although the GoK could try, it is unlikely that the beneficiaries’
occupation of such units could be enforced. Large economic incentives would create a gray
market for selling rights to the flats. In this unofficial mini housing market for the upgraded flats
in Kibera-Soweto, slum dwellers would have enormous incentive to make fast cash by selling
their right to a housing unit to someone of a higher economic and social class.
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This housing standard was originally created in the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1966/7 titled, “Housing Policy in
Kenya.” The housing standard included an interpretation of Kenya’s Public Health Act, which also provided the
legal justification of slum demolition in the 1960s and 70s.
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Not only is hard cash the commodity in highest demand and the most difficult to secure
when working in the informal economy, but it gives people a choice in how to invest it – which
for many is sending it to their rural homes. In terms of physical conditions, most Kiberans have
adapted to the slum lifestyle. For these people, brand new housing units are not necessarily their
top priority. Often other monetary priorities like school fees, supporting family and friends both
new to Nairobi and back at their rural homes, and investing more in their informal business often
all are more urgent and important to Kiberans than taking a new flat to live in, which has been
pushed in front of them by the Government on a gilded silver platter without their asking.53 This
drives home why it is so important for the SSUP and other similar slum upgrading projects to
foster a real sense of ownership and incentive for self-investment among the benefiting
community so as to work as a counter force to economic incentives such as these that frustrate
the SSUP’s objectives.
The best way to cater to the Kibera-Soweto community is to engage them in the planning
process of the SSUP. The facilitation of their decision-making process is necessary to identify
and come to agreement as to how they as a community want to benefit from the SSUP, what the
actual fruit of the SSUP effort might look like, and most importantly in deciding how to get from
here to that agreed upon end product.
Contributing to the tenants’ needs, most residents of Kibera-Soweto lack any college
education and many have not finished secondary school since it was only made free in January
2003 after NARC took office. Most importantly, nearly all tenants and Kibera residents in
general do not understand how the slum upgrading process is supposed to work. This should
come as little surprise to the reader. Much of this is due to both the lack of successful examples
and the abundance of failed housing initiatives and violent confrontations with the local
authorities. Although the residents certainly have an obligation to participate and engage
themselves in the SSUP process, the leading organizations must first empower residents to
become the active participants called for by the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), by at
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to address Nairobi’s housing crisis, the GoK moved back to the provision of all new housing for slum upgrading in
the mid 1990s. This policy momentum now threatens the SSUP.
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the very least educating residents on what slum upgrading is and how the process works within
the KENSUP/SSUP structure.
This is where experts from other SSUP stakeholders such as experienced shelter-focused
NGOs, UN-Habitat, and the GoK could come together with the Soweto community. This
collaborative effort could happen in a way that would share the responsibility of managing such
a challenging process, and would also generate ideas with the Soweto community about possible
options available for the SSUP process and its end product. Namenje, an eight-year Kiberan
resident agrees with this SL-based process. In an interview, Namenje called on his Government
to firstly empower its citizens, “If there are international organizations that wish to help build
houses in Kibera through the Government, let the Government accept, if the Government first
empowers the citizens.”
A key point in facilitating the process of generating community input is that contrary to
the beliefs of some upper GoK officials, slum dwellers cannot always rely on the local
government in Kibera (including chiefs and city councilors) to represent their interests. As will
be illustrated by comparing this section to the “Local Authorities” section below, chiefs and city
councilors have their own interests that are often quite different from tenants’. Therefore, it is in
the interest of the Kibera-Soweto tenants that their local government leaders are not substituted
for authentic community input, which the GoK has a tendency of doing. An authentic
involvement of the Kibera-Soweto community in the development of the SSUP is the approach
advocated by SL and endorsed by the GoK and UN-Habitat on paper, making it the only clear
path forward.

5.2 Structure Owners
Structure owners in Kibera-Soweto, like those in Nairobi’s other informal settlements,
have a quasi-legal right of occupation granted in writing by the Provincial Administration or no
right at all. Most structure owners are in the second grouping, most having paid a bribe or ongoing cut from their rent earnings to the local chief and/or city councilor to obtain and maintain a
plot(s) in Kibera-Soweto to rent out to tenants for a monthly fee. Either way, from the structure
owners’ point of view, their ownership is legit and valid because they had to make an investment
to “buy” their plots.
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An investment is exactly how structure owners view ownership of structures in KiberaSoweto. As it is, Kibera is the most profitable housing investment in Nairobi. Syagga, et al. in
the NSA Rapid Economic Appraisal of Rents in Slum and Informal Settlements, report Kibera to
have the highest return of any housing investment in greater Nairobi, coming in between 102 and
130% annually as compared to 60-80% annual returns from other informal settlements in
Nairobi, (15). The high demand for Kibera housing comes in part due to its prime location,
cheap rents, and excellent market to sell goods due to its enormous population of 700,000. The
fact that most structure owners are not required to (since they do not legally own the land) and
therefore do not invest any money into the structures themselves, only adds to the profitability of
renting out rooms in Kibera.
These lucrative profits have attracted many wealthy investors to Kibera, who each owns
many row buildings comprising about ten to twenty rooms each. According to the NSA Rapid
Economic Appraisal report, a single room costs roughly $175 (12,686 Ksh) for structure owners
to buy, (cited in Mbaria, Slum Housing). However it is difficult to know how bribes are worked
in since every informal arrangement between a structure owner and the local authorities is
unique, not to mention every structure’s value is different depending on varying quality: mud
versus cement floor, metal door or gate for security versus none, leaky versus water-tight roof,
etc.
In order to protect their investment, structure owners must bribe the necessary political
and violent powers to be of service when others might encroach on their structures or their
financial returns. The violent powers typically comprise youth thugs, who are hired to enforce
monthly rental payments through threatened and actual forceful evictions, as described in the
“Tenants” section above.
In protecting their investment, it is in the interest of structure owners to gain security of
land tenure from the GoK by receiving or buying land title. After Minister Raila announced the
launch of the upgrade in Kibera, (6 August, 2003) Amran reported in the East African Standard
that structure owners asked the Government for title deeds and compensation for their structures
if they are to be given up as part of the SSUP as Raila demanded, (2). Those owners referred to
by Amran went so far as to agree with tenants (who have their own conditions) to vow not to
move until the GoK met their conditions.
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There are several types of structure owners in Kibera-Soweto. The two main
classifications are absentee and resident. Absentee structure owners do not live in the
community and rarely visit. Instead, they often hire agents to collect their rents and manage their
structures. Often tenants do not know who their structure owner actually is. Although most
structure owners in Kibera are absentee, Kibera-Soweto has a relatively high percentage of
resident structure owners. According to a study by Bodewes, 70% of the structure owners live in
the Soweto community, compared to the 85% of Kiberan structure owners who are absentee,
(Social no pag.). Ethnically both Bodewes and Goux found Kikuyu and Kamba (less so) to
comprise Soweto’s structure owner population, with no Nubians (the original settlers of Kibera
dating back to World War I).
Most structure owners are starkly politically and economically divided from their tenants.
In Kibera as a whole, according to a study by Mugo (2000) as phrased by Syagga, et al., “…out
of a sample of 120 landlords [Kiberan structure owners] interviewed 57% were public officials
(government officers and politicians)…[who have] enough influence to ensure they are not
displaced,” (Supplementary 15). Most of these public officials are absentee structure owners
who are in for the excellent investment payback. Yet chiefs and assistant chiefs are also
government officers, who live right in Kibera.
Comprising only 20% of the total Kibera-Soweto population, structure owners are clearly
some of the most powerful people in Nairobi’s informal settlements, following only after
members of the GoK Provincial Administration. Unlike tenants who are some of Nairobi’s
poorest citizens, many structure owners fit into the middle to upper class. The divide is less so
for residential structure owners who are closer in socioeconomic status, often live in similar
conditions, and in some cases live in the same structure as their tenants. With economic power
comes political power through the adept ability to finance necessary bribes to city councilors,
chiefs, and the rest of the way up the Provincial Administration’s chain of command as necessary
to advance their interests, focused on economic gain and the protection of their investment.
Although in Kibera the best money-making opportunities for this stakeholder group most
likely lie in maintaining the status quo, Syagga, et al. note, “…upgrading usually confers more
powers to the landlords/structure owners with the tenants ultimately getting pushed out of the
project due to the increased rents,” (NSA 176). However, due to a lack of information and
dialogue between the GoK, UN-Habitat, and the Kibera-Soweto community, structure owners (as
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with tenants) have been left in the dark as to SSUP details, including most importantly, how they
will or could benefit from the project and be involved with it. Therefore, since the KENSUP and
SSUP appear focused on helping tenants with little mention of structure owners, the latter group
has a growing fear of losing their investments and most importantly their financial security based
on monthly income from rents.
To differing degrees of severity, structure owners’ incomes depend on the rents they
charge. Not all structure owners are wealthy. Some claim rent earnings as their only source of
income. This must be respected on an equal level as tenant small business owners who will also
need alternative income sources during the upgrade. Understanding their interest in maintaining
their current status of living for their families, it is no wonder that the majority of structure
owners are very much in opposition to the SSUP.
Following the precedent set in the Mathare 4A upgrade, structure owners ought to be
compensated for their structural and financial losses. The NSA Supplementary Study also
supports that structure owners should be compensated for their losses, however it implies that
only some of a given structure owner’s structures will need to be given up to “de-densify”
Kibera-Soweto for the upgrade project, an issue that will ultimately depend on the decisions
make by the community through the Settlement Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). In
reality, structure owners must be compensated or else they will never support the SSUP.
Without the backing of Soweto’s second most powerful stakeholder group (second only to
political leaders), it will be impossible for the SSUP to succeed in its objectives. Worse still, if
the GoK does not work with structure owners to ensure that they will clearly benefit from the
SSUP, the slumlords will actively work against it.
Unfortunately, on 6 August 2003, Minister Raila appeared to take an opposing position
on Kibera’s structure owners instead of building a cooperative partnership. In his
announcement, Raila told structure owners they had six months to resign the Government land
that their structures occupy, (Amran). Unless Kibera-Soweto structure owners own structures in
other Kiberan villages or other Nairobian slums, Minister Raila asked Kibera’s structure owners,
contrary to the NSA (the major work guiding the KENSUP with policy recommendations), to
simply give up all the land that their structures are on (and presumably their actual structures and
monthly rents) without any compensation. Creating unnecessary tension, Raila has threatened
the future of the SSUP with his decision to take a hard-nosed, authoritarian-type stance on the
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SSUP instead of building much-needed unity among the stakeholders through his role as head
GoK official on the SSUP.
Six months later in February 2004, forceful evictions approved by Honorable Raila took
place in and around Kibera, however not for the purposes of the SSUP. After one month, much
outrage from human rights groups, and a communication between the Pope and President Kibaki,
the evictions were temporarily stopped.54 This rash action from the GoK has left structure
owners in more fear of losing their structures and investments, confused along with most of the
Kiberan community, and most importantly, more leery and untrusting of the Kenyan
Government than ever as leader of the SSUP.
Realizing Kiberan structure owners’ growing opposition, an extraordinary effort is
required to ensure that this stakeholder group is well informed and included in the project.
Regrettably, this has not yet happened as of April 2004 and worse, there has been no effort by
the GoK to actively involve either tenants or structure owners from Kibera-Soweto on the SSUP
at all. As a result, structure owners in Kibera-Soweto and likely from other Kiberan villages
(due to the misunderstanding that the whole Kibera settlement was to be upgraded by the
KENSUP) have already been organizing against the SSUP. Christ the King Parish is aware of at
least one group of Kiberan structure owners that was meeting weekly, as of September 2003, to
pool resources for a temporary injunction against the SSUP, (Memorandum 9 Oct.).
The potential of this stakeholder group to completely derail the SSUP is real and must be
taken seriously. For example, in Korogocho (a slum on Nairobi’s north end), structure owners
permanently stalled a community-based housing upgrade being lead by an NGO called Pamoja
Trust in August 2000. They accomplished this by organizing and attaining a court order to stop
the social and physical mapping of the community, a critical stage that the SSUP is currently in,
(Memorandum 9 Oct.; GoK and UN-Habitat, “The Kenya…” press notice). This reiterates how
critical it is for the three key administrative members of the KENSUP/SSUP – the Programme
Secretariat, the JPPT, and the PIU (the GoK, UN-Habitat, and the NCC) – to organize
themselves to collaborate with the structure owners in Kibera-Soweto to strategize how the
structure owners will benefit from the SSUP. The best way to initially connect with structure
owners would likely be through a blanket effort to connect with the whole Kibera-Soweto
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community, which would have the distinct goal of generating ideas and possible arrangements
for the SSUP through dialoging, ultimately working towards a consensus in which both structure
owners and tenants will benefit.

5.3 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme: UN-Habitat
“Our main business is the people of Kibera and how best they can improve their living
conditions…The [Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading] programme is for the people of
Kibera, by the people of Kibera.”
-Mr. David Kithakye, UN-Habitat Human Settlement Advisor55

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (commonly referred to as UNHabitat) is the United Nation’s programme agency specializing in shelter and urban
development. It is focused on ameliorating the multitude of problems stemming from massive
urban growth in the developing world and providing adequate shelter to all. UN-Habitat was
only recently raised to full Programme status in the UN system on 1 January 2002 by UN
General Assembly Resolution A/56/206, (UN-Habitat web). This happened after the launch of
the Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative (the precursor to the KENSUP). Prior to
that this UN body was known as the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS),
which was created at the Habitat I meeting in Vancouver, 1978.
Since UN-Habitat is fairly new on the scene of development in its present form, there is a
reasonable amount of pressure on the organization to develop a good reputation. To achieve this,
the organization must perform, produce results, and succeed in its endeavors. This pressure
comprises both external and internal forces. The most obvious pressure comes from the
international donor community who largely funds UN-Habitat’s programmes through affiliate
international organizations such as Cities Alliance, the main funding source of the KENSUP.
Other pressure comes from the UN General Assembly and international experts who developed
the Programme’s responsibilities and goals in the political document known as the Habitat
Agenda at the 1996 Habitat II conference on cities in Istanbul, Turkey.
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While UN-Habitat is involved in some 154 technical programmes and projects in 61
countries around the world addressing shelter, urbanization, and good governance activities, the
KENSUP is the largest slum upgrading programme that the organization has undertaken since its
status was changed in 2002. Although every organization that undertakes a project puts its
reputation on the line, UN-Habitat is in a more vulnerable position than some stakeholders due to
both its youth as a full UN Programme, and the large scope and high profile of the
KENSUP/SSUP. With Nairobi as UN-Habitat’s world headquarters, there is an additional
pressure to perform well since the organization is physically close to the project.
Human Settlements Advisor of UN-Habitat, David Kithakye, knows that Habitat’s
reputation is on the line with the Kibera-Soweto Upgrade Project (SSUP). In an interview with
the author, instead of focusing on the potentially strong role that UN-Habitat could play in such
an important slum upgrading project with its expert advice rooted in extensive experience and
theoretical expertise in urban development strategies and methods, not to mention their physical
proximity to the SSUP, Kithakye emphasized the distance between UN-Habitat and the SSUP.
This emphasis seemingly acknowledges the questionable path the SSUP was headed down at that
time, 10 July 2003, and continues to head down into 2004. Kithakye stated multiple times in his
interview that UN-Habitat is only supporting a Kenyan Government project. If representatives
of UN-habitat went to Kibera, they would only be supporting the process of the Government of
Kenya.
This perspective is not unique to Mr. Kithakye. Marie Goux, Ph.D. student and UNHabitat intern, also witnessed this UN-distancing from the SSUP from the inside of the
organization, (personal interview). Moreover, on 17 June 2003, other representatives from UNHabitat met with parish leaders from Christ the King Church in Kibera-Line Saba in answer to
the parish’s request for information on the SSUP. According to the Church’s memorandum to
Archbishop Giovanni Tonucci on 9 October 2003, “The Habitat representatives started th[e]
meeting by insisting that the UN had no project in Kibera and stated it was the project of the
Government of Kenya,” (5). Similarly, Kithakye stated in his interview that the SSUP was
hardly a UN-Habitat project at all, but went further to say that it was also hardly a GoK project
either. He said that the SSUP is really the Kiberan slum dwellers’ upgrading project, “The
programme is for the people of Kibera, by the people of Kibera.”
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Unfortunately this is far from the truth on the ground. In the minds of many of the target
beneficiaries and supposed project owners (the tenant slum dwellers of Kibera-Soweto), the
SSUP is another abstract GoK project that is being pushed on them from the top-down, quite
contrary to the project’s propaganda (see Appendix I). Further discussion of this paradox is
found throughout the preceding and following sections.
Despite the seemingly contradictory non-involved stance of UN-Habitat on the SSUP,
some distancing is warranted. Kithakye’s emphasis of disassociation brings to light UNHabitat’s real fundamental political weakness in the KENSUP as well as in its other partner
projects, despite the fact that UN-Habitat is the other half of the KENSUP partnership.
According to Article V and XI of the Memorandum of Understanding Between UN-Habitat and
the GoK, the GoK is the body that holds ultimate responsibility for the KENSUP and SSUP, the
realization of its objectives, and the bearing of all Programme risks with limited exceptions,
(6,10). The chief role of UN-Habitat in the KENSUP and SSUP is thus limited to project funder
and technical supporter.
Yet UN-Habitat’s role cannot be completely downplayed. UN-Habitat is a member of
the Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT) (the main decision making body next to the Secretariat
of the KENSUP) along with the NCC, the GoK, and Shelter Forum. The JPPT worked and
continues to work with the KENSUP Secretariat (based in the GoK’s MoRPWH) to define the
scope and details of the SSUP. UN-Habitat has been a leader in developing recent urban
development strategies and theories, including the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). In
keeping with SL, UN-Habitat’s main theme stresses the importance of strategically involving
slum residents in their own upgrade. These great ideas are not only well developed and
emphasized in UN-Habitat’s own literature, but also in the actual KENSUP and SSUP
programme documents and press notices56 that UN-Habitat co-authored or approved.
According to Kithakye, the SSUP is taking a SL approach. He said that the SSUP does
not want to disturb what is going on already in Kibera, that the programme wants to build on that
– very important. This suggests that UN-Habitat holds the traditional meaning of “slum
upgrading” in mind for the SSUP: improving existing housing instead of demolishing and
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building new housing units. This is an ideological rift with the GoK Ministry of Roads, Public
Works, and Housing, and its Minister, Honorable Raila Odinga.
Since Raila and UN-Habitat are not on the same page, it is no wonder that the GoK’s
implementation of SL in Kibera has thus far failed. But this means that UN-Habitat has also
failed, albeit indirectly. UN-Habitat’s indirect role of “GoK supporter” in the KENSUP and
SSUP certainly does not translate to zero UN responsibility for what the GoK does or does not
do in Kibera-Soweto through the SSUP.
Due to the acute lack of information for the people of Kibera in 2003, as discussed above
structure owners were organizing against the KENSUP and preparing for violent encounters if
necessary. According to Bodewes, a lawyer who works in Kibera and dialogues with UNHabitat, during 2003 the UN had very little knowledge of what was going on in Kibera, (letter to
the author, 24 Nov. 2003). Although UN-Habitat was not aware of the building tensions and
opposition to the SSUP in early 2003, since their learning of the situation, UN-Habitat has been
frozen in their powerlessness to change the situation. The UN’s silence and inaction during this
critical time period has only contributed to the deterioration of the SSUP’s potential of
successfully meeting its objectives.

5.4 The Government of Kenya (GoK)
“The existence of slums is of great concern to the Government as they accommodate a
large proportion of the urban population who suffer the most deplorable and inhuman
living conditions, threatening the country’s social and economic growth.”
-Honorable Raila Amolo Odinga, E.G.H., Minister of Roads, Public
Works, and Housing, and Member of Parliament (MP) for Kibera57

“We are committed to making participation our hallmark of administration and
management.”
-Amos Kimunya (NARC), Minister for Lands and Settlement58
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Quote spoken at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between Raila representing the
Government of Kenya and Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, January 2003. Quoted in
“GoK and UN-Habitat sign…”
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In line with Werlin, who emphasizes the importance of the role of government in slum
upgrading as coordinator and facilitator, the Government of Kenya (GoK) holds the top position
of KENSUP/SSUP Programme Secretariat. As mentioned in Chapter 4.0, this leading
administrative and facilitative Secretariat is based within the Housing Department of the
Ministry of Roads, Public Works and Housing. The Department of Housing has written much
policy that is well thought out and recognizes key rights and needs of slum dwellers such as
security of tenure and preventing forced eviction. Most housing policy papers note the GoK’s
overarching goal to provide adequate housing to all of its citizens, (Kituo cha Sheria, The
Kenyan 7).
Consequently, in theory the GoK would appear to be a great leader of the SSUP.
Unfortunately, the GoK has failed over the last decade to implement these policies and hence
deliver the promised adequate housing to the majority of its citizens. Among the many reasons
for policy implementation failure given, the Department of Housing itself noted in 1999 that lack
of political will is the primary cause for the failure of the GoK to implement its housing policies,
(Kituo cha Sheria, The Kenyan 8).
Adding further reservations to the ability of the GoK to lead the SSUP, throughout the
1990s the GoK struggled to meet the UN’s housing goals. This was due to economic decline, an
inadequate partner system, poor coordination, and rampant corruption within the Moi
administration. This resulted in a downward spiral of less spending and lower project
productivity. According to the NSA, living conditions actually grew worse for most of Nairobi’s
population throughout this decade. This means that the GoK has yet to successfully implement a
housing strategy that helps a large residential community. While UN-Habitat has assumed more
of a backseat role in the SSUP, providing “support” to the GoK, the historical evidence indicates
that the GoK needs a stronger partner in the UN if this current upgrade is to be successful.
The GoK’s central interest is to maintain the order and stability in Kenya. Part of this
mission includes quelling threats of social unrest and crime that, as Minister Raila stated in the
quote at the beginning of this section, threaten Kenya’s development – which is the second
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Kimunya firmly declared this on behalf of the campaigning NARC administration in August 2002 on the issue of
informal settlements shortly before Kenya’s national election, (qtd. in ITDG-EG).
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related and nearly equal interest of the GoK. Since slums are usually sources of unrest and
crime, it is in the economic interest of the GoK to make slum upgrading a key component of its
housing and development policy.
On the global level, the GoK has an obligation by international law to be continuously
working towards the meeting of the human right of all Kenya’s citizens to have adequate
housing. In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the focal international
convention that the GoK freely signed is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was acceded by Kenya 1 May, 1972. With regard to housing
rights, it declares that member states will, “take the appropriate steps to ensure the realization
of…the continuous improvement of living conditions,” (Kituo Cha Sheria, A Guide to 7). As it
is, in 1993 the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights scrutinized the GoK for
failing to submit progress reports as mandated in the ICESCR, and reported that it found the
GoK to be in gross violation of the ICESCR:

With regard to the right to adequate housing, the Committee notes with great concern that practices of
forced evictions without consultation, compensation or adequate resettlement appears to be widespread in
Kenya, particularly in Nairobi, (qtd. in Kituo cha Sheria, The Kenyan).59

The GoK is also required by the ICESCR to domesticate the rights named in the
Covenant. However according to Kituo Cha Sheria, “The present Kenyan law…clearly
demonstrates that the Kenyan government never complied with this requirement,” (A Guide to
18). Actually, the present Constitution of Kenya does not give the right to adequate housing.
Article 70 provides for the right to and protection of privacy and property, however for this
constitutional protection to apply, one must legally own the property or land that one’s structure
is on in the case of housing, (Kituo Cha Sheria, A Guide to 18). Fortunately this will be changed
once the new draft Constitution is implemented. According to the Shelter Forum, an NGO
highly involved in Kibera with the SSUP, “The draft constitution states that every person has the
right to safe and adequate housing guaranteed by the state. It also states that no one may be
evicted from their homes or have their house demolished without a Court Order,” (The New
59

Source cited by Kituo cha Sheria: “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant.” UN USCOR Comm’n Concluding Observations/Comments, UN Doc.E/C.12/1993/6 (1993).
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Constitution 11). Regrettably, as of April 2004, the new Constitution has not yet been
implemented.
While these large interests remain the foundational motivation for the Government’s
undertaking of the KENSUP and the SSUP, short-term NARC party and individual economic
and political interests comprise the real forces behind the GoK’s motivation and decision-making
on this upgrade project.
Financially, the GoK is completely dependent on the UN and the international donors
UN-Habitat established for the KENSUP/SSUP through Cities Alliance. The present NARC
government inherited a large budget deficit from the notoriously corrupt 24-year ruling KANU
administration. The occurrence of corruption became so bad in 1998 that the IMF and World
Bank cut off its support to Kenya until major changes were made. Although the GoK is
supposed to be contributing approximately $60,000 towards the SSUP Preparatory Phase,
without UN-Habitat the SSUP and the KENSUP would not be possible.
In order to build confidence in current supporters and in order to find new donors, the
GoK has an interest to produce concrete results in a timely manner. Unfortunately, the SSUP is
already behind the original scheduling of the KENSUP. Although this might have been expected
with such a complex multi-sector slum upgrading project, it has created additional urgency
within the GoK to move the SSUP forward as quickly as possible. According to Syagga, et al. in
the Nairobi Situation Analysis Supplementary Study: A Rapid Economic Appraisal of Rents in
Slums and Informal Settlements report, the KENSUP Inception Phase was to end with the start
of the Preparatory Phase in January 2002, with implementation slated to begin in November
2002, (3). The reality of the SSUP (the concrete realization of the KENSUP) is that the
Preparatory Phase actually began one and a half years later in July 2003, and the Memorandum
of Understanding between the GoK and UN-Habitat was not signed and Kibera-Soweto
announced as the first project site until January 2003, only after which could the Preparatory
Phase truly begin one year later than planned. The initial funding received from the UN-Habitat
partner, Cities Alliance, was $250,000 for the Preparatory Phase. According to Makokha, as of
28 July 2003, no donors had been sourced for the next phase, the Implementation Phase, which is
budgeted at US$ 3.5 million in the SSUP document. It is also likely that further funding will not
become available until the Implementation Phase is begun.
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Beyond attracting donor funding, providing quick and tangible results to the Kiberan
slum dwellers will win their political support and vote. Growing criticism of the NARC
administration from the general public is giving political incentive to the GoK to move the SSUP
forward by any means possible. Pressure is building daily for the NARC administration to live
up to the bold campaign pledges of President Mwai Kibaki to build 150,000 new housing units a
year and to create 500,000 new (formal) jobs a year during his five-year term.
The GoK is depending nearly entirely on the success of the KENSUP through the SSUP
to provide the bulk of the promised 150,000 housing units for NARC’s ambitious yearly goal.
This is a dangerous reliance at the present moment not only because of the waning possibility of
a successful upgrade in Kibera-Soweto, but also because this shows a serious divergence from
the theoretical participatory upgrade process described in the KENSUP/SSUP programme
documents and UN-Habitat publications. Meeting NARC’s housing pledge with the SSUP
means that the GoK would have to construct new structures instead of empowering residents to
improve their existing structures, the latter of which is the original definition of “slum
upgrading.” This shows that Raila’s media statements about a pre-planned SSUP in the Land
Update and The Kiberan (discussed below in Chapter 6.0, 6.4.3) appear to actually be in line
with the larger agenda of the NARC administration.
As head of the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing, and the seat of the
KENSUP/SSUP Secretariat, Minister Raila Odinga receives the brunt of the above-mentioned
political pressure and holds the most powerful position in the KENSUP and the SSUP. His
power has been amplified by UN-Habitat’s distancing itself from the SSUP. The SSUP is now
essentially at his whim.
Now a member of the ruling NARC party, Minister Raila blames the present housing
crisis in Kenya’s urban centers on the previous KANU administration for its decades of housing
neglect. However he himself had been a powerful player in that administration as the Secretary
General of KANU, (Mutiga 1). An expert at getting media attention, Raila has been vocal about
the shames of the previous administration and boastful about the NARC’s campaign promise of
providing a very tangible and concrete 150,000 new housing units a year. With regards to the
KENSUP and SSUP, Minister Raila’s personal primary political interest is to perform and
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provide this promise not only to his country, but also to his own public constituency of Kibera, to
whom he is a Member of Parliament.60
Naturally, the pressure to produce quick results under these circumstances is high. In the
face of years of housing provision failure for Nairobi’s slum dwellers, years of corrupt national
government that has robbed the majority of Nairobians basic service provision among other
things, and in the wake of a very popular change of power after a long 24 years with former
President Moi’s authoritarian regime, Raila and the rest of the GoK want to show the Kenyan
people that they will not let them down. In the wake of high hopes that most Kenyans had after
Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 presidential election, the GoK’s failure or delay to provide concrete
results in Kibera through the SSUP has the potential to accelerate an already diminishing support
for NARC.
Although some statements by Minister Raila assure the participation of all stakeholders
and express how committed the GoK is to “working to improve the living conditions of its
citizens…[by] the delivery of 150,000 housing units per year,” (UN-Habitat, Finland), his other
statements and actions speak louder, showing his charlatan nature on SL. For example, Raila has
posed himself offensively against structure owners by issuing a six-month ultimatum in August
2003 demanding that structure owners give up the land their structures are on and approved
forced evictions in and near Kibera in February 2004, (Amran).61 The Minister for Lands and
Settlement, Amos Kimunya, supported Raila’s ultimatum with the oversimplified position that
the “landlords” in slums like Kibera across Kenya will simply have to give up their land because
it belongs to the Government, and that the GoK will ensure that no land is available for the
building of shanties, (Amran; Ahmed). Minister Raila and others in the NARC administration
appear to view the gamble on a longer-term, more difficult and comprehensive slum upgrade that
emphasizes a planning and design process involving slum dweller participation, as being too
great a risk for a country impatiently waiting to see what their “new” government can do.
However, views within the GoK are varied. Housing Department Director, Grace
Wanyonyi, regrets the lack of consultation with Kibera-Soweto residents, calling it a blatant
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However, as with most politicians, Raila has other non-public constituents with much more political-economic
power over Raila than Kiberan slum dwellers.
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See Chapter 6.0, section 6.4.2 for a further discussion on Raila’s media statements and their adverse affect on the
KENSUP/SSUP.
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error. She is also adamant that corruption not be “entrenched in this noble project [the SSUP],”
(Amran; Ahmed). As director of the department in control of the KENSUP/SSUP under Raila’s
ministry, Wanyonyi and Raila are in a power struggle over the project. As it turns out, Raila’s
high profile, two-decade long political career has dealt him immense political power and
recognition throughout Kenya that no one can compete with.
For the SSUP to be successful, it is imperative that common ground be found between
Raila, Wanyonyi, Tibaijuka (Executive Director of UN-Habitat), and all the other many experts
involved on the KENSUP. They must amend their differences and move forward by SL, unified
for the benefit of the Kiberans.

5.5 Local Authorities: Chiefs and the Provincial Administration
Kenyan informal settlements lack the popularly elected representative local governmental
structure to lead the process of project identification and initiation to improve neighborhoods and
their larger city. This is not to say that no structure exists. In fact just the opposite is true.
Kibera-Soweto’s list of local governmental authorities includes a chief, assistant chiefs, Wazee
wa vijiji,62 city councilors, and police. While these authorities exclusively control the political
economy in Kibera, none of these public officials are popularly elected.63 Instead, this sprawling
political power structure is comprised of appointed individuals carrying political favor with the
Government’s higher officials to carry out the will of the GoK on the local level. The chiefs and
assistant chiefs are the lowest and most local of this political structure called the Provincial
Administration, which effectively extends the fingers of the GoK into every urban neighborhood
and rural town in Kenya. Other offices within the Provincial Administration include the
Provincial Officer (PO) and District Officer (DO), both of whom are not significantly involved
in the SSUP enough to warrant specific attention. Corruption is rampant within this non-elected
governing bureaucracy. Residents must pay a bribe to these authorities to receive their attention
or services for anything. The nature of this local governmental structure in Kibera greatly
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This is a group of “elders” that assist chiefs. Vijiji elders are nominated by chiefs to work with them in
controlling the settlement, (NSA 146).
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This will be changing if and when the new Kenyan Constitution is enacted.
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contributes to the difficulty of establishing unity within the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading
Project (SSUP).
Of all the Provincial Administration, the role of chief is most important and significant
with regards to the SSUP. The chiefs’ role is to be the mouthpiece of the GoK at the local level.
Chiefs provide the only link between the GoK and Kiberan residents. The Kibera-Soweto chief
and surrounding chiefs from neighborhoods such as Kibera-Line Saba, however, have not been
big players in the planning and developing of the SSUP, (Bodewes letter). This has created a
very perilous situation. In Kibera and other informal settlements, Syagga, et al. note that, “they
[chiefs] wield immense powers that can facilitate and/or block development,” (NSA 133).
Involving the local chief(s) and assistant chiefs is necessary for local SSUP political support. It
is unfortunate that these local leaders of Kibera-Soweto have not been more involved.
Another concern is the fact that Kiberan residents do not have a say in who their chief is.
This has created a gap of decision-making power between them and important aspects of their
lives, and has fostered corrupt governing. Until government officials cannot be bought by
structure owners, tenants in Kibera will at best have a difficult time voicing and receiving a
response to their interests to really improve their living conditions. The situation is nevertheless
looking up for democracy with the new Kenyan Draft Constitution, which will provide for the
popular election of chiefs – should the new Constitution ever make it through the maze of
Kenya’s diverse political and ethnic divisions.
Nairobi’s informal settlement chiefs and city councilors have illegally allocated slum
plots for decades, providing themselves supplemental incomes. Respected public leaders
including chiefs, city councilors, police, wazee wa vjiji, and even upper-ranking politicians are
all in on the deal. Similar to most of Kenya’s urban slums, in exchange for money, local
authorities are more than willing to “sell” plots in Kibera either verbally or in writing. This
“selling” of plots to structure owners is unofficial and illegal according to the Chief’s Act,
(Christ the King, Memorandum). Depending on the agreement between the chief and the
structure owner, plot holders may have to pay the chief or other local authority an annual
payment to maintain their plots and structures in Kibera, or simply give a lump sum when a plot
is “purchased.” The money they make from the informal land allocation pattern of Kibera slum
gives all of these local authorities ample motivation to work to maintain the status quo, which
translates into their working to foil the SSUP.
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Success for chiefs is measured almost exclusively by their ability to maintain the “peace”
in their neighborhood. In selecting structure owners, chiefs typically select those who will help
maintain the peace and not agitate the community. This goes rather naturally with maintaining
the status quo. Another instrument of “peace maintenance” is the distribution of financial
support in times of need to slum dwellers in Kibera to prevent an uprising or in times of elections
to insure certain candidates maintain power or those with the right connections are newly
elected. The Kiberan political power structure and how its forces are working against the
success of the SSUP are further discussed below in Chapter 6.0, sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Due to the above-mentioned economics of corruption and bribery, the local authorities
(specifically chiefs) in Kibera-Soweto have an interest to work against the SSUP. Therefore,
unless given a good reason not to,64 Kiberan chiefs are likely to side with structure owners to
thwart the efforts of the SSUP to provide improved (and formalized) housing for Kibera-Soweto.
If not outright organizing and rumor milling against the SSUP, other stakeholders must be aware
that local authorities and structure owners could attempt to dominate a government-led
“participatory” process (should this ever come to fruition) to ensure overly-favorable terms of
agreement for themselves. Opposition from this stakeholder group would best be redirected
towards supporting the SSUP by including this group in the intimate workings of this project and
by developing a project strategy that will benefit them. Incentive of benefit for local authorities
ought to be included in the SSUP, and any future KENSUP slum upgrading initiative, if their
support and political will is to be harnessed.

5.6 The Nairobi City Council (NCC)
“Over the last decade, Nairobi has gone from the ‘Green City in the Sun,’ to a level of
decay that is unacceptable. The heart of the Republic of Kenya is Nairobi; but Nairobi is
bleeding. The time to stop that bleeding is now and not later. We know it can be done.”
-Councilor Steve Mwangi, Mayor of Nairobi, July 199365
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One good reason would be pleasing Minister Raila and other GoK higher-ups. This would be a strong counter
force to local authorities’ supplemental incomes from structure owners if Raila and other upper GoK officials did
decide to take a stand to do the SSUP right, and put significant political pressure on the chiefs to cooperate.
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Although Kibera has a population over twice as big as Minneapolis, USA (the former
having more than 700,000 people), and the “village” of Soweto alone within Kibera has a
population matching most of Minneapolis’s suburbs (50-60,000 people), there is no separate
Kibera let alone Kibera-Soweto city government. Nor do any of Nairobi’s other neighborhoods,
rich or poor, have their own elected city council. The whole of Nairobi’s 2.5 to 3.5 million
citizens are governed by the one City Council of Nairobi, in addition to the National
Government’s Provincial Administration, described in the preceding section.
According to Rakodi, et al., local governments around the developing world lack the
capacity and resources including legislative authority, financial resources, and managerial
capabilities to effectively manage urbanization, (15). The Nairobi City Council (NCC) is no
exception. According to Syagga, et al., the city of Nairobi has no autonomy from the Kenya
National Government (GoK), (147). Additionally, despite rapid social and economic changes
that have taken place in Kenya over the past twenty years, political and administrative structures
within the NCC (as well as at the national level) have remained largely unchanged. Meanwhile,
the population in Nairobi’s slums increases every year with more and more people coming under
the NCC’s authority. Yet most of these newcomers receive nothing from the NCC except a local
city councilor who is only willing to provide his services for bribe money.
The NCC has been assigned the highly important role of main project implementer for
the SSUP, (Government of Kenya, SSUP 4). Hence, the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is
established within the NCC Housing Development Department. However, the NCC is not in a
position to effectively fill this role, especially in Nairobi’s most complex slum, Kibera.
Currently the NCC does not provide basic services to Kibera except for a few water lines.
Otherwise, services such as sewer, garbage pickup, adequate water lines, and electricity are only
dreams. This situation has grown worse since the NCC continues to exclude Kibera and other
informal settlements from city plans and budgeting, largely because the NCC has little money
and the slums are unofficial with no legal status.
As it stands, jurisdiction over the SSUP has been a struggle at times between the GoK
and the NCC. Within the capital city, both governing bodies have control and interests over
urban public lands, such as Kibera.
Between the GoK and the NCC, there is an overlapping of departments and services
relevant to the SSUP. Although according to the SSUP document the NCC is charged to
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“coordinate city level activities,” (Government of Kenya, SSUP 4), the GoK is the KiberaSoweto project head responsible to “co-ordinat[e]…project planning, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation,” all of which happens mostly on the city level too, due to the nature
of the project, (SSUP 5). While the NCC’s Housing Development Department is said on paper
to be in charge of the SSUP “facilitation in provision of required infrastructure and services,” it
is the Housing Department within the GoK Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing – the
national infrastructure-providing body itself – that is at the head of the SSUP as the Programme
Secretariat, (SSUP 4). While the NCC is charged with the “generation and provision of
information” about the SSUP, their role (as implementer) has been minimal thus far as the
Implementation Phase has not yet begun as of April 2004, (SSUP 4). The GoK and UN-Habitat
established this project in 2001 and are leading it today. Therefore it is them, not the NCC, who
best know where the KENSUP and SSUP are and therefore must be in charge of the media
campaign and information dissemination. As it is, it has been the GoK and UN-Habitat to issue
press notices in Nairobi’s daily newspapers about the project, contrary to this note in SSUP
project document.
The duplication of authority between the NCC and the GoK and the resulting inefficiency
of government services goes down to the community level. While the GoK has chiefs living in
most neighborhoods of Nairobi, the NCC also has its city councilors living throughout Nairobi.
Kibera’s NCC city councilors’ interests are very similar to those of the Kiberan chiefs, including
maintaining the peace in a volatile yet politically important settlement, and making extra money
on the side by illegally allocating plots to and collecting regular payments from structure owners
as a cut of the otherwise 100% profit and tax-free rent money.
These examples of government overlap illustrate the continuance of Kenya’s historical
struggle to achieve real decentralization and devolution of power in development. According to
Omiya, “Over the years, the Kenyan government’s decentralization strategy has always been a
tool of control over local-level development,” (Omiya 202). Yet the SSUP’s placement in the
capital city is a special situation. Clearly with its strong physical presence in Nairobi, it is easy
for the National Government (GoK) to override the NCC in its shadow and perhaps rightfully so.
After all, the GoK is the body that initiated the KENSUP/SSUP, and is the head facilitator of this
initiative. However the extent to which the NCC has not been a major player in the KENSUP
and SSUP thus far (April 2004) must raise caution flags to all observers that the GoK may be
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repeating its history of gaining more control over local developments through supposedly
“decentralized” structures and initiatives, instead of truly distributing power to local governing
bodies such as the NCC and the phantom Kibera-Soweto Settlement Project Implementation Unit
(SPIU), the latter of which is discussed further in Chapter 6.0, section 6.3.2.
Yet despite these concerns, Nairobi Mayor Joe Aketch supports the GoK’s dominant
leadership on the SSUP. In a statement made in the Daily Nation, 10 May 2002, Aketch
approved the top-down authoritarian manner in which the GoK (through Minister Raila) is
managing the SSUP, in addition to acknowledging the subservient relationship the NCC has with
the GoK on the SSUP through his tone. Mayor Joe Aketch states, “This land [of Kibera] belongs
to the Government and has only been given to people on temporal basis. Therefore when the
Government comes up with a project like the one in the process now [the SSUP], it will
repossess its land and work out a formula how people are to benefit,” (qtd. in Okwemba).
Unfortunately, Mayor Aketch does not appear to be a strong proponent for SL
participatory slum upgrading. Through his statement, Aketch indicates that he believes it is the
GoK’s rightful role to design and implement the SSUP as they see fit. To him, the people of
Kibera-Soweto ought to play the role of passive project beneficiaries who simply will receive
what is handed to them from above. This position is completely opposite of SL, which focuses
on community empowerment through capacity building and community organizing to give
fruition to self-identified and self-designed development projects.
Despite Aketch’s apparent anti-sustainable livelihoods position, it makes sense in light of
the NCC’s failure to solve Nairobi’s land and housing problems. According to Syagga, et al.,
“The NCC lacks clear and specific policies for housing, land use, planning and land
management. Consequently, the council cannot coherently and creatively respond to housing
and development challenges facing it,” (NSA 95). This shed’s light on the NCC’s own
limitations and lack of capacity to effectively fill its role as the PIU to implement the GoK/UNHabitat upgrade project in Kibera.
The lack of effective land and housing policy has of course been an overwhelming
roadblock to improving living conditions in Kenya’s slums. Yet despite the NCC’s current
position of policy disempowerment, SSUP-involved NGOs call upon the NCC to rise to the
challenge of citywide leadership on the KENSUP to improve its deplorable slum situation. The
NGO Community calls upon the NCC to take on the necessary albeit daunting task of policy
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reformulation, (NGO Community, Informal 4). The NGOs also implore the NCC to not be
merely passive to the GoK on the SSUP, but to instead lead the policy process affecting
Nairobi’s slums. Included in this request is the provision of secure tenure, the regulation of land
allocation within Nairobi’s city limits, and a serious effort to ultimately achieve the provision of
adequate shelter for all, all of which would greatly aid the SSUP process, (Informal 4).
Improving Kibera-Soweto through the SSUP is clearly in the long-term interest of the
NCC as an institution. The NCC is currently in a major long-term financial crunch. Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 1980s and early 1990s have rendered the Council
ineffective at providing basic services and infrastructure maintenance (especially roads and
sewer). If sustainable improvements in well being and income generation in Kibera can be
achieved (starting with Soweto village), the NCC could gain much-needed additional revenue
from locally funded services and taxes in Kibera. The potential for tax revenue is very high by
just regularizing the land ownership system for Kibera – already housing nearly one-third of
Nairobi’s population – which currently goes untaxed. As much as the individual councilors,
chiefs, and structure owners might not want it, legalizing Kibera and establishing a secure land
tenure system would allow much of the money now going to line the pockets of councilors and
chiefs to be rightfully directed to the NCC. This would allow the NCC to strengthen their
services, relevance as an institution, and capacity for being a major player in future KENSUP
and non-KENSUP slum upgrading projects. A stronger and relevant NCC overseeing a legalized
land allocation and taxation system would be a very significant contribution to stabilizing
Kenya’s economy, which would attract more foreign investment and tourists (the latter being the
third largest industry of Kenya behind tea and coffee).
The SSUP may serve as a starting place for the NCC to begin this reformation. The NCC
must join with the other KENSUP stakeholders to empower slum dwellers by investing the time,
energy, resources, and patience for a genuine partnership in the multi-lateral collaboration
required by SSUP using the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). Of specific interest to the
NCC, fulfilling their partnership will include working with the Kibera-Soweto community (and
other Nairobian slums later) through their local councilors to help expand local income
generating activities through various initiatives, while also including the removal of policy
barriers to the growth of the informal economic sector. This will certainly help create a much
healthier but also a more relevant and fruitful relationship between Kiberan slum dwellers and
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their city council, as the NCC’s initial investment in people will mature to provide long-term
economic rewards.
Throughout 2003, the NCC has come under scrutiny by President Kibaki’s anticorruption campaign. Several investigations in 2003-2004 have put the NCC in the hot seat.
The GoK’s new anti-corruption police were investigating the Council’s use of the Infrastructure
Programme’s funds to build roads, (Njeru, et al.). Additionally, both the Efficiency Monitoring
Unit as well as a probe ordered by the Minister of Local Government, Karisa Maitha, were
investigating the Council whose reports indicted the council for mismanagement (Churchill
Otieno; Njeru, et al.). The stakes are high, as Churchill Otieno explains, “…report findings may
lead to the disbandment of the council,” (no pag.). Unfortunately the Council’s seat became too
hot when a suspicious fire engulfed Nairobi City Hall in flames on 2 March 2004, just before the
investigative reports were to be issued. Priceless and irreplaceable documents, records, research
material, and city plans dating back 100 years were lost in the fire. Former Nairobi mayor,
Nathan Kahara, noted the loss as “a major setback to the future development of the capital city,”
(qtd. in Njeru, et al.).
The real risk of disbandment clearly illustrates the urgency of reform within the NCC.
The major challenge lies in mobilizing the interest of the whole Council to end corruption
amongst its individual members. Cracking down on corruption connects to the need for
additional transparency and accountability of both individual council members as well as the
NCC as a whole. Moreover, reducing Council corruption connects to the larger issues of
reawakening the vision, mission, and spirit of the NCC’s public service to Nairobians – 60% of
whom are slum dwellers. These changes are mandatory for increasing the ability of the NCC to
effectively perform not only on the SSUP but in all of its endeavors. It is the hope of the author
that the NCC will use the tragic City Hall fire to provide the necessary momentum to seriously
address these major tasks, enabling itself to check the dominance of the GoK over the SSUP.

5.7 The Nubian Community
Although few if any Nubians will be directly involved in the SSUP since almost none
live in Kibera-Soweto, their ethnic group’s situation and interests are unique compared to the
other residents of Kibera. There is potential for Nubian hostility towards the upgrade. As the
oldest ethnic group in greater Kibera and making up a good percentage of the structure owners
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there, the Nubians have been working to receive official land title in Kibera since they first
settled in Kibera in 1912 under temporary occupancy permits from the British colonial
administration, (Parsons). Several acts have come before the GoK to grant certain parts of
Kibera to the Nubians that they lay claim to. Most recently, former President Moi actually
approved one of these measures in the late 1970s. Unfortunately, it was never enacted due to
oversight or corruption. It is difficult to know the exact reasons why the Nubians got
overlooked, however it is likely that no one wanted the difficulty of confronting the land issue in
Kibera, or knew how to do it. Moreover, other Kiberan structure owners would be very upset
about not getting land title themselves. It is also possible that some members of the GoK who
were connected politically and economically to Kibera did not want the Nubians to gain
ownership and purposefully stalled for this reason.
If any resident group has a right to the land in Kibera, it is the Nubians. Since the SSUP
is not benefiting them, Nubians have good reason to be frustrated with the GoK who is
responsible for the selection of Kibera-Soweto site for the KENSUP. Accordingly, the GoK
should be sensitive to the Nubian position. While advancing the SSUP, the GoK ought to revisit
and actually implement the directive to give Nubians the land titles to parts of Kibera that they
should already rightfully have.

5.8 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Note: Throughout this section the term, “NGOs,” will usually refer only to those NGOs
who have been involved in the Kibera upgrading process and the larger KENSUP.

NGOs play a critical role in Kibera. Due to their direct involvement on the grassroots
level, NGOs’ objectives and interests typically line up with those of the people they are serving.
They often act as advocates for the rights and interests of their own target beneficiaries. As
outside organizations, they provide key services and support to people that governmental bodies
and agencies (both through the GoK and the NCC) are simply unable to provide. Not only do
these organizations provide practical services, but long-standing NGOs in Kibera also play a
vital role in solidifying the social-cultural network in the Kibera community by gathering
residents together for education and training as well as project coordination and leadership.
Among the many NGOs at work in Kibera, The Shelter Forum, Kituo cha Sheria (legal
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services), and Maji na Ufanisi are three that have been especially active in Kibera upgrading
efforts. The first two have been highly involved with community groups, churches, and residents
in Kibera directly relating to the Soweto upgrade, while Maji na Ufanisi has done other smallscale upgrading projects around Kibera in addition to becoming involved with the SSUP through
a contract.
The Shelter Forum is actually included in the Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT), an
important body of the SSUP institutional structure described in Chapter 4.0, (Government of
Kenya, SSUP 5). They have been involved for most of the way with the KENSUP and have
been one of the few concrete links to the residents of Kibera. They were involved in leading a
grassroots information effort comprised of two meetings in Kibera in June and July 2003 that
were forcefully disbanded. At the meetings, the Shelter Forum explained in general what slum
upgrading is and they helped organize a committee whose task was to contact UN-Habitat and
the GoK to find out what they planned on doing with the SSUP. Kituo cha Sheria also helped
lead these grassroots meetings in addition to organizing their own events and initiatives in Kibera
to help sensitize and mobilize the community on slum upgrading, as other NGOs have also done.
Unfortunately, in the last half of 2003, both Shelter Forum and Kituo cha Sheria have lost
much of their presence in Kibera-Soweto, (Bodewes, letter). Neither of these NGOs was
actually focusing on Soweto village, rather all of Kibera. Although Soweto’s upgrade does
affect the greater Kiberan community since misinformation and rumors have led many to believe
the KENSUP is upgrading all of Kibera, as of November 2003, a strong presence in even greater
Kibera from these organizations was lacking. This can be attributed to the inactivity of the
Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG), which has contributed to division and a rise in
competition among the NGOs further described below in the MSSG sub-section.
Maji na Ufanisi has been working in Kibera building bore holes and drains, and was still
present in Kibera as of late 2003. By using a community organizing approach, they have
experienced success in these small-scale upgrading projects, although it is slow going,
(Bodewes, letter). Around November 2003, Maji na Ufanisi was working on a contract project
for the SSUP in collaboration with Acacia Consultants in Kibera, (Bodewes, letter). According
to an ad for this consultancy project placed by the GoK and UN-Habitat, the objective of this
two-month project was to compile a list of stakeholders in Kibera with contact information and a
description of the work each does.
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These three NGOs are all members on the NGO Coalition on Urban Land/Housing
Rights Campaign. Other members include Pamoja Trust, Upinde Trust, the National Housing
Co-operative Housing Union (NACHU), and the Intermediate Technology Development GroupEast Africa (ITDG-EA). Although the official KENSUP institutional structure that most of these
organizations were a part of, the Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG), has been nonfunctional as of late, the NGO Coalition has continued to discuss concerns over the SSUP at
meetings outside of the formal KENSUP process.

5.8.1 NGO Concerns
Although involved NGOs were generally pleased with the stakeholder consultations that
took place in the early stages of the KENSUP (when it was called the Collaborative Nairobi
Slum Upgrading Initiative), they still held mixed reactions about the effort even back in 2001,
which have only grown increasingly apprehensive throughout 2003. Initially, some NGOs were
skeptical and concerned about the new slum upgrading initiative due to the GoK’s failure on
previous upgrading efforts, (NGO Community 2). Recent developments in the SSUP, however,
have given involved NGOs real issues to worry about.
Beyond wondering how the GoK was going to provide secure tenure peacefully with a
large group of structure owners all vying for a position of ownership and power in KiberaSoweto (2001), more urgent concern has recently been fostered around the information void that
exists on the ground about the SSUP. In July 2003, the NGO Coalition was highly concerned
about the lack of information among Kibera-Soweto residents about the SSUP that has caused
confusion and fear within the community. This situation has been caused by a lack of dialogue
between the GoK, UN-Habitat, and the Kibera community, (2).
The lack of information is only a symptom of a greater problem. NGOs are very
concerned about Kibera-Soweto’s minimal community participation, which the Coalition noted
at a meeting in July 2003, (2). Recognizing and knowing from experience the importance of
basic popular participation theory in development, the NGO community wants residents to be
involved at all levels on this project, “especially…where critical decisions are made,” (Informal
3). This position follows the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL).
Anticipating the lack of community participation, in their statement presented at a 2001
GoK/UN-Habitat workshop, NGOs suggested going beyond the planned Settlement Project
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Implementation Units (SPIUs) for resident involvement.66 In addition to fully supporting the
creation of SPIUs, the NGO Community suggested that Kibera-Soweto community
representatives also be included in the top administrative bodies of the KENSUP, including the
Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT) and the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC), (3).
Regrettably, as of March 2004 no SPIU had been formed, let alone the issuance of an invitation
to Soweto community residents to join the JPPT or IACC.
Relating to the questionability of the SSUP site selection, the NGO Coalition is highly
concerned with the political implications of Minister Raila Odinga’s position of power over the
SSUP while it takes place in his own constituency, (2). NGO leaders are well aware of the
increased political forces now at work in the pressure cooker that is Kibera, which only increases
the risk for the potential failure of the SSUP. The NGOs’ concern on this matter is so strong that
a proposal came up at the Coalition meeting in July 2003 to relocate the whole KENSUP project
outside of Kibera, (2). While there may be good reason to examine this possibility, the NGO
Coalition agreed that this course of action would be too ambitious. Not only is it too late in the
process, but a political confrontation between the NGO Coalition and Minister Raila Odinga
would be a dangerous maneuver. Working to change the site of the KENSUP pilot project out of
Kibera would create a nasty situation of heightened tension for all stakeholders involved.
Violence would be likely and would hurt the people of Kibera worst – something no one wants
to have happen.67

5.8.2 The Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG)
As an official component of the KENSUP and SSUP institutional structure, the MultiStakeholder Support Group (MSSG) provided the involved NGOs, such as Shelter Forum and
Kituo Cha Sheria, a major voice in the SSUP on the administrative level. NGOs in the MSSG
had also been able to contribute to the KENSUP by information dissemination and consensus
building among the Kiberan community on the ground. In addition to the specific NGO
concerns discussed above, in general NGOs wanted emphasis on process, which meant taking
more time to sensitize, involve, ultimately empower residents, and generally follow the
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Ehresmann 93
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), while the Kenyan Government was conversely more
concerned with producing a concrete output fast, (Makokha).
Due to the disagreement between the NGOs and the GoK, the latter stopped calling the
MSSG’s monthly meetings in early 2003 using its authority as the KENSUP Secretariat. This
has rendered the MSSG powerless and a non-actor in the KENSUP. This Government action has
greatly troubled the NGO Coalition. It is a serious mistake and has proved to be a major hit on
the stability and prospects of success for the SSUP. The GoK essentially put an end to what had
been a relatively consultative process of the KENSUP, now going completely against the peoplecentered approach advocated in the KENSUP and SSUP documents. Furthermore, the GoK
turned their back on a wealth of information and experience that Nairobi’s NGOs bring to the
table. Yet most importantly, the suspension of the MSSG has destroyed their link to the KiberaSoweto residents and the corresponding element of resident participation that UN-Habitat was
counting on being the foundation of the KENSUP and SSUP. It is unfortunate that the GoK
chose the easier route instead of choosing to work out their differences with Nairobi’s NGO
community.
As a result, NGOs have regrettably become increasingly divided. According to Christ the
King Church, as of September 2003 many residents believe that NGOs in Kibera are now in
competition with each other instead of being unified in working to achieve the best possible
upgrade for the Soweto community, (Memorandum 9 Oct.). The minutes from a meeting of the
NGO Coalition on Urban Land/Housing Rights Campaign held in July 2003 confirm the
suspected competitive air between NGOs involved in the Kibera-Soweto upgrade, (2). Rumor
among the residents was that UN-Habitat would be outsourcing various consultancy contracts to
NGOs to gather information and run certain parts of the project, (Memorandum 9 Oct.). These
rumors were legit as in the 8 August 2003 East African Standard, the GoK and UN-Habitat
placed an ad for a consultancy assignment to prepare a report summarizing all actors present in
Kibera-Soweto for the SSUP.68 As mentioned above, this assignment was given to Acacia
Consultants and Maji na Ufanisi. This explains why Christ the King’s efforts to gather more
information about the SSUP from NGOs involved in Kibera were fruitless. Some NGOs are not
willing to share information on their initiatives in worries that competing organizations will
68
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attempt to out-do their efforts. Ironically the GoK noted in their ad that one of the goals of this
consultancy project, in keeping with the SL’s emphasis on unity amongst stakeholders, was to,
“ensure that there is no duplication and/or unhealthy competition, but synergy.”
In reality, NGOs working to sensitize and mobilize Kiberan communities, in part by
explaining the basics of what slum upgrading entails, have been highly divided and
uncoordinated in their efforts, (Makokha, letter). This has resulted in the duplication of efforts
that the GoK and UN-Habitat were trying to avoid. This has in turn further divided and confused
residents who now have differing ideas about slum upgrading and what may or may not happen
in Kibera-Soweto or all of Kibera, (Christ the King; Makokha, letter). Unfortunately the
consultancy effort of the GoK and UN-Habitat to move towards fully involving stakeholders in
the SSUP has backfired. It has only contributed to the growing disunity among the NGOs as
well as the residents themselves, which began with the GoK’s conscious decision to not call the
MSSG to meeting.

5.8.3 Other Interests
In further understanding the growing competitive nature of NGOs involved in the
KENSUP, funding and survival must be considered primary interests for every NGO. Funding is
typically provided through grants from government bodies or other donors including larger
NGOs to implement their own grant money according to the organization’s core mission and
specific objectives. NGOs’ objectives are used to find grants with similar specifications as to
what kinds of efforts the money can be used for. For continued funding, NGOs typically must
report their progress back to their funders, which provides a major source of motivation and
accountability for these organizations. However, one-time issued grants (often from the Kenyan
Government with international aid funding) may not have this level of accountability, potentially
leading to questionable funding use.
While it appears that NGOs would clearly be an asset to the positive progress of the
SSUP in Kibera-Soweto, it is likely that not all NGOs have the best interest of the Kiberan
residents as their top priority. In an interview with Titus Agwanda from the GoK’s Ministry of
Lands and Settlement, he pointed out that NGOs in Kibera depend on bad conditions to exist.
An NGO that has built its mission around serving those in Kibera as a result of the poor
conditions there would be in a sense working themselves out of their jobs if major improvements

Ehresmann 95
were to come about as a result of their work. They would also be out of a job if the SSUP were
successful. Therefore, for their own well being and self-interest in survival, (unless they have
written a planned death into their constitution or project proposal) NGOs will first seek to be
involved in the SSUP as much as possible in order to boost their experience and involvement
record to help them receive future grants. However if involvement is not possible, there exists a
motive to work against the SSUP. Agwanda warned against insincere organizations with selfish
interests, suggesting that some NGOs may even look for ways to sabotage a slum upgrading
project to ensure themselves work and grant money. David Kithakye of UN-Habitat also warned
the author in his interview that some NGOs are involved in upgrading merely for their own
benefit.
It must be noted here that these comments represent the views of the GoK and UNHabitat, which comprise the administrative top-half of the KENSUP and SSUP. Whereas they
hold feelings of distrust toward NGOs, so do NGOs, CBOs, and tenants (who comprise the
bottom-half of the SSUP) hold corresponding feelings of suspicion and distrust towards the GoK
and the UN.
Although these feelings on both sides may be passed off as being typical or even healthy
in a democracy for citizens to question their government, in this case of a specific development
project, suspicion and distrust go against the current development theory, SL. Since unity and
trust are agreed to be key components of this multilateral slum upgrading project, all
stakeholders ought to become aware of the stigmas they hold about the others. All stakeholders
ought to work towards eliminating their feelings of mistrust through dialogue and partnership
building. Everyone involved in the SSUP has a responsibility to build the unity required for the
SSUP’s success, with the greater responsibility falling on the GoK as Programme Secretariat –
specifically the Housing Department and its mother organization, the Ministry of Roads, Public
Works, and Housing, especially if they continue to pursue a predominantly top-down
development approach. In the mean time, the NGOs still involved in Kibera are struggling in
their efforts to help move the SSUP forward, while others have completely disconnected with the
KENSUP.
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5.9 Community-Based Organizations (CBOs)
These local organizations are exceptionally valuable to the Kibera community. CBOs
provide some of the strongest civil stability in an otherwise haphazard, unplanned settlement.69
According to Linus Onyango, the coordinator of the Kibera Community Development Agenda
(KCODA), there were nearly 500 organizations already working in Kibera as of July, 2003, not
limited to Soweto village.
Some CBOs in Kibera include The Kibera Community Development Agenda (KCODA),
the Kibera Water Users and Hygiene Group, Ushirika wa Usafi Laini Saba, Lindi Ushirika wa
Usafi na Maendeleo, and Mukuru Ushirika wa Usafi na Maendeleo. Although these
organizations may not be specifically affiliated with the SSUP, they are an example of the preexisting organizational structure that does exist in Kibera that UN-Habitat officer, David
Kithakye, mentioned in an interview as wanting to tap into for the SSUP. Unfortunately as
Christ the King Church notes, few if any at all are located in Kibera-Soweto, (Memorandum 9
Oct.). These community organizations were self-started by Kiberan residents from other Kiberan
villages who wished to do something to help with the laundry list of challenges their settlement
faces. Major problems identified by KCODA include: Lack of access to land and affordable and
secure housing, human rights abuses, drug abuse, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, unemployment,
water shortage, lack of access to information, degraded environment, poor drainage,
communal/ethnic violence, poor governance, domestic violence, child abuse, rape, illicit brews,
poor health, poor infrastructure, and insecurity, (The Kiberan issue two).
For example, the Kibera Water Users and Hygiene Group is seeking to directly address
the deplorable sewage situation, (The Kiberan issue one 4). Open drainage ditches often clog
with plastic bags and other uncollected garbage making a horrible sewage situation worse. Their
impact and ability of mobilizing is evident in the approximate 600-person clean-up project this
CBO executed on 12 May, 2003, (The Kiberan issue one 4).
Perhaps the most promising development in Kibera regarding the Kenya Slum Upgrading
Programme (KENSUP) is the response of the KCODA community organization (comprised of
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Kiberan youth70) to the information vacuum created by the GoK, UN-Habitat, and the Nairobi
City Council about the SSUP. After meeting to discuss the various problems of Kibera that they
were growing tired of, a small network of residents formed KCODA in June, 2002, who were
originally united by watching TV together in a nearby office. They decided that instead of
forming another group to provide a basic service to Kibera like garbage pick up (to add to the
nearly 500 pre-existing groups), they would address the area of media and community
communication, one of the most important needs that had gone unmet, especially after the launch
of the Kibera-Soweto Upgrade Project (SSUP). With the help of the NGOs, Shelter Forum and
Kituo Cha Sheria, the dream of this youth group has been implemented, with two issues of a
news letter called The Kiberan, published as of February, 2004. According to Makokha (Shelter
Forum), The Kiberan was supported by Shelter Forum and other NGOs that had been active in
the Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG) in response to their disconnection to the SSUP by
the KENSUP Secretariat. The newsletter is not a part of the official KENSUP and SSUP media
strategy.
The Kiberan serves as a strong grass-roots response to one of the most critical factors
working against the SSUP: the media and communication failure by the SSUP Programme
Secretariat and Project Implementation Unit (PIU).71 Directly contributing to the participation
theory integrated in the KENSUP and SSUP documents that is failing to solidify under the SSUP
management team (i.e. the GoK Housing Department and the NCC Housing Development
Department), is the core mission of The Kiberan’s creator, the KCODA: “…to mainstream
popular participation in policy formulation and dispensation structures at all levels of society,”
(Onyango, The KCODA). The Kiberan is perhaps the brightest step forward for Kibera, giving a
sign that there is hope for a successful upgrade project there. It is the hope of the author that the
KCODA’s effort will be continually supported and utilized by not only NGOs, but also by the
GoK and UN-Habitat to communicate with the people of Kibera.
An additional organization deserving to be mentioned briefly for its shared interests, even
though not exactly an NGO or a CBO, is a Nairobi-wide grass-roots effort, Muungano wa
Wanavijiji, or the Federation of Slum Dwellers. After decades of disorganization and
70

The term “youth” in Kenya includes young adults 12-30, with 18-26 year-olds being the most common age range
involved in self-organized “youth groups.”

71

For further discussion on the SSUP communication failure, see Chapter 6.0, section 6.4.2.

98 Ehresmann
vulnerability to the unjust policies of the GoK, Nairobi’s slum dwellers organized themselves
into this federation to raise awareness and stand up for their housing rights. They advocate for
the changing of unjust land laws that perpetuate urban poverty in Nairobi’s slums. Three key
demands from their manifesto that have been adopted by Kituo cha Sheria in their work for
Kiberans and other slum dwellers include:
1) A moratorium on demolitions and evictions that is implemented with the full
protection of the law.
2) Official recognition of the right to the land on which the urban poor live.
3) Secure and permanent tenure to the residents of the informal settlements, (Kituo cha
Sheria, The Kenyan Perspective 15).
CBOs will continue to play an important role in Nairobi’s slums. They are a major
resource that the KENSUP and SSUP leaders cannot afford to not use.

5.10 Christ the King Church, Kibera-Line Saba
Although this parish community is located next to Soweto in Line Saba instead of in the
target community of the SSUP, they hold a distinctive position in Kibera as being the only
church with a permanent structure, a full-time pastoral team, and a congregation that is
comprised nearly 100% of Kiberan residents. Many of the church’s parishioners are from
Soweto, giving Christ the King Church a unique insight to the needs and concerns of the SSUP’s
target beneficiary group, as well as an inside understanding of the politics between the various
stakeholders in greater Kibera. Since the upgrade will directly affect members of this
community, the KENSUP and SSUP has been a very important issue for the church since
Kibera-Soweto was announced as the KENSUP pilot project site in January 2003. Within the
spirit of the Catholic Social Teaching, the church’s pastoral team explains, “Our aim is to ensure
that the upgrading takes place in a peaceful manner that protects and respects the dignity of every
human life in Kibera,” (Memorandum 9 Oct).
The church’s leadership team is a valuable resource of information from the grassroots
level that ought to be fully utilized by the GoK and UN-Habitat for guidance and input on the
Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP).
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5.11 International Donors
For the last two decades there has been a growing call to the international community for
greater involvement and investment in the developing world. Within this movement there has
been special emphasis on Africa – arguably the least developed continent besides Antarctica.
The call has been coming from development experts, various international organizations, UN
bodies, conferences, and the documents produced by these meetings. The main targets of this
call for investment and partnership are the wealthier developed nations of Europe, Japan, and
North America. Although these national governments have of course been asked for aide
money, economic development more importantly depends on capital investment from private
businesses and individuals within these countries.
One example of this growing call to action is the Tokyo Declaration on African
Development. This document was unanimously adopted by 1,000 delegates from sixty-three
countries at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 1993, (UN
Chronicle). Highlights of the declaration’s specific goals include political and economic reforms
to aid economic development through the private sector to meet the lofty goal of a six percent
real growth rate per year of gross domestic product in African nations.
In response to this call for investment for economic development in Kenya, agencies
from numerous countries have stepped forward to make the KENSUP possible. Organized
through Cities Alliance, donor agencies come from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, (GoK and UNHabitat sign). Although the term “investment” implies that investors are hoping to make money
from their investment, in the case of the KENSUP, the donor funding comes as an offering to
fulfill the global responsibility that they have been called to without the strings of profit attached.
Despite this, like most investors, the KENSUP donor agencies are waiting in anticipation
to see and hear about the fruit of their investment. Donors want to know that their money was
well spent and worth it. If good results develop from the KENSUP through the SSUP, there is a
strong likelihood that donors will again invest to continue the KENSUP’s efforts in other slums
around Kenya. On the other hand, international donors may be hesitant to further invest in the
KENSUP if the SSUP is unsuccessful or overly slow to produce, or worse, if it generates violent
conflict instead of the amelioration of slum conditions that it promises.
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In addition to being called to global responsibility and investment in Kenya, the project
financiers also hold a critical responsibility in ensuring that their project does not violate human
rights, especially those of the target beneficiary group – the Kibera-Soweto residents in the case
of the SSUP. Furthermore, donors have a responsibility to hold the GoK and UN-Habitat
accountable through an active involvement in the KENSUP. Donors ought to ensure that the
KENSUP indeed benefits instead of hurts the target beneficiary group and that the project is not
only implemented according to its approved design contained in the KENSUP and SSUP
programme documents, but that it is also implemented in the most ethical and just manner
possible.
Minister Raila’s proposition of temporarily resettling Kibera-Soweto residents as part of
the SSUP therefore ought to be of grave concern to the KENSUP’s donors. Not only is the
temporary resettlement of all or most Kiberans of Soweto village not included in the KENSUP
and SSUP documents and has been shown to be a recurring component of failed past upgrade
projects,72 but it also places the KENSUP/SSUP at risk of breaking international law.
International legal documents require a comprehensive resettlement plan before such a
resettlement is initiated. As of April 2004, no such plan had been developed for the
KENSUP/SSUP to the author’s knowledge, although Minister Raila had already announced a
temporary resettlement component of the SSUP over a year earlier in Athi River,73 and resettling
of Kibera-Soweto residents around Kibera continues to be given as a component of the SSUP by
the GoK. In respect to temporary resettlement as a slum upgrading component, international law
documents that are relevant to the KENSUP international donors include the following:

1) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to which Kenya
is a signatory and party to, Article Twenty-Two, General Comment Number Two on
International Technical Assistance Measures, paragraph six:

International agencies should scrupulously avoid involvement in projects which…involve largescale evictions or displacement of persons without the provision of all appropriate protection and
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compensation, (qtd. in Christ the King Church, Memorandum RE: Kibera Urban Environmental
Sanitation Project, 19 Nov. 2002 2).

2) Guidelines issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) for aid agencies sponsoring projects:

Donor countries should not support projects that cause population displacement unless they
contain acceptable resettlement plans for protecting the rights of the affected groups, (qtd. in
Christ the King Church, Memorandum 19 Nov. 2002 2).

3) The World Bank Operational Directive 4.30, Section Four:
Where large-scale population displacement is unavoidable, a detailed resettlement plan, timetable,
and budget are required, (qtd. in Christ the King Church, Memorandum 19 Nov. 2002 2).

If the SSUP is going to be successful in Kibera-Soweto, the project’s international donors
need to become more active in the project. Since they are one more step removed from the
project than UN-Habitat, it may be difficult for the donors to effectively put pressure on the GoK
to follow through with the high standards based on SL that the KENSUP has developed since
2001. Yet this should be no excuse. This kind of international political pressure on the Ministry
of Roads, Public Works, and Housing could prove to be quite effective in helping to steer the
KENSUP/SSUP back on track. Development aid is not about donating money and forgetting
about it. Success can only be achieved through unified and engaged donors who share the vision
and commitment of the slum upgrading project in Kibera-Soweto.

5.12 Private Sector in Housing
Nairobi’s private housing sector is unfortunately not yet involved with any significance in
the SSUP. However, the GoK and UN-Habitat make numerous references in their KENSUP
documents and have discussed in meetings74 that they want the private sector to play a key
participatory role in housing development in relation to Kenya’s former and present National

74

This is according to printed meeting notes from 28 January, 2002, (Notes, 4).

102 Ehresmann
Housing Policy. Despite their clear wishes to involve the private sector, the sector has not yet
been effectively pulled into the SSUP.
Historically, the private sector has done little if anything to help the majority 60% who
live in informal settlements in Nairobi. With such a high demand for housing in Nairobi it would
seem that housing would be an excellent investment for Kenya’s entrepreneurs. In fact, just the
opposite is true. According to Otiso, the main reason the private sector has not been at the
forefront of providing housing is due to limited profit making opportunities, (section 3.2). There
is simply not enough money to be made, especially in providing quality low-income housing.
The poor majority does not have the money to pay the rent required for most landlords to break
even, let alone make a lucrative profit. The reason for this is that the market value of land within
Nairobi’s city limits, even land that was previously unvalued and unwanted, has risen to such an
extent that it is basically inaccessible for low-income access. Land value has risen with the
rising number of Nairobi’s residents along with increased commercialization. The United
Nations identified access to land as the current “greatest single obstacle to the improvement of
urban living conditions,” (qtd. in Gitau and Olima 2; [UN, 1993]). This may help explain why
Minister Raila was reaching to far off Athi River (35km from Nairobi) for a possible SSUP
temporary resettlement site in early to mid 2003.
In addition to the lack of profitability, Bodewes notes two other major reasons why the
private sector is not involved in addressing Nairobi’s housing crisis. The first is Kenya’s long
history of foreign donors providing for nearly all of the country’s housing improvements. Most
of these improvements have come through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). According to Bodewes, this has created an expectation that foreigners will continue to
pay for future housing, (Letter, 4 Jan, 2004).
The second and most important reason is the lack of security of tenure due to Kenya’s
land problems remaining unresolved, (Letter, 4 Jan, 2004). Kibera’s land officially belongs to
the GoK, and unofficially to numerous structure owners, many who are politically and/or
financially powerful (as discussed above in the “Structure Owners” section 5.2). Those who are
part of the current Kibera political-economic power structure do not want additional prospective
entrepreneurs competing with them. Maintaining the slum-like housing situation in Kibera is
extremely profitable for current structure owners and local government officials. Without any
money spent on upkeep, utilities, or taxes, illegal Kiberan slum housing is Nairobi’s most
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profitable real estate investment, providing an annual return between 102 and 130% compared to
60-80% annual returns from other informal settlements in Nairobi, (Syagga, et al., NSA Rapid
Economic Appraisal of Rents in Slum and Informal Settlements 15). This is the backbone of
Kibera’s political-economic power structure that firmly maintains the status quo and makes sure
to keep the true private housing sector out of the Kiberan market. Beyond this political threat,
prospective housing entrepreneurs also find the risk too great to build in Kibera since the GoK
could take over or destroy new housing units since they would be built on public slum land.
More than simply general inaction, it has been suggested (with the presence of substantial
motive to support the claim) that in some cases landlords of all socio-economic flats and houses,
who comprise the portion of the private sector directly involved in housing development and
provision in Nairobi, have actually worked against the success of slum upgrading projects.
Kimeu, a Kenyan native and former resident of Nairobi, acknowledges that middle to upperscale landlords in Nairobi have hired youth and others to thwart upgrading plans in the past by
spreading false rumors among residents to turn communities against projects. The youths
explain that it is just another ploy by the GoK and the wealthy to move them out of their slum
community in order to develop the land for middle and upper class housing to generate profit.
These statements are unfortunately believable from past experience in Nairobi.
The motive for Nairobi’s landlords to oppose slum upgrading projects lies in the citywide
housing market. They, similar to the structure owners in Kibera, are simply working to protect
their interests. Their central interest is protecting their real estate investment and monetary
income derived from rents paid by their tenants. Although not directly involved with the SSUP,
landlords outside of Kibera have everything to loose and nothing to gain from competing
standards in housing that would result from a large housing upgrade programme like the
KENSUP. If an upgrade programme were successful in offering slum dwellers brand new
housing units based on Kenya’s housing policy standard of two rooms plus its own kitchen and
toilet, and ensured their occupancy of such units by having a fixed low rent, there would be
considerable pressure on middle and upper class landlords to lower their own rents or improve
their facilities to justify the difference in rental rates in the face of competing and changing
housing standards in Nairobi.
Like structure owners, there is no inherent free-market incentive for the private sector to
support the KENSUP and SSUP. While these and other losses to the private housing sector must
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be considered, unlike Kibera’s structure owners, it is not justified to ensure that all private
landlords throughout Nairobi directly benefit from the SSUP. However, legislation protecting
against their losses (i.e. a drop in rents) may be a key strategy the GoK ought to consider to
alleviate destructive opposition from this stakeholder group.

5.13 Conclusion
Every KENSUP/SSUP stakeholder group holds a relatively high level of mistrust and
suspicion towards at least one other stakeholder. On the macro level, stakeholders can be
divided into opposing groups on two different levels. The first opposing pair comprises the
SSUP bottom-half or grassroots stakeholders on one side, and the SSUP top-half or
governmental administrative stakeholders on the other. Generally, stakeholders in the bottomhalf include Kiberan tenants, structure owners, CBOs, RBOs, and NGOs, while stakeholders in
the top-half comprise the GoK including the Provincial Administration, UN-Habitat, the NCC,
and the KENSUP’s international donors. Nationally, mistrust between these two macro groups
has developed over the years due to poor urban housing policies and failed upgrading projects by
both the GoK and the NCC, which now stands as a major roadblock for the SSUP. It is along
this divide that a lack of dialogue and an information vacuum about the SSUP existed during
2003. This led in one case to the threat of violence by a city councilor in June 2003 to disband a
meeting of Kiberan CBOs and NGOs due to a false suspicion that the meeting was organizing
against the SSUP, explored further in the next chapter.
A second major dividing line can be drawn between stakeholders that want the SSUP to
be successful, and those that either have an interest for it not to be successful or do not care. It is
along this dividing line that pits tenants against structure owners. Since 70% of Soweto’s
structure owners live in the community,75 this means resident against resident in some cases. In
addition to structure owners, other stakeholders who could also threaten the SSUP include select
local and higher authorities of both the GoK and the NCC who are directly or indirectly involved
in making money off of the status quo informal nature of Kiberan rent payment and land
ownership, as well as select private landlords from other parts of Nairobi whose rent rates could
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be lowered by possible new slum housing. Other smaller divisions exist between various
stakeholders and even within single stakeholder groups, such as the GoK.
To build a sustainable and successful SSUP, there must first be unanimous agreement
that violent confrontation between stakeholders will never be used as a means to one’s ends. The
success of the SSUP depends on the commitment of each stakeholder group to not only do the
obvious – collaborate, communicate, and peacefully and diplomatically move towards a solution
that will benefit all parties involved – but to also bend over backwards to compromise some of
their own interests when better for the whole of the project. The only way agreement will be
reached is if each stakeholder gives more to the SSUP than they expect to receive from it.
The success of the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) will ultimately be
judged on how well the Soweto community maintains the project improvements and how many
original target beneficiaries are left to benefit years after its Implementation Phase. It is
important to note that after the SSUP has been implemented, the Kibera-Soweto resident
community will be left as the only active stakeholder. Benefiting communities of development
projects usually have the sole responsibility of maintenance. Successful maintenance in KiberaSoweto will only be fulfilled if residents have had a sense of ownership in the project from the
beginning. This sense of ownership can only be fostered by the community’s involvement from
the Inception Phase on – or in the case of the current SSUP, as soon as possible since the
Inception Phase has already come and gone. The importance of community participation, the
manner in which it should happen, and criticism against the theory are discussed in the next
chapter.
This chapter provided an overview of the inherent complexity of the KENSUP/SSUP in
regards to the diversity of this initiative’s stakeholders and their interests. The SSUP analysis
continues in the next chapter on a different level that examines the details of specific conflicts
and complexities that have arisen out of key interactions (or lack there of) between the above
stakeholder groups. The issues revolve around corruption and the importance of community
participation and dialogue.
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6.0 Critical Analysis of the SSUP: Factors working against the Project

The last chapter analyzed the KENSUP and SSUP from the perspective of each
individual stakeholder and their diverse interests. This chapter journeys deeper into the
complexities and confusion surrounding the KENSUP and SSUP introduced in the preceding
chapter. Specifically, in addition to exploring larger trends such as Kenya’s culture of corruption
and its effect on Kibera and the SSUP, this chapter examines key issues including the project’s
disorganization, its trend towards centralization, and ultimately evidence that the GoK is not
serious about applying the key ideas from the KENSUP’s theoretical foundation of the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) on paper, which advocates a participatory peoplecentered approach in Kibera-Soweto.
The major supporting ideas of this chapter revolve around the ambiguity of the KENSUP
and SSUP and the lack of positive stakeholder interaction. The project’s media coverage has
been shrouded in conflict between the GoK and the Kiberans. Its leaders were quiet when dialog
and information was so urgently needed, and when official information did come, it caused
major tension, was inaccurate, or was simply too late.
All of this suggests that the SSUP is following in the footsteps of failed slum upgrading
projects gone before. This trend could be unintentional or deliberate. While it is the hope of the
author that the former is true, the reader may come to his or her own opinion.

6.1 Kenya’s Culture of Corruption
“It happened that now and then the Council would borrow money from the Americanowned World Bank, or from European and Japanese banks, to finance the construction of
cheap houses for the poor. That was a source of real fat. I can remember one time when
the Council demolished some shanties at Ruuwa-ini. The plan was to erect a thousand
houses there instead. The money was loaned to the Council by an Italian bank. The
company that won the tender for building the houses was Italian. But, of course, it had
first given me a small back-hander of about 2,000,000 shillings. I put the money in my
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account and knew that the campaign money had been repaid. Now I waited for the
returns on my investment in the elections,”

-Kihaahu wa Gatheeca, fictional character76

The system and network of corruption in any government can be very difficult to change.
Kenya is no different. Former President Daniel arap Moi’s twenty-four year presidency (which
ended in January, 2003) is now recognized as being one of Africa’s many exceedingly corrupt
regimes, despite it’s role in building Kenya’s once excellent status as a model of development in
Africa. Imara, the newsletter of the Association of the Sisterhoods of Kenya Justice and Peace
Commission (AOSK-JPC), points out that, “Corruption has become a vice that has eaten into all
sectors of our Kenyan society, with public institutions being the most affected,” (2). Since most
of Kenya’s top officials have historically been involved in some kind of corruption, it has been
even more alluring for those lower ranking to also become involved. This has created an
environment that is very difficult to change, and even produces hostile responses to those
attempting to change the status quo.
For example, in 1995 the mayor of Nairobi, John King’ori, had been leading an initiative
to stop corruption in the City Council (NCC). In response to his rather noble work for the
betterment of all Nairobians he received a clear message, unquestionably from fellow councilors,
that they did not like his threatening the way they do business. The message came not only in
the form of death threats, but in an actual assassination attempt by an incited youth that
thankfully only wounded him, (Lorch).
The corruption in the Nairobi City Council that former Mayor King’ori was drawing
attention to is just a small part of the cancer that has been eating away at Kenya’s once high
prospects as East Africa’s leading economic center and development model. Corruption on the
national level contributed to rendering the nation unqualified for its IMF funding in 2000 and
undesirable to private international investors. The IMF had become aware of the high level of
corruption in the GoK and refused to release some US$400 million until Kenya could prove,
“that it ha[d] a foolproof mechanism of fighting corruption,” (Munaita). Contributing to the
IMF’s decision and proving the existence of the corruption problem, in August 2001 Members of
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Parliament (MPs) went so far as to protect themselves and their illegal practices by voting down
an independent investigative body on corruption, (Lacey).
This long pattern of corruption has not only become a way of life in higher Kenyan
politics and political economy during Moi’s regime, but has also trickled down to all sectors and
walks of life. MP Kiraitu Murungi commented on how wide spread corruption and bribery has
become in Kenyan culture at a 2001 conference on the issue, “Corruption is not limited to
ministers, permanent secretaries and other top state officials. Corruption is everywhere. The
chief, the businessman, the teacher, the driver, the messenger, the farmer, the rich and the poor –
your brother and mine – are involved,” (qtd. in Lacy).
This culture of corruption and bribery has been one of the most important factors that has
created and perpetuated the current slum conditions in Nairobi. Two decades of swindling
public funds have left Nairobi’s infrastructure a mess. Former mayor King’ori explained in
1995, “Nairobi has been dismantled. Water and sewage is a great problem. Roads are a huge
problem. We lack the funds. We are paying a lot of money for telephones and electricity, but
why do we not have enough? I complain like other citizens. The charges are there but the
services are not there,” (Lorch). The services are not there because corrupt leaders have been
lining their pockets. For example, it has been common for both councilors and provincial
authorities to make contracts with contractors to do certain projects (usually to improve the city’s
infrastructure) after being paid a bribe by the contracting company, which ultimately comes out
of the government money to be paid for the contract. Shrouded in confusion and a lack of
communication and accountability, the work often does not get done, but the money cycles
around until everyone has taken their own cut of the government money. As suggested in the
quote at the top of this section, some of these projects have included new housing and slum
upgrading initiatives.
In 2004, President Mwai Kibaki is continuing his anti-corruption push that brought him
into office. He met with District and Provincial Commissioners in February 2004 to implore
them to set the example of non-corrupt practices. In a statement on corruption, President Kibaki
stated, “We have to make up our mind that we shall route out corruption so that the resources of
this nation are used for the development of the nation, there is no one who doesn’t know how to
use government money well. We cannot therefore have any excuses, if you are corrupt you
should not be in government,” (qtd. on Statehouse web). Kibaki said accountability is now
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upped in the use of government monies for development. Apparently some Provincial
Commissioners were not submitting project reports on how government money was used until
yeas later, (Statehouse web).
Kibera MP and Housing Minister, Raila Odinga, boldly joined Kibaki’s anti-corruption
campaign in August 2003. According to Raila, the push to end corruption is a war that has
“zero-tolerance” as its slogan. Furthermore, Raila claimed that it will not distinguish between
ordinary citizens and top executives in government. The Daily Nation quoted Minister Raila
Odinga going so far as to say that, “If Raila Odinga, is found to have committed acts of
corruption, he will be charged,” (qtd. in Teyle).
The following section will explore some of the questionable political connections that
govern economics and living conditions in Kibera.

6.2 Kibera’s Dominant Political-Economic Power Structure
“It is in the interest of the ruling elite to continue to prevent easy access to land by the
urban poor because controlling access to land as a scarce resource provides a source of
cash income and political support.”
-Syagga, Mitullah, and Gitau77

“As for me, I’ll never abandon theft and robbery that is based on housing. There’s
nothing on this Earth that generates as much profit as people’s hunger and thirst for
shelter.”
-Kihaahu wa Gatheeca, fictional character78

Supporting the above quotations, McAuslan asserts that wealthy urban elites of most
developing countries control and manipulate the law to ensure that present systems of land
allocation and use remain for their benefit, (28). This is certainly the case in Nairobi. As
explored in Chapter 5.0, many higher-ups who own structures in Kibera work very closely with
local politicians in the slums (including the Provincial Administration and city councilors) who
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unofficially create and deliberate over their “laws” governing land and who is allowed to own
structures.
Agents comprise another part of Kibera’s power structure. Agents are hired by structure
owners to collect rents and manage their structures since most absentee owners themselves
understandably to not want to threaten their own lives by visiting and maintaining their structures
themselves. Moreover, recognizing Kenya’s abundant source of cheap youth labor,79 structure
owners and politicians alike have a history of hiring young men to harass and manipulate
Nairobi’s slum dwellers to their interests including rent collection, forced eviction, and political
control. Youth are often hired on a long-term basis, thus ensuring that they remain organized
and connected to the political authorities or wealthy absentee structure owners to whom they are
connected. Because of their constant presence and availability to their inciters, these puppet
youth groups play a key role in Kibera’s political and economic power structure.
Given the fact that Kibera and many other informal settlements in Nairobi are not legally
recognized by the GoK and are officially located on government land, the practice of charging
rent by structure owners is relatively unstable. In order to maintain order in this system, as in a
legal and secure tenure area with normal landlord-tenant relationships, the ultimate motivator for
tenants to pay rent is the threat of eviction. Unfortunately, the methods that structure owners and
politicians use for eviction in Kibera often violate tenants’ basic human rights.
In the majority of Kibera’s forced evictions over the last ten years, youth and older
“thugs” were hired to actually carry out the forceful evictions, involving the threat of or the
actual use of brutal and coercive methods. A common occurrence became unexpected house
burnings that would happen in the middle of the night. These violent acts affected particular
structures that had either changed hands or housed people who could not pay rent or refused to
pay in protest to their squalid living conditions. An example of the latter are the famous
December 2001 clashes that took place in Kibera, (Onguje). The protest resulted only in
violence and death.
Interestingly, Kibera’s December 2001 clashes were sparked by infamous statements of
both then President Moi and Kibera MP, Raila Odinga (currently the Minister of Roads, Public
Works, and Housing). Both politicians declared that structure owners did not have the right to be
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charging rent to Kibera’s residents since they do not own the land. One of Nairobi’s newspapers,
the Daily Nation quoted Raila, “The landlords must reduce rents because the land on which
Kibera slum is built is government land. You cannot be called a landlord if you do not own land;
those who have constructed houses on government land are government tenants,” (qtd. in Onguje
2001).
The 2001 clashes strongly suggest that the political-economic power structure of Kibera
runs all the way to the top of the Kenyan government. The incentive is clear. With 700,000
people concentrated in a small area, Kibera is the largest voter bank in the country. The
notoriously corrupt government under Moi did not hesitate to exploit this resource for their
political advantage. Christ the King Church states, “We [Christ the King Church] are aware that
politicians have recruited and trained militias that are created for the express purpose of
forcefully carrying out the agenda of the political party,” (Memorandum 19 Nov. 2002 5).
Although recently elected President Kibaki (2003) has given Kenyans hope for an end to corrupt
practices, the following evidence suggests little has changed in Kibera.
In an interview with Ph.D. student and UN-Habitat intern, Goux, I learned that the
Minister of Roads, Public Works, and Housing himself has his fingers sunk deep into the Kibera
political power structure. Apparently Minister Raila has hired youth to live in Kibera to aid in
his politicking, and information gathering and dispensing. He allegedly has paid the rents for
these youth for several years now. Most of them are from the Luo ethnic group from western
Kenya (the same region Raila is from where he enjoys strong support) and come to the
Minister’s service at his whim. If they are unwilling to do what he asks, the young men are
easily replaced with many more from rural western Kenya who are willing to do whatever it
takes to have a chance at big city life in Nairobi. Goux came to have this knowledge after
personally meeting and interviewing these youth in 2003.
Further evidence of the minister’s political use of youth in the Kibera power structure
comes from the statement of an anonymous structure owner published in The Quest for Human
Dignity.80 This publication focuses on Kibera’s December 2001 clashes supposedly between
structure owners and tenants over rents. Yet according to this Kiberan structure owner, the
80

This publication was prepared by the Nairobi-based NGO, Peace Net and the CBO, Kibera Youth Program for
Peace and Development, authored by Onguje, Philip, 2001.

112 Ehresmann
violence was not initiated by the structure owners or the tenants, but rather by youth hired by the
NDP political party – the party of Minister Raila at the time:
It is the NDP youth that put up placards saying president Moi decreed rents should not be paid…[it] is the
NDP youth that are attacking and destroying landlords’ property. There is no tenant that is fighting a
landlord [structure owner]…The truth is that it is the NDP and the Luos that have brought the violence in
Kibera. It is not the landlords. And again it is not the tenants…What we can say is that you advi[s]e the
government to talk with Raila to restrain his youth from interfering in the housing and rents issues in
Kibera and you will not see any violence, (28-29).

The statements by former President Moi and MP Raila encouraging residents not to pay
rents in Kibera in early December 2001 came at a critical time politically. At that time, both of
these political leaders were heading towards a coalition of their two parties, KANU (Moi) and
NDP (Raila). Their statements came during a pre-election period, (2002 was an election year)
thus raising the question if their motive was indeed voter support from Kibera’s mass numbers of
tenants, in effect using Kibera as a voter bank. Christ the King Church supports this analysis,
“The December clashes are a good example of how this exploitation works…It appears that
government officials and politicians wanted to take advantage of this very volatile situation to
curry political favor with certain ethnic communities,” (19 November, 5).
Given the present political state, little will change in Kibera until members of the GoK
and Provincial Administration significantly change the manner in which they conduct their
political affairs. This means that the SSUP is up against very unfavorable odds – against a wellestablished political power structure that is giving no sign of changing. However a major change
in the GoK is on the way. The new Kenyan Constitution that is still in the works as of 2004,
provides hope that long over-due change is sincerely in process. How much the new
Constitution will positively affect Kibera’s political-economic power structure remains to be
seen. Still, all of the SSUP’s stumbling blocks cannot be attributed to Kenya’s faulted political
system alone. The leaders of the KENSUP have mismanaged the SSUP and have failed to
successfully implement SL-based participation in Kibera-Soweto, which has created much
turmoil and has endangered the lives of Kibera’s residents.
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6.3 Community Participation in the SSUP
“Things can only work if governments participate in people’s programmes and not if
people are asked to participate in government programmes.”
-Rahman, Director of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Research and
Training Institute in Karachi, Pakistan81
Beginning in the 1970s in part from the work of John Turner,82 participation has grown to
be a major component of development projects on all scales around the world. Countless
articles, program documents, and most authoritatively, site analyses on actual slum grading
projects indicate that the genuine participation and involvement of the target beneficiary
community is crucial to the sustainable success of any initiative seeking to improve that
community’s well being. In response to this global trend, UN-Habitat and the GoK created the
Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) as part of the official KENSUP institutional
structure to act as the central mechanism to involve the Kibera-Soweto community in the SSUP.
Despite the solid theory, programme documents, and KENSUP/SSUP press notices that
claim community participation as the hallmark of this project, the Kibera-Soweto community has
not been actually or meaningfully involved in the SSUP. Unfortunately, the SSUP’s failure to
implement popular participation while publicly advertising that the target beneficiaries (Soweto
slum dwellers) are directly participating is in keeping with the major criticisms against
participation as a development theory. This break from the theoretical framework of the
KENSUP and SSUP seriously threatens the SSUP’s potential success.

6.3.1 The Argument for Participation in the SSUP
Nearly everyone will agree that all people hold the basic right to participate in decisions
affecting their life. The difficulty lies in how well this right is protected and exercised.
According to Justice in the World, “Participation constitutes a right which is to be applied both
in the economic and in the social and political field,” (point 18). Moreover, point 71 emphasizes
the importance of participatory project planning, “through mutual cooperation, all peoples should
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be able to become the principle architects of their own economic and social development.”
Following this, the participation endorsed by the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) is not
limited to the implementation phase of a project. Rather, SL entails the full inclusion of target
beneficiaries throughout the whole slum upgrading process, most importantly including the
problem identification and decision-making processes that happen while planning and designing
the project. According to Berger, “Those who are the objects of policy [sh]ould have the
opportunity to participate not only in specific decisions but in the definitions of the situation on
which these decisions are based,” (xiii). Therefore following Berger, a true participatory SL
SSUP would have had community meetings starting in early 2003 (right after Raila announced
the Kibera-Soweto site for the KENSUP) to gather detailed information directly from KiberaSoweto’s residents about what specific issues and needs are actually most important to the
community – before time had passed to allow for project opponents to spread false and
manipulative rumors about the project.
Several housing improvement projects in Pakistan have experienced achievement based
on the wisdom discussed by Berger and essential in SL. One of them, the Orangi Pilot Project
Housing Programme (OPP) originally established in 1980 in Karachi, Pakistan, has experienced
much success, (Hasan 82). Based on the potential of community empowerment, the OPP did not
focus on infrastructure and service delivery, or housing provision as many slum upgrading
projects do. Instead, the OPP promoted the growth and capacity building of community
organizations to lead project designing and implementing, supported co-operative action, and
provided expert technical support to the local organizations and individuals in Orangi Township.
Before the project, Orangi had no sewer and almost no water – similar to Kibera. Through selforganized “lane groups,” residents collected enough money and self-managed the construction of
buried sewer systems in their lanes. In this manner, all but the main trunk connections and
possible treatment plants (constructed by the government) could be financed and managed on the
local level at a lower cost.
Although Kibera as a whole has many absentee landlords that would make a project like
this difficult there, according to the KENSUP Site Selection Committee, Soweto village has a
higher percentage of resident landlords than Kibera’s average who would be more willing to
invest in such an initiative. Even if the OPP model is not feasible in Kibera-Soweto, Hasan
summarizes the model’s central message, “…empowerment is possible and feasible, provided
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that architects and planners change their attitude and learn to trust people,” (81). This is a
message the Government of Kenya needs to hear.
If the target beneficiaries of the SSUP (the Kibera-Soweto residents) are not included in
the planning phase of the SSUP,83 then as Scott points out, state officials are left in a self-made
information vacuum. Within this vacuum, GoK authorities (both national and local) will be, and
already have been, forced to assess the needs and interests of the Kibera-Soweto residents based
not on their reality on the ground, but on the limited typifications available to the GoK about
their situation as slum dwellers. According to the Shelter Forum, the situation will grow worse if
slum residents are not actively involved in the design and planning as well as the implementation
of the KENSUP and SSUP, saying in fact that, “…this programme [SSUP] will not succeed,” if
target beneficiaries do not participate, (6).
Assuming what the needs and goals of a poor community are by outside project leaders
described by Scott is quite common even for non-governmental workers. One example is a small
Latin American community explained by Sociologist, Dr. Ron Pagnucco. A few foreign
volunteers approached the community with the funds for a participatory slum upgrading project.
After gathering information from residents, the community’s priorities turned out to be much
different than the project leaders expected. The first thing the community wanted to build was a
soccer field with large stadium lights so the community could come together to play and watch
soccer at night after work. The community wanted the lit soccer field before they wanted a new
sewer system and other basic infrastructure items that most westerners automatically assume to
be the top priorities of any developing community. Had the community not been consulted, they
would have received an unwanted sewer system that would have likely deteriorated over time by
negligence resulting from a lack of ownership in the project, in addition to not having their
priority needs met. Non-locals regularly falsely assume what the top priorities for residents are.
Alternatively, Wera points out, “By allowing the ‘objects’ of the policy to work on the
solution rather than having one forced upon them, a vested interest is fostered within the group
and the decisions made represent the reality of those affected,” (3). The Kibera-Soweto
community’s input on critical decisions shaping the SSUP is the only path to creating a project in
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Kibera that will address the real and actual needs of the urban poor that the SSUP is aiming to
help.
If Kibera-Soweto residents are actively involved in the planning and designing of their
SSUP, in addition to gaining the community-wide vested interest mentioned by Wera,
individuals’ incentive, initiative, and ownership in the project will also be created. All of these
are key elements of long-term sustainability of an upgraded Soweto village and eventually the
whole of Kibera. Moreover, the Soweto community’s involvement in designing the solution to
their problems will align the residents with the other SSUP stakeholders (namely the GoK) and
fundamentally contribute to creating the unity and synergy needed for success – emphasized by
SL and exemplified in the OPP. Instead of resisting, mistrusting, and being suspicious of the
GoK, Kibera-Soweto residents would be able to dedicate themselves in partnership to the
primary objective of the KENSUP and SSUP: to sustainably improve their own livelihoods and
living conditions by deciding the best local upgrading and tenure scheme for their community
with the support of the top-half of the SSUP – GoK, the NCC, and UN-Habitat – in addition to
select NGOs organized together for collaboration.
Rahman, the director of the Research and Training Institute of the Orangi Pilot Project,
sums up participatory slum upgrading, “Things can only work if governments participate in
people’s programmes and not if people are asked to participate in government programmes,”
(qtd. in Hasan 81). This is precisely what the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) demands.
Applied to the SSUP, all of the above show that without the emphasis on grassroots
involvement in decision-making to balance out the necessary administrative top-half of the SSUP
valued by Werlin, the SSUP risks unsustainability and ultimate failure to improve the lives of the
target beneficiaries, even if initial improvements are experienced for several years. Worse still,
without the above SL conditions the SSUP risks the outcome of violence. This would come
from both Kiberan residents against the project and local government officials through incited
youth attempting to maintain order in a chaotic community. Conflict could also be expected
between structure owners and tenants over the rent rates and management of whatever sparse or
sour fruit the SSUP might be able to produce without the input of the Kibera-Soweto community
in the planning and designing of their upgrading project.
With the importance of participatory development in mind and the guidance of UNHabitat, the GoK has claimed in writing and in speeches that it will follow SL in the SSUP and
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the larger KENSUP. The KENSUP document states that all objectives of the programme,
“…will be done through engaging full and active participation of stakeholders,” (Government of
Kenya 5). The SSUP document is even more specific by naming residents, “This [slum
upgrading] will be through the active involvement of slum dwellers, public authorities, domestic
and international investors alike,” (Government of Kenya 1). Even the GoK head of the
KENSUP, Minister Raila Odinga, has himself publicly endorsed a participatory approach for the
SSUP on multiple accounts. A UN-Habitat Media Centre article covering Raila’s announcement
of the KENSUP states, “Mr. Odinga stressed that, in common with other best practices from
around the world, tenants and landlords would be consulted and fully involved in the planning
and execution phases of the slum upgrading project to ensure that their needs and concerns are
addressed,” (Major Initiative). Echoing this, in the 8 August 2003 KENSUP press notice84 Raila
writes that slum dwellers will be “fully and actively involved in improving their own livelihoods
and neighborhoods.” However Raila actually does not have a real choice in the matter. In
addition to international pressure, Kenya’s 1996 Physical Planning Act requires that residents be
involved in the planning process for physical developments of their area, (Acttoki).
Unfortunately even this law has failed to guarantee genuine community participation in KiberaSoweto.

6.3.2 Potential Participation via the Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU)
With the value of an SL participatory process clear, the next major question is how
should this resident participation be realized in the SSUP? The difficulty in answering this
question has stood as a roadblock to grassroots participation not only in the SSUP but also in
other development initiatives around the world. It is much easier to talk about involving
residents in designing a project than actually realizing it. The gap between participatory
upgrading talk and walking the walk is a major problem in the SSUP and raises several other
questions.
Just how far should the concept of participation be taken? Through what mechanism
should the Kibera-Soweto community participate in the SSUP? Should the GoK make a
concerted effort to actively include the residents of Kibera-Soweto in the public policy-making
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process on a level in which all community members are involved? While democratic idealism
would answer yes to this last question, there are serious doubts as to if this could ever be sensibly
possible. Hurdles existing for this all-inclusive level of community participation include
crippling organizational complexity and the resulting exceedingly slow process that would
produce little to no forward motion on the project. Additionally, the fact of reality is that some
Kibera-Soweto residents lack the will, ability, and/or availability (time wise and economically in
loses from their income-generating activity) to commit to a deeply involved decision-making
role in the SSUP. The natural response to this dilemma in a democratic nation such as Kenya is
the use of representatives who are justly and democratically elected to a body to serve as the
voice of the people of Kibera-Soweto regarding their interests, needs, and concerns.
Such a representative body is actually mandated as part of the official KENSUP
institutional structure in the KENSUP and SSUP documents. The KENSUP/SSUP call for the
creation of the Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU). The SPIU’s purpose is to
mobilize grassroots participation for the SSUP and be the voice of the community in directing
the Kibera-Soweto Project. Unfortunately according to Makokha and Bodewes, as of March
2004 Kibera-Soweto’s SPIU had not yet been formed – fourteen months after Raila’s
announcement of Kibera-Soweto as the KENSUP’s pilot project.
The formation of this group is absolutely critical for upholding the goals of community
participation present in the KENSUP and SSUP programme documents. According to the
arranged institutional structures of the KENSUP and SSUP as of March, 2003, the SPIU is to
provide the primary and in fact now the only avenue for all local community participation in the
SSUP since the Multi-Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG) no longer meets.85 It would be
easiest to form the SPIU from existing self-organized community groups, which is exactly what
the GoK and UN-Habitat were planning to do, (Christ the King Church). Unfortunately this is
not a viable option.
Contrary to assumptions held by UN-Habitat and the GoK, Soweto is one of if not the
least organized villages of Kibera. According to Christ the King Church, which has many
parishioners from Soweto (located in neighboring Kibera-Line Saba), developed and organized
community groups (NGOs and CBOs) in Soweto simply do not exist, (Memorandum 9 Oct.).
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Confirming this, Goux’s research also found that Soweto’s lack of pre-existing community
organization is partly due to the community’s higher percentage of recent rural-urban migrants
and a younger than average population compared to other Kiberan villages, (6). Adding to the
disorganization is the community’s current shifting population composition due to gentrification
resulting from the anticipation of SSUP benefits by outsiders. Further illustrating this reality,
nearly all of the CBOs and NGOs that the KENSUP Secretariat has worked with during the
Inception Phase to develop the framework of the national KENSUP are based elsewhere in
Nairobi or in other Kiberan villages that are not target beneficiaries of the SSUP. Although
community-organizing efforts have been working in Huruma (the top ranking settlement
identified by UN-Habitat’s Site Selection Committee for the KENSUP86) for the past four years,
organizing efforts have not even been started in Soweto, (Christ the King, Memorandum 9 Oct).
This means that the GoK and the NCC cannot depend on pre-existing groups in Kibera-Soweto
to organize themselves into a SPIU and otherwise take care of the community participation
component of the SSUP on their own. An intentional special effort is required to create the SPIU
in Kibera-Soweto and the GoK and NCC must step up to fulfill their roles as coordinators and
facilitators with the strong leadership and support of UN-Habitat to conduct this effort.
The key criticism is that the GoK and UN-Habitat were not even informed of this
situation on the ground in Soweto at the end of 2003 – nearly one year after they had publicly
announced Kibera-Soweto as the first project of the KENSUP in mid January 2003. Had the
GoK and UN-Habitat been more organized and in dialogue with the community or surrounding
communities such as Kibera-Line Saba, they could have immediately begun taking the necessary
measures to facilitate the creation of one or several SPIUs in Kibera-Soweto after the
Secretariat’s announcement. Part of the confusion is associated with the questionable site
selection process that chose Kibera-Soweto for the first KENSUP project, discussed in the last
section of this chapter. As it is, the effort to form a SPIU in Soweto is far behind schedule and
there is much to do.
Forming one or several SPIUs in Kibera-Soweto will involve a lot of work, and will be a
very sensitive issue. Several key questions must be addressed before forming the SPIU(s). For
example, how will Kibera-Soweto residents select community representatives? While it is easily
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stated that the community will select the SPIU members, given Kibera’s nature as a political
tinderbox, this task will be difficult to do justly. Should a full community election be held?
Although challenging to organize, this would be the best and most just method. Who will run
the election? While in one sense it would be logical for the GoK to place local chiefs and city
councilors in charge of it since they are the local governmental authorities, due to the vested
interests of all three of these governmental groups in Kibera-Soweto and their notorious
corruption, it would be much better if a neutral third party or a multi-lateral group ran the
election. UN-Habitat would fill this leadership role for the SPIU formation process excellently,
and could earn back the trust of the Kiberan community on the KENSUP. If UN-Habitat lacks
the resources to send their own experts into Kibera, then they should coordinate and support
creditable NGOs to lead the formation of SPIU(s) by election in Soweto. The KENSUP
Secretariat will need to authorize UN-Habitat and corresponding NGOs for their election
activities according to the current Memorandum of Understanding between the GoK and UNHabitat. Without this policy spark from the Secretariat (based in the MoRPWH), UN-Habitat or
neutral third parties (such as NGOs) will not begin the process on their own and conversely, such
an election process demands one coordinated effort to eliminate mass confusion and chaos that
would come from many disjointed SPIU formation efforts.
After the election has been arranged, how will it be monitored to ensure validity and
fairness, especially when acknowledging the community’s bi-polar interests between structure
owners and tenants? Both structure owners and tenants have strong incentives to take whatever
measures are necessary to ensure that their stakeholder group comprises the majority of
representatives on the SPIU(s). Therefore the SSUP officials, and monitoring NGOs and CBOs
all must enforce that a proportional number of structure owners to tenants are elected to represent
Soweto in the SPIU(s), based on the groups’ relative population percentages in the Soweto
community. Given that 80% of Kibera-Soweto’s residents are tenants, they ought to comprise
roughly 80% of the SPIU representative body.
Of further concern, according to Goux’s study, wealthier or politically connected people
have already started migrating to Kibera-Soweto (gentrification) in anticipation of enjoying
whatever benefits the SSUP might ultimately provide. Besides creating a problem of rising rents
that are unjustly and pre-maturely displacing the urban poor targeted by UN-Habitat and the
GoK to benefit from the SSUP, there arises the question of representation of Soweto’s new
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residents on the SPIU(s). In fairness to the original target beneficiaries and to set an important
precedent for future KENSUP upgrade projects, officials ought to prohibit the new wealthier
migrants from both the fruits of the SSUP, and certainly from being representatives on the
SPIU(s). But how will these wealthier residents be controlled and kept out of the SPIU(s) and
the SSUP as a whole to ensure the original poorest of Kibera-Soweto actually benefit from and
hold the community voice in the SSUP? One possible strategy suggested by Goux is to only
allow residents who can prove they have lived in Soweto since before January 200387 to be
included in the SSUP and its SPIU(s), (12). This will prove extremely difficult to do given the
state of corruption in Kibera and demands attention and strategy development from all KENSUP
stakeholders, especially UN-Habitat – the most experienced stakeholder with slum upgrading
projects.
Considering the high stakes involved with the SSUP since Kibera shanty houses are the
highest returning housing investment in Nairobi, in general all participants and observers should
expect the attempted bribing of and violent threats against whoever is running the SPIU election.
Everything that can be must be done to stop these forces and protect those working for a just
process. Since structure owners have an unfair economic advantage over tenants, such an
election must be closely monitored by many third party organizations to eliminate all bribery and
corrupt practices.
Realizing Kibera’s complex and heated political environment, these issues are just some
of the challenges facing the implementation of community participation in the SSUP.
Unfortunately these difficulties may prove too daunting for the GoK, as the SSUP Secretariat, to
follow through with. Between the initial meetings of the Joint Slum Upgrading Initiative88 in
November 2000 between the GoK and UN-Habitat, to October 2003, NGOs were the closest
level of organization to the slum dwellers either leading body had directly interacted with. While
relying on NGOs for key information about the situation on the ground ought to be a component
of the SSUP, the difficulty and complexity involved with implementing community participation
down to the next level – the final grassroots level of ordinary slum dwellers – should not be
reason to evade it. Recent Kenyan history shows that this project will not achieve its goals
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without such grassroots residential input.89 In the face of this challenge, the KENSUP
programme documents actually provide a framework for the democratic formation of a SPIU.
According to Makokha and the Inter Agency Co-ordinating Committee (IACC) report, it
is in fact the Nairobi City Council (NCC) that holds the direct responsibility to facilitate the
formation of the SPIU(s) in Kibera-Soweto through the Council’s KENSUP Project
Implementation Unit (PIU) structure, (10). While the KENSUP document confirms this
NCC/PIU role, the SSUP document makes no mention of the NCC/PIU responsibility to help
form the SPIU(s). This has contributed to the confusion surrounding how community
involvement will actually be implemented in the SSUP. To help the NCC, according to the
meeting notes of an October 2001 workshop, the Secretariat (GoK) agreed to monitor the
SPIU(S) formation, while the Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT) would help to run the
elections, which proves that the KENSUP architects did intend for an actual SPIU election, (Inter
Agency Co-ordinating Committee 1).
Beyond the above Kenyan governmental entities facilitating the formation of the SSUP
grass-roots body, Makokha of the Shelter Forum hopes NGOs will also be involved with the
creation of the one or more SPIUs in Kibera-Soweto, (Personal Interview). Christ the King
Church also recommends not only one community SPIU group, but the formation of several
democratically elected community groups in light of Soweto’s lack of pre-existing community
organization, (Memorandum 9 Oct.). This is a good suggestion as it will involve more residents
in the SSUP both directly and indirectly.
Despite the positive fact that the SPIU is a part of the KENSUP and SSUP institutional
structure, it is implied by the unit’s name – the Settlement Project Implementation Unit – that
this group will only be involved in the Implementation Phase of the SSUP and not in the
planning and design processes of the Preparatory Phase – the most important phase for
community participation. One could argue that this offers some explanation as to why this core
community group has not yet been formed, since the SSUP is not yet in the Implementation
Phase as of April 2004. In response, it must be noted that the KENSUP and SSUP programme
documents in addition to the IACC Sub-Committee Working On The Programme Organization
and Institutional Structure Final Draft Report, have charged the SPIU with key activities directly
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related to the Preparatory Phase and the design and planning of the actual end product of the
SSUP. Following SL, these activities involve gathering input from the target beneficiaries about
their unique needs and interests. Specifically, there are two points (“b” and “e”) from the IACC
report section 6.1 titled, “Terms of Reference [for the SPIU],” which state that instead of simply
implementing a pre-designed project from the top administrative half of the KENSUP/SSUP
institutional structure as the SPIU name implies (Settlement Project Implementation Unit), the
SPIU (and therefore the Soweto community through representatives) will be meaningfully
involved in shaping the SSUP by holding the following responsibilities:

b) Identify the social and physical infrastructure and other project intervention needs of the settlement, (12).

e) Liaise as necessary with both PIU and the Programme Secretariat in project planning, implementation
and monitoring, (12). [Emphasis added in both points.]

Therefore, it is clear that the failure of the SSUP to connect with its target beneficiaries in
Kibera-Soweto in a participatory, engaging, and empowering manner by early 2004 is not the
fault of the way in which the KENSUP and SSUP have been theoretically designed and
structured. It is also not the fault of the consultative KENSUP Inception Stage (2001-2002)
which designed the Programme’s institutional structure with the ideas of creating a participatory
slum upgrading programme based on the ideas of SL.90 Rather, the disconnection between the
GoK and the residents of Kibera-Soweto appear to be the primary responsibility of the GoK
Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing, in which the KENSUP/SSUP Secretariat is
based, and secondarily the responsibility of the Nairobi City Council, which comprises the SSUP
Project Implementation Unit (PIU). Remembering the KENSUP/SSUP institutional structure
outlined in Chapter 4.0, section 4.4, the Secretariat is in charge of the co-ordination and
facilitation of project planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation between the
stakeholders, while the PIU is to be the primary implementation body. Although the KENSUP
and SSUP documents state that the SPIU will work closely with the Secretariat and the PIU, both
90
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of these bodies have failed to fulfill their duties to facilitate the creation of a SPIU in KiberaSoweto.
Beyond the absence of a SPIU, according to diverse sources the Kibera-Soweto
community has not been involved in the SSUP at all, nor have community members been so
much as informed of the actual project details. According to Amran, Kiberan residents Mutemi,
Namenje, and Opwanda, a Memorandum dated 9 October 2003 from Christ the King Church,
and a letter to the author from Bodewes (in Nairobi) dated January 2004, any kind of government
consultation meetings with the Kibera-Soweto community had not taken place previous to
January 2004.91 This is clear evidence of the MoRPWH’s failure to effectively facilitate and
organize the SSUP, and illustrates the Secretariat’s lack of commitment for genuinely facilitating
a SL participatory slum upgrading programme, which would have been otherwise shown by the
Ministry’s helping to form SPIUs in Kibera-Soweto immediately in early or mid-2003 in
preparation to launch the SSUP’s Preparatory Phase (July 2003), and by seeking the necessary
information to do so in a timely manner.
Although the GoK attempted to respond to the demand for community involvement by
providing information on the SSUP in August 2003, it was already much too late. On 8 August
2003, the GoK published a press notice about the KENSUP signed by Minister Raila Odinga in
the East African Standard. In the notice, Raila promised a “Consultative process to
establish/identify required improvements…in the coming months.”92 The notice unfortunately
only provided general information about the Government’s intentions in Kibera-Soweto and
gave no intention of democratically forming a SPIU. While any positive involvement of the
community would be welcomed at any time, a silent and slow-moving GoK throughout 2003 has
already caused much damage. The GoK and UN-Habitat also held an official launching
ceremony for the SSUP in mid-October 2003. Yet this cannot hide the fact that the Kibera91
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Soweto community was kept uninformed about the details of the intentions and process of the
SSUP (and therefore about the future of their homes and businesses) from January 2003 (when
the Soweto site was announced) to October 2003, and arguably later than this into 2004 for some
details such as which and how residents will be guaranteed an improved or new living unit.
While there were sporadic newspaper articles during the first ten months in the Daily Nation and
the East African Standard that covered Minister Raila’s statements on the SSUP, this media
coverage often caused even more tension in Kibera instead of diffusing it.93
In addition to the Government’s passivity in facilitating participation in Kibera-Soweto,
as discussed in the NGO section 5.8 of Chapter 5.0, the GoK also willfully rendered the MultiStakeholder Support Group (MSSG) inactive in early 2003. The MSSG was a main body of the
KENSUP institutional structure and had provided an important official forum for NGOs and
CBOs in Kibera to voice their concerns (which often lined up with those of the target
beneficiaries) throughout the KENSUP Inception and Preparatory Phases. In early 2003, the
KENSUP Secretariat (GoK) simply stopped calling meetings of the MSSG, which was one of its
responsibilities, (Makokha, letter). Makokha, the CEO of the Shelter Forum (an NGO in
Nairobi), suspected the disagreement between the NGO Coalition and the GoK over the process
and timeframe of the SSUP as the likely reason behind the GoK’s action or inaction as the case
may be, (Personal Interview). In general, the NGO Coalition wanted emphasis on process,
involving more time to sensitize, involve, ultimately empower residents, and generally follow the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL), while the GoK has been more concerned with quickly
producing a concrete output. This difference of opinion had also previously affected the site
selection process, which led to the JPPT taking over the MSSG’s responsibilities in the site
selection project component during 2002, indicating a long-standing conflict between the MSSG
and the GoK.
The loss of the MSSG was a tough hit on the level of community participation,
coordination, and unity within the SSUP. This loss has undoubtedly contributed to the
information void in Kibera and the stalling of the SSUP. Furthermore, the GoK and UN-Habitat
were well aware of the benefits of this body, stating in the SSUP document that the MSSG,
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“provides a powerful mechanism for participatory decision-making and information sharing,”
(Government of Kenya 6). This indicates that the KENSUP Secretariat’s inaction to call the
MSSG into meeting throughout 2003 was indeed a deliberate effort to undermine competing
views on how the upgrade in Kibera ought to be conducted, instead of working in cooperation to
come to a consensus.
In effect, the SSUP has become an increasingly centralized slum upgrading initiative.
This trend is consistent with Kenya’s recent history. As in many developing countries,
centralization has been a pattern in Kenya’s urban planning since the nation’s independence in
1963, using an approach where the urban periphery takes up services and projects pushed out
from the centre, (Syagga, et al., NSA 161). According to Omiya, Kenya’s top government
officials also have a history of not only centralized slum upgrading initiatives but of using the
GoK’s very decentralization strategy as a means to control local-level development, (202). More
specifically, in terms of Kenya’s past development planning using participation theory, Syagga,
et al. state, “…the elites and experts normally make the major decisions regarding what is
desirable and community participation is normally seen as a means of legitimizing what has
already been decided upon,” (161). Unfortunately the GoK appears to be leading the SSUP
down this road that looks all too familiar. This is both the central criticism against popular
participation theory in general, and the author’s analysis of the way the GoK has used
participation in the KENSUP, both of which are explored in the next section.

6.3.3 A Critical look at the GoK’s use of Participation in the SSUP
The previous section established that the KENSUP/SSUP architects had planned for a
seemingly effective mechanism (the SPIU) to implement the development strategy of popular
community participation. Yet no SPIU or other actual community-wide participation effort
directly related to the SSUP occurred in Kibera up until April 2004. These issues raise serious
questions about the GoK and its current ability and commitment to “facilitate” a participatory
SSUP according to the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). Of the questions raised, the
central concern is why has the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing under the direction
of Minister Raila Odinga not followed through with the SL community participation concepts
and mechanisms ingrained in the KENSUP and SSUP documents? Specifically, why has the
Ministry not directed or facilitated the formation of the SPIU(s)? Why did the GoK neglect their
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media strategy until August 2003? Why did the GoK not connect to its target beneficiaries early
on when all the slum upgrading literature, including the Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA),
advises that they ought to?
These are difficult and complex questions whose complete answers are beyond the scope
of this paper and will shape future research and analysis on the KENSUP and SSUP. However,
part of the answers to the above questions is connected to a growing school of thought that
criticizes popular community participation as a development theory. The following will begin to
shed some light on the above “why” questions.
Over the last two decades, “participation” has become a catch phrase in the sphere of
development. Unfortunately, through the popularization of the concept of participation in
development, it has become rare to find a deep appreciation for and more importantly a thorough
understanding of the complexity involved with this deceptively simple concept. As explored in
Chapter 5.0’s Stakeholder Analysis, the multi-sector, SL, comprehensive slum upgrading
programme that is the KENSUP/SSUP on paper is a momentous proposal and challenge, yet it is
a challenge that was not sufficiently respected at the time by its architects. With the concept’s
growth in popularity, according to the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), many academics
and practitioners have grown increasingly critical of the contradiction between claims and
practice and the way participation theory is being abused in development work. Many would
argue that the KENSUP/SSUP leaders have misused the promise of community participation
since it has not yet materialized as of April 2004.
Some critics of participation would condemn those who conceptualized the
KENSUP/SSUP for not fully appreciating what they were saying when they planned the
KENSUP to be participatory. This position would go on to say that the Programme architects
used key phrases like “slum dwellers will be involved, engaged, and will participate and plan
their project,” only because that is the current global developmental jargon with which the
KENSUP paperwork must agree.
Some would argue that the GoK did not fully understand or take seriously the
implications behind their bold statement in their 8 August 2003 SSUP consultancy ad, which
reads, “The people living in slum areas will lead the slum upgrading process.”94 The argument
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follows that the GoK simply wrote this statement because it sounds good and it is what Kenyans
want to hear; especially from the newly elected NARC administration that is offering hope for a
better government in Kenya. Moreover, international donors want to hear that people are leading
their own process of slum upgrading. Concerned people around the world want to hear that the
GoK is really establishing a decentralized slum upgrading project. This statement is also good
for the international publicity that is key for Kenya’s sources of foreign investment and
exchange, which are primarily associated with tourism. Yet in reality, the above statement from
the consultancy ad is an oxymoron for if it were true, it would have been written by a selforganized group of Kibera-Soweto community members, not the Government of Kenya.
As it is, it is clear that it is in fact the GoK who is leading the slum upgrading process in
Kibera since the MoRPWH placed the ad (with UN-Habitat’s approval). What’s more, the
GoK’s Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing (MoRPWH) also exclusively comprises
the KENSUP Programme Secretariat and has lead the whole KENSUP process since former
President Moi initiated it in 2000. Clearly the GoK’s initiation and leadership alone are not
negative things, of which the GoK’s initiation of the KENSUP is actually a good thing in the
author’s opinion. However, the above points make it clear that the GoK’s statement, “The
people living in slum areas will lead the slum upgrading process,” simply cannot be taken
seriously as the KENSUP and the Kibera-Soweto project (SSUP) are currently organized.
Similarly, participation critics would argue that Minister Raila Odinga likewise did not
completely understand or mean the implications of his bold declaration in the KENSUP 8 August
2003 press notice95 to their full extent. Raila’s announcement reads:

The most significant and innovative aspect of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme [KENSUP] is the
enabling of the slum dwellers and other stakeholders to be fully and actively involved in improving their
own livelihoods and neighborhoods.

Recognizing participation’s moralistic overtones, by basing his Ministry’s development
project96 on the concept of community participation, Raila makes it difficult for people to
95
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criticize the SSUP. To do so would be to seemingly condemn the slum dwellers themselves,
since they are allegedly “fully and actively involved” in a “self-help” type project that is already
the Kibera-Soweto slum dwellers’ own project according to Kithakye of UN-Habitat. Yet as has
been shown throughout this paper, in reality the residents are far from “owning” the SSUP. The
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) explains this critical view in that community
participation has come to be a “legitimating device, drawing on the moral authority of claims to
involve the poor in defining and pursuing their own development to place the pursuit of other
agendas beyond reproach,” (IDS website). Given Kenya’s reputation for corruption, it is
conceivable that there is some truth in this view as applied to the Kenyan Government (GoK).
Perhaps the GoK does have other agendas for Kibera behind the public front they have
given for the SSUP. In fact the recent evictions in Kibera in February 2004 for the purpose of
clearing land for the proposed expansions of the Kenya railway,97 the electrical company, and the
dual roadways proposed to cut through Kibera, provide strong evidence that the Ministry of
Roads, Public Works, and Housing (MoRPWH) does indeed have other agendas for Kibera.
Unfortunately, these alleged agendas appear to be undermining much of the potential benefit that
the SSUP has not yet provided Kibera. The problem is that the three development projects
mentioned above are much more alluring to the GoK (specifically to the MoRPWH who will
oversee them in addition to the SSUP) than the SSUP.
Development expansions of the Kenya railway, the electrical company, and the roadway
are very large business deals that undoubtedly involve many hundreds of millions worth of US$
in international donor money to Kenya. Depending on the politics that decide which companies
get the contracts, there could be quite a bit of incentive in the form of backhanded money for
MoRPWH officials to focus on these other three projects before the SSUP. Making them even
more attractive, these new projects are much more straightforward than effectively managing the
difficulties of an authentic community participatory approach in Nairobi’s most complex slum,
Kibera. Clearly, there is incentive for the GoK to not follow through the Sustainable Livelihoods
Approach (SL) on the SSUP as outlined in this project’s official documents.
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130 Ehresmann
While their mentioning draws critical attention to this aspect of the MoRPWH’s twofaced handling of Kibera and further questions the authenticity of the Ministry’s commitment to
apply SL to the SSUP (a key point of this analysis), further investigation of these and other
possible hidden agendas of the GoK working behind the SSUP is beyond the scope of this paper.
Continuing the critical argument against the GoK’s use of participation theory, perhaps
the chief reason the GoK did agree to a participatory KENSUP based on SL is because there was
simply no real choice. The participatory SL approach is the current globally accepted method of
slum upgrading and poverty eradication. UN-Habitat and the international community (who is
funding this programme through Cities Alliance) would find it unacceptable to approach such a
large national slum upgrading programme any other way. In this way, the IDS explains that
participation has in this manner come to be globally superficial, over simplified, based on weak
theoretical foundations, and largely misunderstood.
Although critics have called the manner in which developing countries apply
participation into question, the concept itself remains legit and essential for many avenues of
political and social life, including above all in this paper, slum upgrading. As a concept
fundamentally based on democracy, it is bound to be difficult and challenging. Yet these draw
backs are no reason to remove popular participation from slum upgrading. The participationbased Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL) is not only based on values of justice, but has been
shown in past slum upgrading initiatives to be the key to sustainable success in projects that have
implemented it effectively.98 Correspondingly, a lack of community participation has been the
root cause of failure in projects that imposed a top-down designed project on suspicious target
beneficiaries.
Although the drafters and creators of both the KENSUP and the SSUP have intended the
SSUP slum upgrading initiative to be different than previous schemes in terms of its high
inclusion and involvement of the residents on a local level,99 it appears that once again the
participation of residents, even by indirect inclusion through elected representatives in the SPIU,
is just a development ideal that is too difficult to be realized in this large-scale project. Or, at
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least the leaders of the SSUP appear to think that real community participation is too difficult. It
is the author’s opinion that following the KENSUP’s original plan for resident participation
through the SPIU mechanism is quite possible if the MoRPWH, particularly Minister Raila, was
to decide that that is what it/he wants. Achieving the authentic participation of the community
would also be a probable success if the GoK decided to work with and assist the NGOs to
accomplish this goal, the first part being the creation of one or several SPIUs in Kibera-Soweto.
Echoing Hasan’s slum upgrading lesson from the Orangi Pilot Project Housing
Programme in Pakistan, Syagga, et al. warn in the NSA against the continuance of the Kenyan
Government to exclude residents from decision-making processes on projects affecting them.
Syagga, et al. conclude:

…as long as the central government [of Kenya] as well as development agencies do not have faith in the
community to manage implementation of projects and ability to collect revenue through cost recovery,
control of projects and criteria for decision-making are likely to remain centralized which in turn hinders
realization of effective community participation at [the] local level and the realization of sustainable
solutions to poverty alleviation, (161).

The likelihood of a policy change on participation in the SSUP remains low if the GoK’s
decision to involve Athi River in the SSUP without Kibera-Soweto’s residents’ input is any sign
of their commitment to “allow the people to lead their own upgrading project.”

6.3.4 The Athi River Controversy
The Athi River controversy of 2003 stands as a prime example of the Government of
Kenya’s continued patterns of using non-participatory practices and centralized policy-making.
Athi River (also known as Mavoko) is a town located about 35km from Nairobi with about
200,000 residents within the municipal city limits of Nairobi, (Agutu). Following a pattern of
urban sprawl similar to the American model of development, Athi River has experienced quick
growth due to the creation of its Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and is catering towards a
growing lower and middle-income population, (Goux 14).
In early 2003, this Nairobian suburb was unexpectedly pulled into the SSUP. After his
February 2003 mention of a connection between Athi River and the SSUP, Minister Raila
Odinga officially announced in May 2003 that the residents of Kibera-Soweto (60,000) would be
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temporarily relocated to Athi River during the upgrading of their settlement, (Christ the King,
Memorandum 9 Oct 4). Allegedly, after temporary relocation, the old slum housing would be
destroyed to make room for new structures. A Daily Nation article by Otieno reported a more
moderate plan. According to Otieno, UN-Habitat Executive Director, Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka,
confirmed that land had been identified in Athi River to receive only some Kibera residents to
Athi River. According to Tibaijuka, only those who worked near the Export Processing Zone
would be moved as part of the SSUP. Even if the latter were true, most Kiberans trusted Raila
and were therefore under the impression that the whole Soweto settlement was going to be
relocated. Without direct communication between the GoK/UN-Habitat and Kiberans outside of
daily newspapers, rumors about the relocation spread.
This situation naturally created high levels of fear, anxiety, and most detrimental: major
opposition to the SSUP early on in the project. After a later announcement of the launch of the
Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) by Minister Raila on 8 August 2003, tenants and
resident structure owners alike expressed further concerns about being temporarily relocated in
far away sites such as Athi River, (Amran 2). Although Raila ultimately changed his stance on
using Athi River as part of the SSUP due to strong public opposition and Tibaijuka stepping up
to essentially cancel the proposition from UN-Habitat’s end in October 2003,100 the whole ordeal
illustrates the recklessness and unilateral approach Minister Raila has taken with the KENSUP
and the SSUP.
Throughout the whole situation, both Raila and Tibaijuka violated the agreed upon
procedures explained in both the SSUP and KENSUP documents. In regards to the dedensification of Kibera-Soweto the SSUP document states in section 5.6, “Demolitions will be
kept to a minimum and/or avoided as much as possible,” (Government of Kenya 7). Moreover,
“Decisions on the demolitions and relocations will be taken with full involvement of the
community,” [emphasis added] (7). Section 3.2.4 of the KENSUP document states that any
relocation and compensation of structures “will be done through consensus among tenants,
structure owners and the local leadership,” (Government of Kenya 7). However the KiberaSoweto community was not involved on any level in the decision to make Athi River their
temporary relocation site.
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Unfortunately, the community had no avenue to be “fully involved.” The only means of
community input and participation as mandated by the KENSUP and SSUP programme
documents would have been through the Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU). As
discussed in the previous section, the SPIU has yet to be created as of April 2004. Moreover, the
GoK and UN-Habitat have no intention to create this community representative body until after a
survey has been completed in Soweto by hired consultants, despite the mandated involvement of
the SPIU in this survey. The whole Athi River controversy illustrates the obvious past and
current need of the SPIU in Kibera-Soweto.
If the Kibera-Soweto community had been consulted on relocation to Athi River, this
town would have never become a possible relocation site. Athi River would be a poor site
selection for most Kiberan slum dwellers. Its very adoption into the SSUP serves as a prime
example of the failure of the GoK and UN-Habitat to follow through on their promises to consult
and involve their target beneficiaries in making important decisions that will directly and
profoundly affect their lives and well being in the planning of the SSUP.
Moving to Athi River would be an extremely difficult transition for most Kiberan slum
dwellers and would not line up with the majority’s interests. Kibera’s close proximity to jobs is
a vital interest of her residents. Contrary to some opinions that many residents in Kibera-Soweto
already work in Athi River in the EPZ, most Kiberans work in Nairobi’s near-by industrial area
or in private homes of wealthy neighborhoods surrounding Kibera. Kibera’s close location to
these areas plus the City Centre allow residents to walk to work and completely eliminate
transportation costs. Living 30km away from Nairobi in Athi River would not only incur
transportation costs likely using more than half if not all of the average day’s wages, but would
destroy Kibera’s social networks, communities, schools, and small businesses.
Although in theory Athi River’s new and fast-growing Export Processing Zone (EPZ)
industrial area could offer unskilled employment opportunities to Kiberans, Goux’s 2003 study
found that employee turn-over in some of the EPZ companies is quite low. This means that few
jobs would actually be available to the new comers. Additionally, after interviewing several
companies, Goux concluded that many EPZ companies would prefer hiring original Athi River
residents over Kibera-Soweto residents in large part due to negative slum dweller stigmas, (16).
Moreover, if the pattern of urban sprawl continues (which is likely), the value of land and
housing units in Athi River will continue to rise as the demand increases. Another town closer to
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Nairobi, Kiserian, located 17km from Nairobi has already experienced luxurious upper-class
housing unit development by private developers, (Goux 5). It is very likely that this upper-class
housing speculation will soon happen in further away Athi River. This would in turn add fuel to
the fire of economic incentive for Kiberans who would have been allocated housing units or land
in Athi River through the SSUP (permanently or temporarily) to rent out or sell their housing
space to willing and waiting wealthier individuals. Such transactions would happen under the
table as they would clearly thwart the objectives of the SSUP. Goux, who worked with UNHabitat on the SSUP in 2003, notes that slum dweller beneficiaries would be vulnerable to being
manipulated (both psychologically and physically) to sell under value by wealthier and more
powerful individuals, (5).
Unfortunately, Minister Raila took none of this into account when he made the decision
to use the Athi River housing project for the SSUP. Had he and his MoRPWH worked more
closely with community organizations in Kibera or even UN-Habitat and their researchers in a
participatory manner before making and announcing his decision, Raila would not have pursued
Athi River as a project component for the SSUP. The GoK position of wanting to use Athi River
instead of building a brand new settlement for slum dwellers can be easily understood as an
effort to consolidate projects for economic savings since Athi River has both pre-existing
infrastructure and new low-income housing that would not need to be constructed from scratch.
The project in Athi River was originally a separate low-income housing project run by
the Finnish Government. In return for debt cancellation it owed Finland, the GoK provided a
section of land in Athi River where Finland was to build model low-incoming housing,
(Bodewes, letter 24 Nov). This arrangement is similar to debt-for-nature swaps, a method that
American and European conservation groups have used in Latin America over the last two
decades to preserve rainforests, (Ehresmann). In need of a temporary location for the residents
of Kibera-Soweto during the upgrade, Minister Raila decided to incorporate this project into the
SSUP.
The GoK’s lack of participatory decision-making and their failure to properly facilitate
communication and unity between KENSUP stakeholders goes beyond not involving KiberaSoweto residents. The Athi River municipal council itself was not involved in the early 2003
decision by Raila to incorporate their Finnish housing project into the Kibera-Soweto upgrade.
Understandably upset at this disrespect and centralist assumption that Athi River would do
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anything the national Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing (MoRPWH) instructs
without consultation, Athi River’s mayor, Joseph Mutuku Musau, stated his town’s opposition to
the measure, “We will not allow the Government to bring these people [Kiberans] here as the
ministries of Public works and Lands have not involved us in the plans,” (qtd. in Agutu).
Beyond mayor Musau’s resistance to the GoK, current Athi River residents have also had
an extremely negative response to the settling of Kiberans in their community via the SSUP.
Existing residents of Athi River fear the stereotypical negative social implications that tens of
thousands of slum dwellers would bring to their suburban community such as crime, drugs,
illegal brews, prostitution, and general degradation of living conditions. Athi River residents
were understandably worried about issues such as where the new children would attend school
and where the Kiberans would receive health care. The lack of any kind of answer from the
MoRPWH (GoK) to these questions increased tension and opposition to Minister Raila and the
SSUP in both Athi River and Kibera.
Attempting to integrate Kiberan residents into Athi River would be difficult, as mixing
socio-economic classes in neighborhoods is anywhere in the world. Steinhorn and Diggs-Brown
found that genuine and stable economically and ethnically diverse neighborhoods in America
required deliberate community organizational and participatory measures for their sustainability.
The central issues were to stop the flight of higher-income families and the corresponding drop
in real estate value that accelerates the process, as well as building intentional communities
across ethnic and economic lines. While flight would not necessarily be likely in Athi River, the
supposedly short-term nature of Kiberan’s in the area would not allow for quality community
building and integration, which would compound negative feelings on both sides, and would add
to the instability of the whole situation in the Athi River community as well as the SSUP and
KENSUP. Furthermore, Athi River has several of its own small informal settlements in need of
care. Mayor Musau goes on to explain how this fits in with his council’s struggles and
frustrations with the national Government, “We have our own people who need to be assisted
and cannot watch as others are brought from outside to benefit,” (qtd. in Agutu).
After the outcry about relocation, Minister Raila ultimately changed his position in July
2003. He stated that no one will be forced to move to Athi River in July 2003 and reiterated this
point at the official SSUP launch ceremony in October 2003, (Mutemi, letter). Instead of using
the Finnish housing project in Athi River, there was a new emphasis in 2004 on using GoK
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acquired land near the women’s prison, in closer proximity to Kibera, for SSUP temporary
relocation sites. This provided a great relief to Kiberans. Currently, only those who voluntarily
wish to relocate to Athi River will do so. This, however, makes sense only to the small number
of Kibera-Soweto residents who already work in the EPZ.
Had Minister Raila lead the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing to consult
mayor Musau and the Athi River City Council before making such a major policy decision (as
would be expected in any participatory upgrading project as large as the SSUP) the above
conflicts could have been addressed and probably avoided. This cooperation would have
produced either a workable agreement, or more likely, it would have become clear much earlier
to Minister Raila that Athi River is not suitable for the SSUP. This would have saved hundreds
of thousands of Kiberans from needless confusion and anxiety about their future. It also would
have kept the political climate in Kibera much calmer – the opposite of which is now one of the
leading factors currently working against the potential success of the SSUP. As it is, the SSUP’s
potential success has been greatly jeopardized by the lack of participation and collaboration in
the Athi River controversy of 2003, as well as by the other issues this paper has examined above.
Despite the GoK’s trend towards a centralized approach on the KENSUP’s SSUP in Kibera, the
grassroots have not been waiting passively for the GoK to facilitate their participation, explored
in the next section.

6.3.5 The Grassroots Response
In the face of the lack of effort by the GoK, NCC, or UN-Habitat to inform and involve
Kibera residents about the slum upgrade, residents have taken their own initiatives. Included in
these grassroots efforts are The Kiberan newsletter and a series of meetings by Kiberan NGOs,
CBOs, and residents in June-July, 2003. These two initiatives illustrate how intrinsic community
participation is and how willing some Kiberan residents are to get involved. This self-help and
self-organization has been strongly encouraged not only by the GoK throughout Kenya’s
independent history and the spirit of Harambee101 (self-help fundraiser), but also by NGOs, UNHabitat, and other international development stakeholders. Slum dwellers in Kenya have been
101
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criticized lately for depending too much on what others can do for them, “others” including the
Government, NGOs, and international donors, instead of focusing on what they can do for
themselves – a key component of popular participation theory.102 Unfortunately, one of the
grassroots efforts that developed was met with hostility by the Nairobi City Council (NCC).
In frustration and concern over the massive information void and the lack of dialogue
between Kibera residents and the GoK, UN-Habitat, and the NCC, several NGOs and a CBO
took action to help. Kituo cha Sheria (NGO), the Shelter Forum (NGO), and the Kibera
Community Development Agenda (KCODA) – the youth group who started The Kiberan

newsletter – called and facilitated a meeting with some Kiberan organization leaders to discuss
the SSUP in early June, 2003, (Mutemi). It is important to note that this meeting did not have an
official link to the SSUP, and those in attendance were from all over Kibera, not just Soweto
village. According to Mutemi, a Kiberan resident who was in attendance, this first meeting
produced a successful brainstorm and discussion on concerns that people had on slum upgrading
in their community, (Personal Interview). Additionally, Kituo cha Sheria explained present
housing policies and the pros and cons of upgrading. Beyond ideally having a voice in the
project about to affect their lives, Kiberans from every village simply wanted to know what the
upgrading plan was for their settlement. The group formed a 12-person committee to contact the
GoK and UN-Habitat to gather information on the Kibera upgrade, (Mutemi).
Regrettably, the committee was unable to share its findings with the over 200 residents
who came for the second meeting on 28 June 2003. Soon after the meeting began, youth thugs
equipped with whips arrived to break up the “illegal” meeting, (Mutemi; Christ the King,
Memorandum 8). The youth had been hired to disband the meeting by local city councilors in
fear that those at the meeting were organizing against the SSUP. The councilors as well as the
youth were also upset that they had not been included, which initially spurred their suspicions of
the meeting.103 Heeding the youths’ orders to disband, those gathered dispersed without sharing
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information. This dramatically reduced the creditability of the NCC, which was already bad.104
Instead of trust, Kibera residents felt bitterness towards the NCC – the body who was supposed
to be leading the SSUP on the ground through its official SSUP institutional structure, the Project
Implementation Unit (PIU).
This violent confrontation105 was yet another tough hit on the SSUP. While the residents,
NGOs, and CBOs were attempting to do exactly what the GoK called for in the KENSUP – “The
people living in slum areas will lead the slum upgrading process” – the local government crushed
this quality bottom-up effort that was in the Kenyan spirit of self-help. This confrontation
illustrates how important dialog, communication, and information dissemination really are for
the SSUP and larger KENSUP – and how much they are lacking in this initiative. It also sheds
light on the culture of violence that exists within the fabric of Kenya’s local and provincial
governments, which will remain a major factor hindering popular participation in the SSUP and
its success until addressed. If the GoK and UN-Habitat had not left so many key organizations
and people in the dark between January and July 2003, contrary to their participatory strategy
outlined in the two programme documents,106 there is a good chance that this mishap could have
been avoided. As it is residents, NGOs, and CBOs are fearful to meet in Kibera due to the high
tension surrounding the upgrade. The unity and enablement that was to be created by the NCC
and the GoK for the KENSUP and SSUP have been replaced with disempowerment and
marginalization – the opposite of the KENSUP/SSUP’s objectives.
Currently, even if the Nairobi City Council (NCC) or the GoK turn around and wish to
meet with residents in the consultative and information-sharing process that the KENSUP
documents and press notices affirm will happen, at least some if not most residents will be
fearful to show up to any meeting due to the possibility of violence. If they do show up, there is
an additional fear to speak up because residents might think their opinion will not be heard by
authorities who already have a plan of how the slum upgrade is going to go. Worse still,
residents may likely not speak up due to the fear of being targeted by the authorities as a resister
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to the SSUP upgrade initiative, which may bring about forced eviction or other forms of coercion
to achieve cooperation with the pre-planned project. Whether or not these fears are warranted,
they are real for Kibera’s residents and are likely to now critically disable a governmental effort
for the active participation and involvement of the Kibera-Soweto slum dwellers in “their”
upgrade project – should the GoK change its policy on the SSUP and insist that resident
participation in the planning and design phase authentically happens.
After examining the contradiction between the KENSUP’s participation theory and the
SSUP’s actual lack thereof on the ground, the next section will examine the information vacuum
and lack of media coverage that the SSUP has received. All three issues are directly related to
the GoK’s disorganization on this project and UN-Habitat’s failure to step up to both challenge
and aid the GoK.

6.4 The KENSUP’s Information Vacuum and Poor Media Coverage
“The success of the [Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading] project will depend upon, among
other things, an effective information and media strategy. Educating both the general
public and the residents of Soweto village will be crucial. The Government [of Kenya]
and UN-HABITAT will establish a mechanism to co-ordinate the media campaign and to
continually respond to media interests at all stages of project development and
implementation.”
-SSUP document, (7)

In addition to the lack of community participation discussed in the previous section, the
principal factor working against the success of the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project
(SSUP) has been an acute lack of information among the Kiberan residents from the GoK and
UN-Habitat. The lack of timely, accurate, and cohesive information about the SSUP has created
unnecessary confusion, anxiety, and tension among all KENSUP stakeholders – the most
important and volatile being the Kiberan residents. This has carelessly threatened the SSUP’s
potential success, and has at times stimulated the political climate in Kibera dangerously close to
violence. Both the lack of participation and the information vacuum in Kibera are related to the
larger issue of the general disorganization and poor facilitation of the SSUP by the GoKcontroled KENSUP Secretariat (based in the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing) in

140 Ehresmann
addition to its conscious parting from the KENSUP’s Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) theoretical
framework.
Compounding the lack of direct communication between the MoRPWH and Kiberans,
acutely inadequate media coverage has shrouded the KENSUP and the SSUP in uncertainty and
misunderstanding. Despite a comprehensive Media Strategy paper107 that was drafted for the
early Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative (which became the KENSUP) complete
with an estimated US$28,300 budget, the actual media coverage of the KENSUP and SSUP has
been spotty and unsuccessful. The Media Strategy document warns of the urgency of its central
objective to not only inform the general public about the upgrade initiative but more importantly
to, “Inform and educate local grass-root communities, particularly selected communities, [i.e.
Kibera-Soweto presently] of the procedures involved in slum upgrading in order to avoid
controversy and costly misunderstandings,” (2). Unfortunately the GoK, specifically the
Ministry of Roads, Public Works and Housing (MoRPWH), has decided not to give the
KENSUP Media Strategy the priority it deserves. Furthermore, Minister Raila Odinga and the
MoRPWH seemingly have their own plan for the SSUP, which lies well outside the parameters
set within the March 2003 KENSUP and SSUP programme documents and Raila’s 8 August
KENSUP press notice.

6.4.1 Confusion on the KENSUP and SSUP timeframes
The phases of the SSUP (KENSUP’s pilot project) overlap the same set of phases that
comprise the full national programme, the KENSUP. This overlap has caused confusion
between the mother programme and the daughter project and has contributed to raising the
general level of confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the KENSUP and SSUP among
most stakeholders, especially among Kiberan residents. This has greatly jeopardized the SSUP
both in loosing what potential trust and support Kibera-Soweto tenants might have originally
had, in addition to fanning the flames of opposition to the SSUP among some structure owners.
Firstly, the date that the SSUP was actually begun is unclear. The discrepancy does not
lie with the sources, but rather in the reality that the SSUP has simply had a very foggy and
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unsure start, despite the project’s magnitude and importance as the starting point of a nationwide slum upgrading programme. There are four major dates regarding the beginning of the
SSUP component of the KENSUP:

-January 2003: Kibera-Soweto was officially announced as the pilot project site of the
KENSUP in January 2003 by Minister Raila Odinga at the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding between the GoK and UN-Habitat. Also, the KENSUP press notice
signed by Raila on 8 August 2003 names the “beginning of 2003” as the start of the
KENSUP Preparatory Phase, which is essentially the same as saying the SSUP
Preparatory Phase since the national KENSUP essentially became the specific SSUP at
this time since there were no other active KENSUP projects between January and August
2003 ; herein lies the confusion.

-July 2003: The SSUP officially got under way with the (real) start of its Preparatory
Phase. This date was given in interviews by Eric Makokha (Chief Executive Officer of
the Shelter Forum), David Kithakye (UN-Habitat Human Settlements Advisor), and
Mutemi, Namenje, and Opwanda (three Kiberan residents).108 This start date was also
confirmed by Titus Agwanda, an official from the GoK Ministry of Lands and
Settlement, also in an interview with the author.

-8 August 2003: The GoK and UN-Habitat placed a Consultancy Ad in the East African
Standard advertising the hiring of an outside organization to complete the first activity of
the SSUP Preparatory Phase, a stakeholder identification report.

-October 2003: Seemingly realizing the lack of public knowledge in Kibera concerning
the SSUP, the GoK made the effort to officially “launch” the SSUP in late October 2003,
according to the second issue of The Kiberan, a local newsletter (5). Although nearly
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four months had passed since the July starting date, it was the Preparatory Phase – not the
Implementation Phase – that was launched (again) at this time. Presiding over the launch
ceremony was Kibera’s own Member of Parliament (MP), Public Works and Housing
Minister, and GoK head of the SSUP, Honorable Raila Odinga.

Deciding which of these dates is the true start of the SSUP is up for debate. For the
purposes of this paper, the author will assume July 2003 as the start date.
Secondly, adding to the discrepancy between the KENSUP’s and the SSUP’s Preparatory
Phases, some activities that are listed as part of the KENSUP Preparatory Phase, which
according to Syagga, et al. began in January 2002 and were scheduled to end in October 2002,109
were directly related to the SSUP, which itself did not actually enter the Preparatory Phase until
July 2003 as mentioned above. Additionally, as mentioned above, the KENSUP press notice
written and approved by the GoK/UN-Habitat on 8 August 2003 conflicts with the July 2003
SSUP Preparatory Phase start date, instead stating that the KENSUP “Preparatory Phase began at
the beginning of 2003.” Yet the primary activities that the Preparatory Phase “will begin with,”
according to the SSUP programme document (3), were not started until at least six months after
“the beginning of 2003” in August 2003. The primary activities of the SSUP Preparatory Phase
include a detailed assessment of Kibera-Soweto, first involving an identification of all KiberaSoweto stakeholders focusing on which community, non-governmental, and religious
organizations are present there and what they are doing, and secondly involving a detailed
physical and social mapping of the settlement. Both of these tasks are to be done “including
consultations with structure owners, tenants, and state authorities” to achieve their ends,
(Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat, SSUP 3). Since the GoK and UN-Habitat did not place
a consultancy ad in the East African Standard daily newspaper advertising the hiring of an
outside organization (presumably an NGO involved in shelter) to act as a consultant to complete
the first activity of the SSUP Preparatory Phase (the stakeholder identification report) until 8
August 2003, clearly the KENSUP/SSUP Preparatory Phase actually did not start at the
“beginning of 2003,” as Minister Raila claims it did in the KENSUP press release also issued on
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8 August 2003. It is also clear that the Preparatory Phase was not completed in 2002, as planned
by Syagga, et al. Interestingly, Raila’s claim of the SSUP’s early 2003 start in the KENSUP
press notice actually appeared in the same 8 August 2003 issue of the East African Standard as
the above mentioned consultancy ad that stands as the only concrete mark (aside of formal
announcements and ceremonies) of the beginning of the SSUP Preparatory Phase.110
Although scheduling and timing details such as this may not seem directly important to
the ultimate success of the SSUP, the diverse conceptions of the project timeframe illustrate the
lack of coordination within the KENSUP and SSUP and have caused great confusion and anxiety
among the target beneficiaries of Kibera-Soweto and other stakeholders. These
misunderstandings are largely the fault of the KENSUP Secretariat (GoK). The Secretariat’s
disorganization has also contributed to an unwarranted high level of tension that has affected all
of Kibera (not just Kibera-Soweto village) since the first rumor of a slum upgrading project
happening there spread like wild fire even before Raila’s formal announcement of the KiberaSoweto KENSUP site in January 2003.

6.4.2 The SSUP’s Media Coverage
During the critical first eight months after Minister Raila announced Kibera-Soweto as
the first project of the KENSUP in January 2003, until the Minister’s 8 August 2003 KENSUP
press notice, there was no evidence that the KENSUP Secretariat had enacted any comprehensive
media strategy as outlined in the Media Strategy paper. The limited coverage that the upgrade
project has received has not been consistent. Various sources have contradicted each other over
key aspects of the upgrading initiative such as its name, where and when it will take place, what
it hopes to do, and how it will be done.
To begin with, Mulama111 wrote in her article for the Inter Press Service News Agency,
“The Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme [KENSUP] seeks to improve 150,000 houses in
Nairobi and other urban centres per year.” This statement has mixed-up the facts. In reality the
number “150,000 per year” came from current National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) President
Mwai Kibakye’s bold campaign pledge in 2002 to provide not improvements to existing housing
110
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Even Mulama’s title is false: “Questions Hang Over UN’s Goal of ‘Cities Without Slums’ by 2010.” In reality,
the UN goal is set for 2020.
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but actual new housing that did not exist before in Kenya’s urban centers. Although the NARC
GoK has now incorporated the KENSUP as part of their strategy to create the promised 150,000
housing units per year after winning the late 2002 presidential election, when the initial
campaign pledge was made, the GoK planned the KENSUP to only provide or improve some of
the 150,000 units per year.
Additionally, time wise, Mulama’s above statement is not realistic for the KENSUP to do
alone. Currently, the Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) is the first and only project under
the KENSUP. Kibera-Soweto alone has 60,000 residents, which is about 8% of Kibera’s
population of 700,000. By conservatively low estimates there are on average four people per
housing unit, which means there are at most 15,000 households that need an improved or new
housing unit from the SSUP. As it is, the SSUP has already taken more than one year and still
has not produced anything for just these 15,000 housing units in Kibera-Soweto. If the GoK is
actually trying to fulfill NARC’s over-zealous housing promise, it can be understood why
Minister Raila Odinga is trying to push the SSUP to the provision of new low-income housing
instead of facilitating a genuine participatory upgrading project. But these issues and questions
are not clear in the media, Kiberan’s only real source of information on their upgrade project
during 2003.
A key symptom of the SSUP’s major media failure is that it has been unclear throughout
2003 if the impending future KENSUP upgrade involved all of Kibera or just Soweto village. In
several KENSUP news articles covering statements by Housing Minister Raila, the specific
declaration of the Soweto village of Kibera being the actual project site of the KENSUP was not
mentioned at all. For example, Soweto village was not mentioned in an exclusive interview with
Raila about the Kibera upgrade by an NGO, the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA), for their AprilJune 2003 issue of their newsletter, Land Update. This phenomenon happened again months
later in a heated article by Amran in the East African Standard (8 August, 2003), one of
Nairobi’s most popular newspapers. Moreover, the author of this thesis witnessed the popularity
of generalized talk about the “Kibera upgrade” without specific mention of Soweto among
Nairobians between June to August 2003 while the Athi River controversy was being covered,
indicating there were other media articles that also failed to pinpoint Soweto village. Due to this,
for all anyone knew, everything Minister Raila said in this time period about how the supposed
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“participatory” project was going to be run, including the controversial temporary relocation to
Athi River, was to potentially affect all 700,000-plus Kiberans.
This lack of key information created anxiety and confusion as the other approximate
640,000 Kiberans who do not live in Soweto village became needlessly worried about their
future stability, livelihood, and community life, thinking they too would have to relocate. This
unclear media coverage coupled with a major vacuum of information from the GoK and UNHabitat on the SSUP recklessly increased pre-existing tension in Kibera to a level that has
seriously threatened the success of the SSUP. The misunderstanding that has been fostered has
also increased Kiberans’ suspicion and mistrust of the GoK, which has resulted in wellestablished opposition to both the SSUP (lead by structure owners) and to any other talk of
upgrading efforts in Kibera associated with the Government or UN-Habitat. According to
Bodewes, UN-Habitat lacks a fundamental understanding of how complicated the Kiberan
community is, and does not realize how much opposition really exists from the Kibera-Soweto
village against the SSUP, (letter to the author).
Amran’s article showcases the opposition between the Kiberans and the Government of
Kenya (GoK). The title itself is prophetic of an impending violent confrontation between Raila
and Kiberans. In large print the title, “Raila, Govt brace for fight in Kibera,” stood on the front
page of the East African Standard’s 8 August 2003 edition. It would have been difficult for
anyone walking by Nairobi’s numerous newsstands to have missed it that day. 112 Amran
described the situation nearly as divided and heated as two boxers waiting to battle. Minister
Raila was in one corner, with structure owners and tenants miraculously united in resistance
against Raila’s centralized authority over the SSUP in the other. In the words of Amran,
Minister Raila’s position on the upgrade was, “…that Kibera’s landlords [or structure owners]
have six months to relocate to make room for the slum upgrading programme,” (1). Raila’s
“move it or lose it” ultimatum naturally put structure owners on the defense and fueled their
resistance against the SSUP. Instead of building unity and “avoiding controversy and costly
misunderstandings,” as the GoK stated they would in the KENSUP Media Strategy document,
Minster Raila and this media coverage actually increased the division and tension between
Kiberan residents and the Government of Kenya.
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It is rather ironic that it was in this same issue of the East African Standard (8 August
2003) that the one-page press notice for the KENSUP was issued, buried on page “P3.” In an
undoubtedly positive media effort by both the GoK and UN-Habitat (signed by Honorable
Raila), the basics of the KENSUP are explained.113 However, the theoretical press notice
strongly contradicts the aire of a reality bounded in conflict as projected by Amran’s whole
front-page article. Amran’s reporting largely undermines the fine print of the positive KENSUP
description that many fewer are likely to have read. Instead of an aggressive Minister Raila
giving structure owners a six-month ultimatum to surrender their land causing Kiberan residents
to unite in opposition to the Government, the official KENSUP release calmly states:

The most significant and innovative aspect of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme [KENSUP] is the
enabling of the slum dwellers and other stakeholders to be fully and actively involved in improving their
own livelihoods and neighborhoods. Full involvement and contribution of stakeholders is therefore the
hallmark of the implementation strategy, (GoK and UN-Habitat).

If anyone were to have read the KENSUP press notice after reading Amran’s front-page
article, they would not have been able to take it seriously. The dichotomy existing between
Amran’s apparent eyewitness reporting and the GoK’s public facade is simply too great to
accept.
Additional media conflict is illustrated by the consultancy ad placed by the GoK and UNHabitat for the KENSUP, also in the East African Standard of 8 August 2003. The ad is
soliciting the services of outside organizations to identify existing stakeholder groups in Kibera.
The consultancy ad states a similar allegiance to the SSUP’s SL people-focused development as
Raila’s KENSUP press release. The consultancy ad states, “The people living in slum areas will
lead the slum upgrading process,” (third par.). Yet according to Amran, the Kiberan residents
have in fact been led by the GoK. In his front-page article, Amran explains how both Kiberan
tenants and structure owners deny ever being approached by the GoK regarding the SSUP. He
writes, “They [Kiberan structure owners and tenants] argued that they are being forced to do
what has already been decided by the Government,” (2). This connects back to the above
participation section 6.3.3 and supports as holding true for the SSUP, the critical view that
113

See Appendix I for this press notice.

Ehresmann 147
participation theory is often used only as a justification for centralized decision-making in
present development projects around the world. Although Amran’s reporting may not be fair
since the GoK is technically only responsible to Kibera-Soweto instead of all of Kibera, it
appears that Kibera-Soweto residents are indeed being forced to fulfill a centralized project,
explored further in the next section.
Furthermore, the consultancy ad’s very solicitation of outside services to identify actors
in Kibera is contrary to the mandate given in the SSUP programme document concerning the
Preparatory Phase’s identification of all Kibera-Soweto stakeholders. According to the SSUP
and KENSUP programme documents, and the IACC114 Sub-Committee working on the
Programme organization and Institutional Structure’s final report (2001), the identification and
documentation of all necessary settlement stakeholders in Kibera-Soweto is under the
jurisdiction of the Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU), (Government of Kenya,
SSUP 5; Government of Kenya, KENSUP 11; IACC 12). Unfortunately this institutional
structure of the SSUP, to be composed of elected community members of Kibera-Soweto, was
not formed as of March 2004. The 8 August 2003 ad was answered by many competing NGOs
and CBOs, and was eventually awarded to Maji na Ufanisi and Acacia Consultants. Moreover,
at the time of the completion of this paper (May 2004), the physical and social mapping process
was to be just getting underway under another consultancy without the SPIU, (Bodewes). This
further illustrates not only the media contradictions, but also a dichotomy between the GoK’s
actual decisions on the SSUP, and the KENSUP’s original plan in the official programme
documents released just five months earlier in March 2003.
In addition to the consultancy ad, the 8 August 2003 KENSUP press notice also contains
a fallacy related to the SPIU. The notice states reassuringly to the Nairobi public that, “An
Institutional Framework for co-ordination, implementation and monitoring of the [KENSUP]
Programme involving all relevant Government Institutions, Local Authorities, Community
Organizations, donor and development partners has been put in place.” However the full SSUP
institutional structure has in fact not yet been put into place. As of April 2004, the SPIU for
Kibera-Soweto remains non-existent over 8 months after the press notice, as has been mentioned
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elsewhere in this paper. The top-half of the KENSUP/SSUP institutional structure115 has failed
to facilitate the creation of this absolutely critical community group that represents the KiberaSoweto community’s only voice in “their” project. The GoK and UN-Habitat deliberately
overlooked the lack of an SPIU to favorably explain the then current stage of the KENSUP to the
Nairobi public in this press notice, one of their first official media announcements. This only
compounded the confusion surrounding this quagmire of a slum upgrading project and provided
more fuel to strengthen the opposition already organized against it.116 The GoK pushed its trust
past its limits with the Kiberan people.
Moreover, the press notices states, “The Programme [KENSUP] recognizes that sharing
of correct and timely information is critical in a delicate process such as slum upgrading.” While
this may or may not represent the actual present thinking of the KENSUP Secretariat (GoK), as
discussed earlier in this paper, the Secretariat’s actions clearly do not reflect what they have
written. In addition to the above-mentioned fallacy about the SPIU formation, the Secretariat’s 8
August 2003 press notice simply came months too late, only after much damage to the SSUP’s
potential success had already been allowed to ferment, with the Athi River controversy of MayJuly 2003 being case in point (section 6.3.4 above).
Yet for the media coverage the SSUP has received, it is difficult to assign responsibility
for the SSUP’s contradictions and unclarity. On one hand, it appears that Minister Raila of the
MoRPWH is to blame. He did not clarify Kibera-Soweto in many of his comments during 2003,
and he appears to have taken a forceful and confrontational stance with structure owners, quite
contrary to SL. Outside of the 8 August 2003 press notice, many of Minister’s Raila’s
statements that are quoted and paraphrased in Nairobi’s media (such as in the Amran article
discussed above and the KLA article further discussed below) go completely against the
KENSUP and SSUP programme documents and the SL people-centered development strategy
that the KENSUP claims to be based upon. The Minister’s statements also do not line up with
what other KENSUP leaders have been saying about the Kibera-Soweto project (SSUP),
including Grace Wanyonyi (GoK Housing Department), David Kithakye (UN-Habitat), Patrick

115

This includes the Secretariat (GoK), JPPT (GoK, UN-Habitat, etc.), and PIU (NCC).

116

See Chapter 5.0, section 5.2, “Structure Owners,” for further discussion of organized opposition to the SSUP.

Ehresmann 149
Acttoki and Titus Agwanda (GoK Ministry of Land and Settlements), and Eric Makokha (Shelter
Forum) discussed above in this paper. These contradictions have confused many.
On the other hand, the authors of the articles could be blamed for writing and
paraphrasing Minister Raila with a bias and agenda to thwart the SSUP and/or raise opposition to
the GoK by putting Raila in a negative light. It is also possible that some authors simply
exaggerated or manipulated Raila’s statements to attract the attention of media consumers,
especially in articles covering the drama of the Athi River relocation conflict. Additionally,
Nairobi’s media authors could be criticized for casually writing about a very sensitive situation
without a full understanding of the SSUP. This situation has made it easy for the details of the
KENSUP and SSUP to get mixed up. Nonetheless, the whole media and information problem
could have been avoided if the GoK’s MoRPWH had better organized the SSUP in general and
followed through with the KENSUP Media Strategy that was outlined well before 2003 in the
final draft of the document titled, Media Strategy for the Government of Kenya / UN-Habitat
Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative, and then reiterated in the SSUP project
document (March 2003).
Despite giving Minister Raila the benefit of the doubt for his offensive tone with Kibera’s
structure owners and his general misalignment with other KENSUP leaders, recent forced
evictions approved by Raila suggest that it is not just the media exaggerating his comments. A
large eviction and demolition campaign on and around 12 February 2004 destroyed more than
400 structures including a clinic, churches, schools, and housing structures estimated to house
approximately 2,000 people, (Mbaria, Pope). The demolitions were executed by Raila’s
Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing (MoRPWH) because the structures were
apparently located on road reserves that the Ministry wanted to reclaim. Ironically, most of the
structures destroyed were located in Raila Village, named in honor of Minister Raila Odinga,
their Member of Parliament (MP). Raila Village is located near Kibera, or actually in Kibera
according to Daily Nation writer, Mbaria. There was much looting on homes whose owners
were not prepared since they thought they did not live on the road reserves. This combined with
apathetic police greatly contributed to the GoK’s already negative reputation on slum policy and
upgrading, (Buildings on).
Raila Village’s mass demolition clearly violated international human rights law on forced
evictions, remembering Kenya’s membership to the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
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and Cultural Rights as of 1972. Many organizations stood up in protest against the evictions in
addition to esteemed individuals including UN Special Rapportuer on Adequate Housing,
Miloon Kothari, and Pope John Paul II. Although President Mwai Kibaki finally agreed under
pressure to “temporarily halt the demolition of slums,” this rash measure by Minister Raila and
his Ministry has raised concern and anxiety in Kibera-Soweto even higher. Soweto residents,
especially structure owners to whom Raila’s August 2003 ultimatum was directed towards, now
wonder if they too will meet a similar fate as Raila Village’s residents did. Moreover, Raila’s
action unfortunately seems to validate many of the previous rumors floating around Kibera that
the GoK is not to be trusted on the SSUP.
Besides those who lost everything they owned, the most unfortunate result of these
demolitions is the message Minister Raila is sending to his constituents of Kibera-Soweto. It is a
message of power that delivers fear. If the structure owners and tenants alike of Kibera-Soweto
had any thought of questioning or challenging Raila’s Ministry on the manner in which the
SSUP is being run and executed (that is without the community’s authentic input on the plan and
design of the upgrade), they will now think twice before standing up for their right to participate
again. This seemingly works into Minister Raila’s plan, since he has apparently had the whole
SSUP planned since early 2003.

6.4.3 The Pre-Planned Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP)
The SSUP document states, “Beneficiaries will be involved and empowered in deciding
their priority needs…,” (Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat 6). Raila also wrote himself in
the 8 August 2003 KENSUP press notice that slum dwellers will be “fully and actively involved
in improving their own livelihoods and neighborhoods.” However brief research into the media
coverage of Raila’s statements about the KENSUP during 2003 reveals that Minister Raila
Odinga had the plan and design for Kibera-Soweto’s “upgrade” set in his mind at least six
months before he described the SSUP at the official launching ceremony in October 2003. The
minister’s explanation of the type of structures to be built for this slum upgrading program in
interviews months before the SSUP even began its Preparatory Phase in July 2003 raises the
question as to just how participatory and “resident-run” this upgrade project is, as UN-Habitat’s
David Kithakye had assured the author was the case. This, along with Raila’s contradictory
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handling of Athi River in early 2003 originally involving mass involuntary relocation,117 lines up
with the Minister’s “say one thing, do another” leadership on the SSUP.
One major interview with Raila that showcases the Minister’s preliminary plan for the
SSUP appeared in the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) April 2003 publication, Land Update. In a
lengthy two-page exclusive interview with Raila, Kiberans learned directly or by word of mouth
what Raila planned to do with their community:
In places such as Kibera, apart from relocating dwellers, we need to de-populate the area as the population
is quite dense. Even if we went up to three or four stories, still there would be no land available for
amenities such as schools, dispensaries, shopping centers and so on…
[UN-Habitat and the GoK recognize] the enormity of the problem in terms of the numbers involved and
realize we have to go vertically rather than horizontally. Therefore, we will have to construct high rise
houses, (Raila, A Ministerial Policy 5).

After being challenged by KLA of the great possibility his proposed upgrading strategy
has of becoming another contentious and potentially violent hot bed like Mathare 4A,118 Raila
responded defensively, similar to Kithakye of UN-Habitat in his interview with the author,
emphasizing first that the Mathare 4A conflict had been resolved. Further pressed by KLA on
the similarity of his above strategy of building vertically and the failed Kibera Highrise (Nyayo
Highrise) project, Raila assured that this current slum upgrade was going to be different than
previous failed low-income housing initiatives, again similar to Kithakye’s comments. Unlike
Kithakye’s emphasis on the Soweto-Kibera upgrade being the residents’ project, however,
Minister Raila continued painting his vague politicized, ideal, and pacifying portrait of the
Soweto-Kibera project in his KLA interview:

When Nyayo Highrise was upgraded, those who moved into this estate were the middle-class and the slum
dwellers were displaced. If this were to happen, we would be creating another slum elsewhere. However,
under the UN Habitat Scheme, we will ensure that the current slum tenant remains the tenant in the
upgraded houses, (Raila 5).
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How the GoK or UN-Habitat will ensure this remains to be seen. Complications and
conflicts of interests arise if the GoK requires Soweto residents to live in newly built flats. For
many slum residents, it is not in their interest to live in a high-rise flat unless they change how
they earn a living. For example, slum residents who operate small kiosks selling fruit or
consumer products from their dwelling place would be put out of business if they lived on the
second or higher floor in a high-rise flat. Due to land scarcity and tough competition with other
kiosks, most of these shop owners would not be able to set up a new separate kiosk.
Additionally, some residents would prefer to rent out or sub-lease a new flat given to
them for additional income than to live there themselves. Instead of wanting a better housing
situation, some enterprising upgrade beneficiaries (tenants) will seek to turn their SSUP benefit
into a class mobility opportunity to become a landlord even though that means remaining
themselves at slum-level living conditions. If they do not mind living in slum conditions, who
should stop them? For these people, a long-term economic upgrade with a secure income is
more important than a nicer housing structure, of which the former is certainly much more
difficult for the GoK or UN-Habitat to provide. Yet Kibera-Soweto tenants’ turning the SSUP
into an opportunity to become landlords while not living in the product of the project seems to
pervert the objectives of the KENSUP and the SSUP. More importantly, it is precisely this
economic potential of becoming a landlord that has caused a displacement of original KiberaSoweto residents by wealthier individuals (gentrification) in anticipation of receiving the fruits of
the SSUP, which has already made Raila’s promise of ensuring that the “current slum tenant
remains the tenant in the upgraded houses” impossible to completely fulfill.
It appears as though Minister Raila does not fully appreciate or understand the difficulty
of what he is suggesting. For those original residents left in Soweto, it will be nearly impossible
to force them to live in storied flats, as was the case in the Kibera Highrise project located next to
Soweto village. If flats were what the Kibera-Soweto community wants, then there would only
be the gentrification problem. Residents would want to move in and enjoy the high-rise lifestyle.
I am not suggesting that Soweto residents do not want flats, only that if they are given something
they do not want, the SSUP will ultimately fail to benefit them in the manner intended.
This raises the most important question: what do the Kibera-Soweto slum dwellers want?
What do the residents of Soweto-Kibera want to have happen with this project that has
seemingly fallen like manna from the sky to them? The key is that they must give the answers,
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or else they will not have ownership or appreciation for the project – both of which are required
for sustainability. The residents themselves must participate in the planning and developing of
their slum upgrade programme as David Kithakye (UN-Habitat), most development theorists,
and “lessons learned” from past project reports have said. In line with political theorist, James
Scott, without gathering and seriously considering fair and unbiased information from the
community, Minister Raila and other top GoK or UN-Habitat officials who are far removed from
the reality of Kibera cannot lead a successful SSUP by simply dictating what end product the
SSUP ought to create from limited information, in Raila’s case, high-rise flats.
Conversely, Minister Raila is claiming to be including slum dwellers in the KENSUP
process. In addition to the KENSUP 8 August 2003 press notice that claims slum dwellers will
be fully involved to “identify required improvements,” in an August 2003 speech announcing the
KENSUP,119 Minister Raila stated, “…tenants and landlords would be consulted and fully
involved in the planning and execution phases of the slum upgrading project to ensure that their
needs and concerns are addressed. In fact, consultation meetings with slum dwellers have
already started,” (Major Initiative). It is, however, uncertain where these consultation meetings
took place. Interviews by the author with members of Christ the King Church and slum dwellers
in Kibera-Line Saba (located next to Kibera-Soweto) suggest no such consultations took place in
Kibera-Soweto. Furthermore, the fact remains that there was no community representative
Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) formed in Kibera-Soweto in August 2003 (or by
early 2004 for that matter) with whom official consultations could have taken place as mandated
in the official KENSUP/SSUP institutional structure.120
How and with whom did Raila’s slum dweller consultations happen? It is possible that
because Raila did not specifically say “Kibera-Soweto” or SSUP in his August 2003 speech, he
could have been referring to efforts to begin KENSUP projects in other slums in Nairobi.
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that if any consultations with residents actually did take
place in Kibera-Soweto in 2003, they did not influence Minister Raila, the MoRPWH, or the
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KENSUP Secretariat at all since Raila’s plan for building high-rise flats in Kibera-Soweto
through the SSUP was not altered between his exclusive KLA interview in April 2003 to
October 2003.
Two months after his August 2003 speech in October, Raila explained the whole plan for
the SSUP to the people gathered for the official SSUP launching ceremony in Kibera-Line Saba
at a site ironically next to Kibera Highrise, a bitter reminder for many Soweto residents of that
failed upgrade project that now houses middle-class residents instead of them, (Onyango in The
Kiberan, 2nd issue). Honorable Raila had the SSUP planned and ready to go for his “launching”
speech, the product of which is four-storied flats identical to the Kibera Highrise estate. While
this kind of concrete information from the GoK provided some relief to Kiberans who had been
stuck in a stake of uncertainty and confusion due to the information vacuum, it is simply
impossible for the GoK to have completed a comprehensive participatory process in the spirit of
SL in two months time, especially without a SPIU.
Beyond short-cutting the full involvement of the community in the decision-making and
planning for the SSUP, Minister Raila’s plan for Kibera-Soweto contradicts the official
documents outlining the KENSUP and SSUP. Raila’s plan to build four-storey highrises in
Kibera-Soweto contradicts section 4.7 of the KENSUP Programme document which states that
although some structures may have to be demolished and relocated to make room for service
wayleaves and rationalized planning, “Demolitions will be kept to a minimum and/or avoided as
much as possible,” (Government of Kenya 9). In order to build highrises in Kibera-Soweto, all
or nearly all existing structures will need to be demolished. Furthermore, section 3.2.4 of the
same document states that any relocation and compensation of structures “will be done through
consensus among tenants, structure owners and the local leadership,” (7). Remembering the Athi
River controversy and Amran’s article in the 8 August 2003 East African Standard titled, “Raila,
Govt Brace for Fight in Kibera,” which covered Minister Raila’s six-month ultimatum given to
structure owners to make room for the KENSUP, it is clear that the Minister is not following this
KENSUP stipulation. Raila’s highrise agenda simply does not even vaguely follow these
explicit KENSUP components nor other general directives, plans, and SL strategies laid out in
the collective documents surrounding the KENSUP and SSUP.
This again raises questions that cannot be ignored. Why is Minister Raila set on building
highrise flats when that strategy failed miserably in the Kibera Highrise project in the mid 1990s
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due to gentrification? Why has he made the decision about what the end product of the SSUP
will be without genuinely consulting the Kibera-Soweto community as publications signed by
him (such as the 8 August KENSUP press notice) said would be done? Some of these questions
may be answered in understanding the GoK’s interests to produce a fast concrete output through
the KENSUP to show their international donors and the Kenyan people that the GoK is capable
of concretely improving its citizens lives, among other interests explored in the GoK stakeholder
section 5.4 of Chapter 5.0 above. Further investigation into these questions is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper. Given all of the confusion that has surrounded the KENSUP and SSUP
due to the specific fact that the SSUP is taking place in politically charged Kibera, it is
interesting to note that Kibera-Soweto was actually not ranked first by the site selection
committee.

6.5 The KENSUP’s Site Selection Controversy
In the course to select a pilot site for the KENSUP, the leading KENSUP bodies engaged
in an extensive process that consulted diverse stakeholders in early 2002. The Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) of the KENSUP established a committee to evaluate shortlisted sites that were chosen by criteria developed by the Multi-Stakeholder Support Group
(MSSG). This committee ranked settlements in terms of “suitability for pilot implementation.”
Specifically, the following weighted criteria were used to rank possible sites:

Land Status 25%
Absence of Infrastructure 15%
Community Organizations 15%
Impact with respect to population and area size 15%
Ratio of resident landlords to tenants 15%
Other – including structure conditions and interventions by other agencies 15%

The results of the IACC special committee are as follows:
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Name

Weighted Score% [higher means better for the KENSUP]

1) Huruma Village

66

2) Kibera-Soweto

57.5

3) Mariguini South B

51

4) Kibera-Makina

50

5) Deep Sea Parklands

48.5

6) Mukuru Kwa Ruben

47.5

7) Korogocho

41.5

8) Kingstone Mukuru

28

Interestingly, Kibera-Soweto is not the top ranked site. In fact it is eight and a half
percentage points lower than Huruma, which is the largest margin between any two consecutive
sites of the top seven. This understandably caused a bit of confusion initially. The magnitude of
the incongruity and confusion between Huruma’s top ranking in the KENSUP site selection
process and Kibera-Soweto’s actual selection for the KENSUP pilot site is clearly illustrated in
an issue of the Land Update, produced by the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA). In its JulySeptember 2002 issue, it states that a pilot project of the GoK and UN-Habitat “Nairobi slums
upgrading project”121 had already started, but not in Soweto. The article reads, “…a pilot
initiative to upgrade the Huruma informal settlement in the Starehe Division in Nairobi has
already started,” (Nairobi Slums 1). So the question remains, why is Kibera-Soweto the first site
of the KENSUP when Huruma ranked above Kibera-Soweto in the supposed exhaustive site
selection process? The answer revolves around Kenyan politics.
Although former President Moi did take the positive step to initiate the KENSUP in
2000, the effort was not without political self-interest. Despite the results of the site selection
committee and UN-Habitat’s natural desire to choose top-ranking Huruma, in November 2002
Moi refused to sign the pilot project papers of the KENSUP unless the first project was done in
Kibera, part of Moi’s long-time constituency of Langata District. This rejection of Huruma
happened nearly one year after comments on lowering rent in Kibera by both Moi and Raila

121

This is an unofficial name for the Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative/Programme (the early name of
the KENSUP) used by the KLA author.
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Odinga provoked violent clashes in Kibera in December 2001. Perhaps Moi wished to make
something up to his constituents, perhaps not.
Either way, the selection and retaining of Kibera-Soweto for the pilot project site of the
KENSUP has been purely political, based on the interests of former President Moi and current
Minister Raila, both of whose constituencies include Kibera.122 Even after UN-Habitat
attempted to change the KENSUP pilot site (back) to Huruma after Kenya’s 2002 election
replaced Moi with President Kibaki, Kibera-Soweto remained. The reason is that after Moi left
office, Minister Raila essentially assumed control of the KENSUP and holds the lead GoK
position of power on the KENSUP as the Minister of Roads, Public Works, and Housing – the
seat of the KENSUP Secretariat. Like Moi, Raila has a strong interest to benefit his
Parliamentary constituents in Kibera (Langata District). He played a lead role in Moi’s regime in
its later years as Secretary General of the KANU party, and switched to the NARC party shortly
before the 2002 election when it was clear that political power was shifting and KANU was
going to lose the election. Raila Odinga has generally become one of the most powerful and
respected politicians in Kenya, whom President Kibaki (NARC) cannot afford to disagree with.
President Kibaki, as patron of the KENSUP, therefore allowed the KENSUP pilot project to
remain in Kibera-Soweto so as to maintain the fragile political coalition and unity that helped put
him into office.
Despite the political manipulation that has put the entire future success of the long-term
national KENSUP on the line, the questionability of Kibera-Soweto as the first project site has
not been widely discussed or debated in Nairobi. In fact some sources assume that KiberaSoweto was chosen legitimately via the official site selection process outlined in the programme
documents. In a new but critically influential grassroots media source available to Kiberans
called, The Kiberan, the reason for the Kibera-Soweto site selection was given to be simply
“because of its uniqueness,” and its positive fulfillment of the site selection criteria – which of
course is not entirely true unless one considers a second place ranking that is only 87% as good
as the first ranking site equal, (2nd issue 2 and 5). Some stakeholders including UN-Habitat may
simply recognize their political powerlessness to do anything to persuade Minister Raila
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otherwise. At this point in the KENSUP, the lack of debate on this issue may be for better or for
worse, but it remains a critical point of note in this analysis.

6.5.1 Kibera-Soweto should not have been ranked second
While the IACC site selection committee was not responsible for ultimately choosing
which site was to be selected for the KENSUP, the second-place ranking assigned to KiberaSoweto is questionably high. The fact of the matter is that land, political, social, cultural, and
economic issues in greater Kibera are incredibly complex and fiery. This is understandably so in
the most populous slum in Sub-Saharan and East Africa. According to Gitau and Olima,
Kibera’s land issues are more complex than other previous sites of slum upgrading in Nairobi,
such as Mathare 4A, which achieved a marginal level of success only after much heated conflict.
Bodewes agrees, noting that UN-Habitat does not realize and appreciate how complex Kibera is,
(Letter 24 Nov). It is therefore clear that Kibera demands much more attention for a successful
comprehensive slum upgrading project than other possible KENSUP pilot sites and previous
slum upgrades in Nairobi.
The KENSUP site selection committee undermined Kibera’s complexity by ranking
Kibera-Soweto a generous second place. It may be argued that part of Kibera’s land complexity
derives from the Nubian community’s viable right to Kiberan land ownership from their longstanding history in Kibera since 1912. The corresponding fact that there are nearly no Nubians
living in Kibera-Soweto makes it appear as though Kibera-Soweto would be a satisfactory site
for the KENSUP after all. However, that several articles have called Soweto’s land ownership
“clear” (one being in The Kiberan) shows a lack of appreciation for general non-Nubian-related
land complexities that surround structure ownership instead of outright land ownership in all of
Nairobi’s slums. Although it is “clear” in Soweto that the Kenyan Government (and not the
Nubians) officially owns the land, the heart of all informal settlement land controversy surrounds
not who actually owns the land so much as who controls the structures and therefore owns the
rent money they produce.
The complexity of power in Kibera related to structure ownership stems from the history
of countless exchanges of plots and structures for money or political favors since World War I.
Although many structure owners might try to link their plot’s ownership back to the Nubians’
legit temporary occupancy permits that were granted pre-World War II, most plots in Kibera
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have other illegal beginnings. Most structure owners came to own their structure through a chain
of bribery paid to local chiefs, city councilors, and/or previous structure owners. The situation is
heated due to the enormous economic rewards from such an investment, with Kiberan slum
structures actually being the best real-estate investment in greater Nairobi, (Syagga, et al., NSA:
A Rapid 15).
Further illustrating why Kibera-Soweto should not have even been ranked second in the
site selection process is the forced eviction campaign of February 2004 in Kibera authorized by
the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing. Forceful and violent evictions for the
proposed construction of a city by-pass road displaced over 2,000 people and greatly increased
anxiety and confusion in Kibera. But road developers are not the only ones with their eyes on
Kibera’s prime location. Cutting directly through Kibera is the main line of the Kenya Railways
Corporation to western Kenya, which is badly in need of upgrading itself.123 Also cris-crossing
Kibera are power lines owned by Kenya Power and Lighting Co. Ltd. Both of these major
industries followed suit and issued notices in Nairobi’s newspapers in February 2004 announcing
intended evictions of structures located 100 feet of the rail line and under or near power lines.
Although President Kibaki eventually called for the temporary halt to these slum
demolitions, the bottom line is that Kibera is an unsuitable starting site for the KENSUP.
Kibera, although direly in need of upgrading, is a political hotbed making quality and sustainable
upgrading activities by an inexperienced KENSUP institutional administration with such a large
project (directly affecting 60,000 people) extremely difficult. Even though just the one village of
Kibera-Soweto is directly involved in the SSUP, the fact of the matter is that all of Kibera (over
700,000 people) is worried about the upgrade and will be affected by it somehow.
First ranking Huruma would have (rather obviously due to its highest ranking) been a
much better KENSUP pilot project site than Kibera-Soweto. Huruma has simpler land status,
better community organization, and most importantly, a cooler political environment without as
many differing interests, powerful figures, and forces involved both politically and economically.
This puts Huruma at a much lower risk for violent conflict and conflict in general. Doing the
first KENSUP project in Kibera before well-established national slum upgrading policies,
experience, and best practices are secure has needlessly put all stakeholders involved at a high
123
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risk for failure to accomplish their objectives. This is exactly what Rio de Janeiro’s Favela
Bairro slum upgrading programme has been seeking to avoid by focusing first on Rio’s smaller
slums.124 Unfortunately it is the slum dwellers who are left to bear a disproportional amount of
any negatives that come of the whole Kibera-Soweto upgrading process. This was an
unnecessary risk that has not only put the entire Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme on the line,
but more importantly, it has put Kiberan lives at stake.
In spite of this, after all this time and buildup too many people are expecting the upgrade
programme to benefit Kibera. It would be too difficult to change sites and would create a state
of hyper confusion and turmoil. Although the NGO Coalition on Urban Land/Housing Rights
Campaign agrees that the political connections of Minister Raila to Kibera is of grave concern
and a significant risk to the success of the KENSUP, they decided in July 2003 that a proposal to
change sites would be too ambitious, (2).
It is not, however, too late to change the nature of the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading
Project (SSUP) from a high-rise construction project that Raila has created it to be, back to its
original intent and purpose. That original project conception encompasses authentically and
sustainably aiding Kiberans in Soweto village by providing a stable national policy environment
for slum upgrading and empowering residents and building capacity within the community to aid
their improvement of their own living conditions through problem identification, strategy
development, decision-making, resource generating, and community implementation more in
line with the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). As UN-Habitat settlement advisor David
Kithakye said, the proper role of the GoK and UN-Habitat is supporter of slum dwellers, not
distributors of pre-planned and pre-determined housing schemes that fail to take into
consideration the target community’s unique needs and interests.
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7.0 Conclusion

The theoretical framework for the KENSUP that began to be formed in 2001 is based on
the global development strategy called the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL). SL
developed directly from the evolution of development theories and strategies from the last three
decades. As illustrated in Chapter 3.0, the Government of Kenya (GoK) tried a wide range of
policies, from demolition to site and service schemes emphasizing self-help, in attempting to
manage the growing informal settlement problem in Nairobi and Kenya’s other urban centers.
Most of these policies failed due to specific idiosyncrasies of each strategy, while others
encompassed good ideas that simply failed due to the manner in which they were implemented.
SL has woven some of these good ideas together with a focus on the people that a given project
will help, while also recognizing the importance of solid government leadership to coordinate all
of the different stakeholders of slum upgrading so as to build the necessary unity and trust for
collaboration between otherwise estranged parties.
The KENSUP’s following SL means that the SSUP’s target beneficiaries (Kibera-Soweto
residents) are to play an active role in their upgrade project. The most important aspect of
resident involvement is their empowerment, or at the very least the empowering of a
democratically elected representative body of the residents, to identify and prioritize problems in
their community that they want the SSUP to address. The KENSUP’s community representative
units are called Settlement Project Implementation Units (SPIUs). SL also means that NGOs and
CBOs are to play a major role in educating residents about slum upgrading and the different
possible schemes they could chose from. It is important that the organizations working in the
Kiberan community are teaching the same things, which is possible when effectively coordinated
by the GoK and the Nairobi City Council (NCC) through the KENSUP Secretariat and PIU
respectively, or by UN-Habitat if need be. Finally, the residents, through the SPIU(s) of
KENSUP projects, are to participate in making the decisions about what the actual products of
their upgrade project will be.
Throughout this paper I have supported SL and the KENSUP’s theoretical foundation
based on this development approach. Both UN-Habitat and the GoK created the KENSUP based
on genuine wishes and interests to improve the deplorable living conditions of Kenya’s urban
slum dwellers. The programme’s objectives are, therefore, noble and greatly needed. My

162 Ehresmann
contention with the KENSUP lies rather with the handling thus far (January 2003-April 2004) of
its first project, the SSUP, in the village of Soweto in Kibera.
In answer to its primary research question, this paper has shown that the SSUP is in fact
not following SL very closely and is therefore headed towards failure of achieving its goals; the
primary goal of which is improving the livelihood and well being of the residents of KiberaSoweto. But worse than not meetings its goals, the GoK has actually worked directly against
them; unintentionally I hope. In response, UN-Habitat has not stood up to challenge the GoK on
this issue. They have instead taken a passive role in the SSUP.
Sometime during 2003, the SSUP lost its projection to meet its goals. My research has
shown that most of the responsibility lies with the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and
Housing (MoRPWH) of the GoK. Instead of building unity and trust between the various
stakeholders involved in the SSUP (as is the Government’s role as KENSUP facilitator and
Secretariat), the GoK allowed and fostered division, tension, and suspicion to become
characteristics of the SSUP. The GoK should have been well aware of the difficulties of
building unity and trust when such diverse interests exist among the SSUP’s stakeholders. Yet
instead of taking the necessary precautions to effectively manage the project along SL principles,
the MoRPWH’s careless and at times intentional malicious handling of the SSUP throughout
2003 has greatly jeopardized the project.
Between January 2003 and August 2004, there was no direct dialogue between the GoK
and the Kibera-Soweto community, and very little if any official information was available about
the SSUP in Kibera as a whole. Nairobi’s mass media served as the only medium of information
exchange. The unofficial media coverage that the KENSUP and SSUP did receive during this
time, especially that covering the Athi River controversy, was confusing and contradictory,
creating more apprehension in Kibera contrary to the KENSUP’s official media strategy. When
the GoK finally did make an official public announcement about the KENSUP with its 8 August
2003 press notice in the East African Standard newspaper, its overly positive rhetoric starkly
contradicted Amran’s front-page article discussing the conflict between Kiberans and the
GoK.125 Additionally, in early 2003 when the NGOs involved with the KENSUP through the
Multi Stakeholder Support Group (MSSG) sat in disagreement with the GoK over how the SSUP
125
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should be run (wanting instead a slower project emphasizing participatory processes), the GoK
simply disempowered the group and eliminated their opposing views and input on the SSUP.
Finally, contrary to the GoK’s own SL-based KENSUP blueprints, the Kibera-Soweto
community was not authentically involved in the planning and decision making processes for
their SSUP. Instead, the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing announced its own plan
for the end product of the SSUP: four-storied flats.
As head of the KENSUP Secretariat, and the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and
Housing, Minister Raila Odinga has lead the GoK away from SL back to the provision of public
housing reminiscent of Kenya’s late 1960s informal settlement policy. Raila’s proposed new
highrises in Kibera-Soweto would undoubtedly benefit Nairobi as a whole by increasing the
city’s low and middle-income housing stock. The flats would also ease political pressure on
NARC to fulfill its over-zealous campaign promise of building 150,000 new housing units a year
for Kenyan slum dwellers. However the SSUP now risks, like similar projects before it,
ultimately becoming unable to sustainably benefit the urban poor it is directed at helping due to
its top-down, non-participatory planning and design phase, and its lack of focus on economic
development in Kibera. Although development theorist, Werlin, did call for a strong
governmental role in slum upgrading, his model uses a top-down/bottom-up approach. Thus far,
as of April 2004, the SSUP has been missing the bottom-half of the current SL slum upgrading
strategy with the absence of a SPIU. At best, it will be extremely difficult to benefit the majority
of the Kibera-Soweto target beneficiaries with the new high rise flats after they are built due to
similar economic pressures that have made middle-income residents the actual beneficiaries of
several past upgrade initiatives, the most relevant being Kibera Highrise, which coincidentally
neighbors Kibera-Soweto.
A significant difficulty of Raila’s SSUP plan is that all Kibera-Soweto residents must be
first relocated before the highrises can be built. Displacing some 60,000 people is no small task.
In addition to households, countless small businesses will need to be relocated not once, but
twice, in order to move back into Raila’s new flats. The interim time between their first
relocation and settling into the new housing will be a vulnerable period for Soweto residents.
Incomes will be disrupted as established clientele and other community bonds are broken or
greatly strained at best.
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Notably, Raila’s SSUP highrise plan is in danger of breaking international law. Large
scale evictions or the displacement of persons are highly discouraged by nearly all international
and UN housing documents, including The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, to which Kenya is a signatory and party. Where displacement is absolutely
unavoidable, a comprehensive resettlement plan is required before such a plan is initiated. No
such plan exists for Kibera-Soweto as of April 2004. More on point, the entire displacement of
Kibera-Soweto is not necessary for a successful SSUP.
In the past, slum upgrading has meant slowly improving existing structures by
empowering the residents to take ownership in their homes to improve them themselves. While
it may seem like this may not be practical for Kibera since structure ownership there is very
complex and political, the Government’s plan to bulldoze the current Soweto settlement to make
room for the new high rise apartments also does not respect current structure owners. This is a
significant dilemma of the Kibera-Soweto project.
Furthermore, SL and much current slum upgrading literature (including that of UNHabitat) emphasize the stimulation of income-generating activities and a broader focus on
community empowerment than just housing and service provision. While it is possible that after
the Kibera-Soweto community is temporarily relocated, the SSUP will come to focus on the
issue of assisting the target beneficiaries to create sustainable income-generating activities, the
fact remains that if slum dwellers are unable to pay their rents, they will move out of the new
highrises. Since this would completely thwart the main objective of building the highrises, this
fact illustrates why resident participation in the planning and design phase of the SSUP is so
important. It is crucial that the KENSUP Secretariat addresses this issue with the target
beneficiaries before any housing construction begins.
The above issues of relocation and income generation need not be impassible barriers for
the SSUP. However the issues of insufficient dialoging and information exchange between the
GoK and the Kibera-Soweto community, the absence of a SPIU and effective community
participation in the planning of the SSUP, the corresponding centralized planning and control of
the SSUP by the GoK’s MoRPWH, and the Ministry’s decision to build unsuitable high rise flats
after temporarily relocating 60,000 people of Kibera-Soweto, are all major issues that greatly
threaten the potential success of the SSUP and must be addressed immediately. Since the SSUP
is its first project, the national-scale KENSUP as a whole is also at risk financially and
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experientially. Without a successful slum upgrading project in Kibera-Soweto, international
donors will be difficult to find and the KENSUP institutional structures will remain
inexperienced in successful slum upgrading.
After an excellent three year in-depth KENSUP Inception Phase involving diverse
stakeholders, it would be a major loss if the SSUP failed to meet its high potential. Not only
would it be a discredit to the GoK, but to all organizations involved. The groundwork for the
KENSUP is solid and thorough, the Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA) and its supplemental
studies attest to that. My research has shown that the current problems of the Kibera-Soweto
Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP) are ultimately the result of poor upper-level management and
decision-making involving strong political and economic underpinnings. Counter-productive to
the SSUP’s objectives, decisions by the MoRPWH and Minister Raila have deepened divisions
and exacerbated tensions among SSUP stakeholders.
Contrary to the guidelines in the official KENSUP and SSUP documents, Minister
Raila’s highrise plan has been developed and chosen for Kibera-Soweto without that
community’s participation and consultation in the problem identification and decision-making
processes – the most important phases of a slum upgrading project. While Minister Raila holds
dominant political control of the KENSUP’s SSUP in Kibera as this settlement’s MP and head of
the MoRPWH, other GoK KENSUP leaders such as Housing Department Director, Grace
Wanyonyi, do not agree with the direction Raila has taken the SSUP. Wanyonyi regrets the lack
of consultation with Kibera-Soweto residents. UN-Habitat undoubtedly agrees with Wanyonyi
and would prefer the GoK to follow SL more closely, however they realize their lack of political
power due to the respected sovereignty of the GoK and the UN’s weak position as a mere
supporter of the GoK’s KENSUP according to the Memorandum of Understanding signed
between these two bodies in January 2003. Nonetheless, the lack of information to Kiberans
between January 2003 and August 2003 about the SSUP, intensified by Raila’s six-month
ultimatum (given in August 2003) to Kiberan structure owners to get out of the way for the
KENSUP, pitted structure owners and tenants alike against an aggressive GoK in suspicion of
their intensions. The residents’ attitudes will now be difficult to change and mobilize for the
SSUP.
Factioning has also happened among NGOs and CBOs. Several NGOs are moving
forward with their own separate initiatives to help residents in Kibera understand slum upgrading
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while others have disengaged from the KENSUP process completely. Meanwhile, in the absence
of any other agreed upon way forward for the SSUP due to the Secretariat’s mismanaging the SL
participatory process between diverse stakeholders in 2003, the GoK has reverted back to its
historical centralized and authoritarian methods of directing housing projects. As the NSA
warns, past projects that have followed this pattern imminently end up not being socially or
economically sustainable. Unfortunately, due to the Ministry’s blatant disregard for the new
strategies presented and advocated for in the NSA, and their ignoring of other stakeholders such
as the NGO community who provide a valuable link to the target community, the SSUP is
doomed for a similar fate met by many projects before it unless a drastic and complete redirecting of the project takes place to put it back on its original trajectory described in the project
and KENSUP documents.
In the author’s opinion, large bureaucratic upgrade programmes like the KENSUP will
always struggle to achieve their goals. Although they all attempt to somehow involve the
residents of a given slum estate in the project, logistically it is often too difficult to actually do in
the short timeframes many governments desire. Using the ideal democratic participatory process
that is recommended and outlined in the KENSUP/SSUP documents by creating SPIUs might
prove to be relatively chaotic and time-consuming at first. Democracy, although more just and
ideally desired, can seem much less efficient than a hierarchical, top-down governing structure.
Many people in the GoK, especially Minister Raila who held a high role in the previous ruling
KANU party, know the benefits of a hierarchical government very well after working under
former President Moi’s twenty-four year authoritarian regime. If something needs to be done
within a short timeframe, a hierarchical structure with centralized decision-making proposes a
very alluring alternative to participatory democracy, though the suitability of the product may be
poor.
This paper has shown that Minister Raila and other KENSUP GoK leaders appear to be
drawn to the hierarchical and centralized manner of governing, despite NARC’s 2002 campaign
platform against this ideology. At the same time, the GoK and UN-Habitat claim to be
facilitating a grassroots “self-help” movement through the SSUP illustrated by their public
statement, “The people living in slum areas will lead the slum upgrading process,” (Consultancy
ad). My research has shown that this is simply not the case. SSUP policies and its planning
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have been shaped by the GoK with little knowledge of the needs and priorities of the majority of
Kibera-Soweto’s residents.
The GoK’s assumed centralized planning of the SSUP contradicts major development
theorists who contributed to the shaping of the current Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL)
that is supposedly guiding the KENSUP. Both Scott and Berger realized that isolated policy
makers (in this case, government slum upgrade planners) cannot develop effective strategies
without generous consultation and input from the objects of that policy or upgrade programme.
Turner, who believes in minimized government for development projects, would be disgusted by
the large role the GoK has taken in the SSUP. Finally, even though Werlin and Balogun would
conversely applaud the strong role that the GoK has assumed in the SSUP as such a role is
necessary to both handle the complexities of such a large slum upgrade (Werlin) and to actually
achieve the objective of popular participation (Balogun), even these two development theorists
would criticize the blatant lack of the “bottom-half” (comprising the target community) of their
dual “top-down/bottom-up” development models.
If the GoK goes forward with Raila’s proposed public housing plan in Kibera, opposition
is likely to build against the new NARC administration, already struggling to make a name for
itself and maintain public support. Building four-storey flats in Kibera-Soweto would be an
exact repeat of the Kibera-Highrise project, which failed to benefit any poor Kiberan slum
dwellers due to higher rents and political issues. The current tenants of Kibera-Soweto comprise
many of those who were displaced by this previous failure. They remember their stab in the
back from the GoK, and will be quick to oppose another project as such.
Given the present political state in both Kibera and greater Kenya, little at best or nothing
at worst will change in the possibility of the SSUP being successful until the GoK fundamentally
changes the nature of its Provincial Administration (PA) by way of its new Constitution. The
infiltration of political corruption in Kibera between chiefs, assistant chiefs, city councilors, and
structure owners of all walks of life makes unity between the SSUP’s stakeholders a very
challenging goal, if not simply impossible. A major component of this PA corruption is that no
official of the PA hierarchy (chief, assistant chiefs, district officer, and provincial officer) is
publicly voted into office. However Kenya’s new Constitution does call for the democratic
election of these officials, giving hope for a truer representation of local communities in its
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governmental leaders who will, ideally, reject the pattern of bribery and corruption so rampant in
Kenya at the time of writing.
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8.0 Suggestions and Alternatives

Given the above conclusions, there are several suggestions that I would like to propose
for a path forward that could possibly help put the SSUP back on its original Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach (SL) course. My research strongly suggests that sticking to the
KENSUP’s original SL theoretical framework is the best way to achieve a successful slum
upgrading project in Kibera-Soweto (through the SSUP). A successful SSUP will ideally stand
as a model for future projects of the KENSUP. The following suggestions are by no means
comprehensive nor are they the only way forward for a successful SSUP.
Over arching all of the following suggestions, the Ministry of Roads, Public Works and
Housing (MoRPWH) of the GoK, as the leader and facilitator of the SSUP, needs to earn the
trust of the Kiberans. The GoK must show the Kiberans that they will not let what happened in
Kibera Highrise happen again. The MoRPWH must do its job to support the empowerment of
the residents in Soweto so that they may have a voice, and that they may use that voice to
communicate their needs and concerns during the upgrade. The tension that has built in Kibera
over the last year (2003 and early 2004) from a lack of information, false rumors, and actual
forced evictions approved by the MoRPWH must be dissipated through non-violent outlets such
as community base groups to discuss the Kibera-Soweto situation and upgrade project. The
KENSUP’s official base groups are called Settlement Project Implementation Units (SPIUs).126
In the interest of sustainably achieving the SSUP’s goals, all forward motion on
implementing the SSUP as described by Minister Raila Odinga at the official SSUP launching
ceremony in October 2003 (i.e. temporarily displacing the majority of Kibera-Soweto village)
should immediately stop until the following things are done:

1) Any decisions made by the MoRPWH and Minister Raila should be put on hold until
approved by one or several democratically and justly formed Kibera-Soweto Settlement
Project Implementation Unit(s) (SPIUs).

126

This is a mandated KENSUP institutional structure that comprises nearly the only venue for target community
input into slum upgrading projects. As of April 2004, no SPIU officially existed in Kibera-Soweto to the author’s
knowledge.
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2) A large-scale informational campaign should be launched in Kibera-Soweto to educate
all target beneficiary residents on the KENSUP, the SSUP, how the SPIU(s) will be
created, and on slum upgrading in general. The campaign should explain the specifics of
the upgrading project, most importantly describing the SL process that the SSUP will
now take and how the residents can actually participate in guiding their project.

2a) Additionally, reasons behind all decisions regarding what design of housing
and infrastructure that have already been made by the GoK and NCC should be
explained. However other possible slum upgrading schemes with examples from around
the world should also be thoroughly explained and discussed as real possibilities for
Kibera while noting the positives and negatives of each scheme.

2b) UN-Habitat ought to play a major role in this campaign by training and
strongly supporting key NGOs and CBOs through their expert staff with knowledge of
diverse slum upgrading schemes and grassroots mobilization experience. The KENSUP
Secretariat, based in the Housing Department under the MoRPWH, must initiate and
coordinate, or give the power to UN-Habitat to coordinate its own effort, to organize
NGOs and CBOs for this grassroots level educational campaign due to the current
structure of the agreement between the GoK and UN-Habitat.

3) A similar large-scale and consistent media campaign for the general public in Nairobi
should be arranged, as provided for in the KENSUP’s documents discussing media
strategies.

4) Efforts to authentically form the Settlement Project Implementation Unit(s) (SPIUs) in
Kibera-Soweto should be coordinated and begin as soon as possible. SPIUs will offer
true long-term members of Kibera-Soweto the opportunity to evaluate, critique, and
contribute to the plan and design of how the SSUP will be materially and non-materially
realized as or through representatives of the Kibera-Soweto community (60,000 people).
Through the formation process, it should be realized and celebrated that the very creation
and empowerment of these democratically elected committees is fulfilling a major SL
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objective of the SSUP and KENSUP to mobilize and directly involve the target
beneficiary community in a real way to steer their upgrading project.

4a) The SPIU(s) should be created through a genuine democratic process to allow
legitimate residents in Kibera-Soweto to choose their own community leaders separate of
the area chief, assistant chiefs, and city councilor. Although the KENSUP Inter-Agency
Co-ordinating Committee’s (IACC) Sub-Committee working on the Programme
Organization and Institutional Structure (2001) state that SPIU formation should be
coordinated and facilitated by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) of the Nairobi City
Council (NCC), since the NCC has experienced internal problems involving an
investigation into its corruption, a fire in the city hall (early 2004), and has generally been
a weak stakeholder in the SSUP, the PIU will require much assistance to form the
SPIU(s) in Kibera-Soweto. Therefore, the KENSUP Programme Secretariat (MoRPWH)
should coordinate with the Joint Project Planning Team (JPPT), the PIU, and UN-Habitat
to facilitate the elections for Soweto’s SPIU(s). However, recognizing the rampant
corruption that also exists in the GoK, UN-Habitat would be the best neutral party to lead
the SPIU formation process, especially given its many experts in the field of grassroots
organizing for settlement projects. If UN-Habitat lacks the resources to send their own
experts into Kibera, then they should coordinate and support creditable NGOs and CBOs
to lead the formation of SPIU(s) in Soweto. These organizations will first need to
mobilize and educate the Kibera-Soweto community about how the election process will
happen and what the SPIU(s) will mean to the Kibera-Soweto residents as their voice in
the SSUP.

4b) The KENSUP Secretariat (based in the MoRPWH) will need to authorize
UN-Habitat and corresponding NGOs and CBOs for their SPIU election activities in
Kibera-Soweto according to the current Memorandum of Understanding between the
GoK and UN-Habitat. Without this GoK policy spark, UN-Habitat or other neutral third
parties will not and cannot begin the election process on their own, which requires one
coordinated effort to eliminate mass confusion and chaos in Kibera.
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4c) New wealthier migrants to Soweto who anticipate benefiting from the
upgrade project should be excluded from the SPIU(s) and the SSUP in general out of
fairness to the original SSUP target beneficiaries. This includes not allowing recent
migrants to enjoy the product of the upgrade if it involves new housing like high rise
flats, and also excluding them from being representatives on the SPIU(s) since they do
not accurately represent the Kibera-Soweto community, one of Kibera’s poorest. This
will also set an important precedent for future KENSUP upgrade projects that will
hopefully curb gentrification in project areas.
Exactly how these new wealthier residents will be controlled and restricted from
the SPIU(s) and the SSUP to ensure the original poorest of Kibera in Soweto village
actually benefit from and hold the community voice in the SSUP is a very difficult and
important issue. One possible strategy suggested by Goux is to only include those
residents in the SSUP and its SPIU(s) who can prove that they have lived in KiberaSoweto since before January 2003 – when Kibera-Soweto was announced for the
KENSUP, (12). While this is a good suggestion that I support, it may prove to be
extremely difficult to do given the high level of corruption in Kibera. This issue
therefore demands much attention and strategizing from all KENSUP stakeholders.

4d) The proper formation of one or several SPIU community bodies will take
time and will be difficult. Yet it is absolutely crucial to the success of the SSUP that no
short cuts are taken. These groups will play a major role in building support among the
Kibera-Soweto residents (both tenants and structure owners alike) for the SSUP, which is
required for the project’s success. The SPIU(s) will be the fundamental link between the
KENSUP’s “top-half” (GoK, UN-Habitat, and the NCC) and the “bottom-half” (the
target beneficiaries of Kibera-Soweto) as demanded by the Sustainable Livelihoods
Approach (SL) and asserted by the GoK itself.

5) The KENSUP Secretariat should end the ambiguity regarding its own commitment to
truly leading an SL project in Kibera by fully committing in practice to the full
participation of the Kibera-Soweto residents to back up its public statements on the
matter. This full resident and stakeholder involvement should happen not only during the
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Implementation Phase of the SSUP, but also in the actual planning and designing of the
SSUP, designated to happen during the Preparatory Phase. If this means that the
MoRPWH’s current plans for building four-storey flats for Kibera-Soweto’s upgrade
need to be completely changed, so be it. Yet such plans (as described by Minister Raila
and discussed in this paper at the end of Chapter 6.0 in section 6.4.3) are not a waste
since they can still be presented to the SPIU(s) as a possible upgrading scheme among
others to be chosen from.

5a) As Balogun suggests, capacity building for a strong local participatory and
decentralized upgrade effort should not be limited to residents at the grassroots level,
(172). Local GoK, NCC, and UN-Habitat officials therefore ought to be included in the
local governance capacity-building process.

6) The KENSUP Secretariat should immediately call the MSSG to meet and reinstate
regular meetings at least monthly with its original members. New members ought to also
be considered for joining this body, including but not limited to other NGOs, CBOs, and
Kibera-Soweto residents.

7) A detailed plan of resettlement and compensation must be developed and presented to the
residents of Kibera-Soweto if the SPIU(s) and other institutional bodies of the SSUP are
in agreement that it is best for the target beneficiaries to include the mass displacement
(temporary or permanent) of their community for the SSUP. Not only is such an
approved plan crucial to counteract crippling opposition to the project from the residents
that has the potential to turn violent (as seen in the December 2001 clashes in Kibera),
but a detailed resettlement plan is also required by international law.127

127

This includes the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - General Comment Number Four: all
forced evictions are a prima facie violation of the Covenant. Article 22 paragraph six of General Comment Number
Two on the International Technical Assistance Measures (Fourth Session, 1990) warns that, “International agencies
should scrupulously avoid involvement in projects which…involve large-scale evictions or displacements of persons
without the provision of all appropriate protection and compensation…” Furthermore, the World Bank Operational
Directive 4.30 Section Four states very clearly, “Where large-scale population displacement is unavoidable, a
detailed resettlement plan, timetable, and budget are required,” (Christ the King Church, Memorandum on Kibera
Urban Environmental Sanitation Project).
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7a) Any such resettlement plan should ensure that SSUP target beneficiaries will
be financially supported by the GoK and UN-Habitat to help match what they were
making before the relocation. On the minimum, SSUP target beneficiaries ought to have
enough money to pay for at least the basics of food, shelter, medicine, and continuing
their children’s education under the college level without having to use personal savings
while this massive social and economic transition is going on. This is to acknowledge the
vulnerability of Kiberan slum dwellers who work in the informal sector and will
experience a major disruption in their incomes during the transition period to temporary
and then permanent residencies.

7b) Special attention should be given to structure owners since they have nothing
to gain and their incomes to lose in the SSUP. Since a successful SSUP needs structure
owners’ support, beyond compensating structure owners for the fair value of their
structures, it is very important that the people from this stakeholder group (and their
associates who need it) receive assistance to establish new legit income sources.
However it is also possible that Kibera-Soweto and the KENSUP Secretariat could decide
to somehow allow structure owners to benefit in another way from the SSUP, such as
using a rent-to-buy scheme that would allow current structure owners to remain structure
owners in a future upgraded Kibera-Soweto village.
This financial support is in response to Kenya’s lack of a social-economic safety
net in times of unemployment. According to Patrick Acttoki from the GoK Ministry of
Lands and Settlement, unemployment aid money has never been discussed in the GoK as
an issue relating to slum upgrading, (personal interview). Providing such a financial
support system as part of the SSUP could greatly lower the probability of gentrification in
an upgraded Kibera-Soweto, and hence insure that the SSUP fulfills its primary goal of
sustainably improving the living conditions of the current residents of Kibera-Soweto.

To achieve the above recommendations of stopping, evaluating, and redirecting the
SSUP, the GoK ought to invite UN-Habitat to increase its direct involvement in the SSUP to
keep the project from permanently derailing from the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SL).
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The GoK’s continued distancing from the KENSUP’s theoretical framework would be
detrimental to accomplishing the objectives of the KENSUP and SSUP.

8.1 Actively Engage Youth (30 years of age and under)
Youth comprise the clear majority of Kenya’s population, with Kibera having even more
than the national average. According to Khasiani of Kenya’s Population Studies and Research
Institute, 60% of Kenya’s 28.7 million people are between the ages of 10 and 24. Moreover,
Global Virtual University (sponsored in part by the United Nations Environmental Programme
[UNEP]) found 43% of Kenya’s population under 15 in 2001. As such, young people comprise
an extremely important group that needs to be focused on and recognized by all development
stakeholders for being the primary grassroots go-power of development that they are. From my
own experiences with the KASTA youth groups of Kariobangi neighborhood in Nairobi, I have
witnessed the high potential and empowering spirit of self-organized youth groups. However,
these groups desperately need resources, guidance, and training from NGOs, UN-Habitat, the
GoK, and other organizations in positions to support youth groups.
Supporting my experience, Anthony Mutuku writes in the youth-organized newsletter,
The Kiberan, “It is…very important that the community and government take immediate
measures to ensure that these young people are taken care of and therefore saving the whole
population…If these young people are not going to be supported, the future of the country
becomes doomed…” Mutuku is referring to all the negative vices of urban slum life that work
together to eat away at the souls of Kibera’s young people. The challenges faced by youth living
in Kibera are similar to those faced by youth, especially financially disadvantaged youth, around
the world. Among the many challenges facing young Kiberans are HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, acute
poverty and the corresponding lack of resources for secondary schooling or higher education,128
128

Secondary schooling after the American equivalent of eighth grade is not free in government public schools in
Kenya. Families must struggle to make hard decisions between eating enough and paying school fees month to
month. Before January 2003, primary school was also not free. While more children attend primary school in
Kibera and Nairobi’s other slums than one might imagine (often through private “informal” schools), undereducation due to lack of funding is certainly a major constraint for youth growing up in informal settlements.
In one case, I met an incredibly bright 22-year-old Kenyan from the town of Isiolo, located north of
Nairobi. He had applied to several prestigious American universities, including Harvard and Brown, and was
accepted to all. However, without a full-ride scholarship including transportation, attendance at one of these
universities that he had earned a place in was impossible. In the meantime he is leading an NGO that he organized
focused on changing traditional cultural attitudes that support Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).
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domestic violence, insecurity, discrimination, unemployment and the lure of joining a gang, and
for women, being financially forced to solicit themselves sexually, which contributes to
HIV/AIDS – full circle. Because of the real value of the energetic contribution youth have to
give in providing an integral contribution to the success of the upgrading project in KiberaSoweto (SSUP), the KENSUP on the national scale and in slum upgrading initiatives throughout
the world, local, national, and international organizations must do whatever it takes to ensure that
positive forces, influences, and opportunities are more powerful than those seeking the selfdestruction of young people, lest Kenya’s (and the world’s) future become ever more unstable,
oppressive, and violent.
Therefore, participation efforts in slum upgrading around the world ought to focus a
substantial amount of time and energy on young people. Having drive, energy, passion, and a
real long-term stake in the future of their community, young people will continue to provide the
go-power to produce concrete results that communities may otherwise never see. Furthermore,
recognizing again that youth form a strong majority of the population in nearly all urban slums,
any SL participatory strategy for slum upgrading would be ineffectual if young people were not
given due voice and input.
It is when youth are alone and isolated from those who sincerely care about their well
being that their challenges become overbearing. As Mutuku names, “…[without] a lot of
attention, assistance and direction to enable them [youth] to make good decisions and become
responsible people in the future,” there is nothing to stop the above named urban vices from
spoiling pristine fruit. However when organized together, the real potential of young people is
unlocked. It is therefore critical that all development stakeholders in Nairobi make a special
priority to get involved with existing youth groups by providing much-needed resources and
support through guidance and training of new skill sets, in addition to encouraging and aiding the
formation of new youth groups without spurring negative competition. If positive youth groups
are not actively supported, young people will turn to gangs, whose profits are drugs and justice is
violence, which will greatly thwart any efforts of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme in
Kibera or any other urban slum in Kenya.
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8.2 Secure Land Tenure must be included in the SSUP and KENSUP
In Kibera, the lack of secure land tenure is the most important policy issue in any
discussion concerning slum upgrading. If structure owners legally owned the land, they would
have incentive to improve their structures to allow them to charge higher rents. Better, if the
resident tenants owned their land and structures they would invest in their own housing
themselves, both financially and with their labor. Either way, providing secure land tenure is a
must for any slum upgrading project in Kibera.
Secure land tenure need not be individual ownership of one plot. As exemplified in the
Huruma-J neighborhood of Nairobi (discussed in Chapter 3.0, section 3.3.1.1), community land
ownership offers a bright alternative to a possible lifetime of debt that may be required to
individually purchase a plot of city land. Since the political and economic situation is so
unstable in Kibera, the Kibera-Soweto community should have different flexible and locally
defined tenure systems available to choose from. UN-Habitat, the GoK, and NGOs will need to
work together with the SPIU(s) to develop several different land tenure systems that could work
in Kibera-Soweto. After the options have been presented to the community and feedback
gathered, the SPIU(s) may discuss and decide on behalf of the community which scheme is best.
The NSA offers advice from past projects, which “finds that emphasis should be placed on
community-based insurance and credit schemes to ease the financial burden and distress of the
slum residents,” (Syagga, et al. ii). SSUP leaders must develop strategies to avoid the value of
the land becoming so high that the poorest of Kibera-Soweto would be unable to access land.

8.3 Alternative Strategies
In response to Minister Raila’s high rise agenda in Kibera, one logical strategy that has
oddly not been discussed much, is to build upgraded housing according to the target beneficiaries
needs and plans first, then move residents only once: “build first, move once.” This would
seemingly greatly reduce the financial and social difficulties of having to displace a large
population twice when using a temporary residence before the actual new housing and
infrastructure is constructed. Since new housing would have to be built for the temporary
occupants anyway (which could likely house residents up to one or two years), there is really
little reason not to shift the investment of research, input gathering, consulting, and project
planning and design to go immediately into the construction of the new permanent infrastructure
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and housing units on the new site. This would nearly eliminate all the anxiety, confusion, and
mistrust in the SSUP facilitators (GoK) held by Kibera-Soweto residents, since residents are
most worried that the SSUP will become another Kibera Highrise that will not benefit any of
them after they are “temporarily moved” – or evicted.
Now that Minister Raila has announced that the SSUP’s temporary relocation sites will
be on nearby sites around Kibera instead of 35km away in Athi River, this “build first move
once” approach seems more relevant than ever. In interviews, both Acttoki of the GoK Ministry
of Land and Settlement, and Kiberan resident Namenje gave the lack of open land as the main
excuse against this strategy. However the GoK appears to be willing and able to access enough
land near Kibera for the temporary relocation of the 60,000 people of Soweto village. While it
may be that access to such land is dependent on the temporary nature of its occupancy, there
certainly ought to be a strong initiative to examine and consider the option of building the real
SSUP end product before moving Soweto’s 60,000 people if it has not already been looked into.

8.4 Future Research
This paper has examined the Kibera-Soweto Slum Upgrading Project (SSUP), a current
slum upgrading initiative of the KENSUP that is still being realized. Due to this, there are
naturally many avenues for future research, especially given that conditions in Kibera and the
project itself could change at any time. Parts of this paper may already be obsolete.
Nonetheless, a successful SSUP and KENSUP require the continuation of much reflection,
evaluation, information gathering, and analysis. Through this process of researched writing on
the SSUP, many difficult questions arose that I could not adequately answer and were beyond the
scope of this already lengthy paper. The most important of these questions follow and will shape
future research on the KENSUP and SSUP.
The central question is why has the Ministry of Roads, Public Works, and Housing
(MoRPWH) under Minister Raila Odinga not followed through with the active community
participatory SL concepts ingrained in the KENSUP and SSUP documents and recommended by
the Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA) report (2001)? Why has the KENSUP Secretariat not
facilitated the formation of one or more SPIU(s) in Kibera-Soweto when these groups are
required by the KENSUP institutional structure to make any decisions about a specific project?
Related to this, how and why did Minister Raila decide on the SSUP’s end product – to build
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four-storey flats in Kibera-Soweto – without the input from one or more SPIU(s) and otherwise
without genuinely consulting the Kibera-Soweto community as publications signed by him (such
as the 8 August KENSUP press notice) said would be done? Moreover, why is Minister Raila
set on building high rise flats in Kibera-Soweto when that strategy failed miserably in the Kibera
Highrise project in the mid 1990s due to gentrification?
More generally, why did the GoK and UN-Habitat neglect their media strategy until
August 2003 since Kibera-Soweto was announced as the first KENSUP project site in January
2003? Why did the GoK not connect to its target beneficiaries in a timely manner when all the
literature said that they ought to? Why has UN-Habitat distanced itself from the SSUP when it
has the knowledge and expertise in slum upgrading that the GoK is lacking? How committed are
the MoRPWH and Minister Raila to fully and authentically following through with the
Minister’s promise (August 2003) to let the target beneficiaries lead the upgrading process in the
SSUP and future KENSUP projects?
Beyond the KENSUP management issues, plenty of work remains to be done on the
ground working between the two main target beneficiary groups: Kibera-Soweto’s tenants and
structure owners. A few questions that just scratch the surface are: What are the different
priority needs of the tenants and structure owners? What are their respective concerns with this
slum upgrading project? What are their ideas on how to solve their worries? What would the
SSUP look like and need to include for the majority of Kibera-Soweto’s structure owners to
accept and support the project? Who does each group think would be excellent, fair, open, and
willing leaders to represent their stakeholder group on a SPIU?
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9.0 Methodology and Acknowledgments

On a Human Rights Fellowship with Chemchemi Ya Ukweli (CYU) (meaning
“wellspring of truth”) in Nairobi, Kenya during the summer of 2003 (granted by the University
of Minnesota Human Rights Center), I had the opportunity to research slum upgrading in Kenya
on many different levels. Through several of CYU’s contacts, I was able to collect many of my
vital primary sources. I am indebted to CYU for offering access to and assisting me in utilizing
both their network of people and organizations in Nairobi for meetings and interviews related to
this research project, as well as their own library of resources.
In addition to interviews with government, UN, church, and NGO officials and staff, I
also had the opportunity to conduct field research and talk with residents and involved
individuals in the Nairobi estates (neighborhoods) of Kibera, Huruma-J, Kariobangi, Korogocho,
and Riverside. Of these, most directly relating to this project is Kibera, where I am most grateful
to Christine Bodewes of Christ the King Church (Kibera) for her shared knowledge and expertise
on Kibera, her guidance on a my topic focus, and her connecting me to Nicodemus Mutemi,
Ignatius Namenje, and Andrew Opwanda who graciously shared their Kibera with me. From
Kariobangi I am thankful to the secretariat of KASTA and the youth groups organized under
them, especially the Exodus and Indigo groups for sharing their work with me.
I am further appreciative of the opportunity I had to discuss and share research with
others focusing on Nairobi’s struggle of development and housing upgrading. I specifically want
to thank Ph.D. researcher Mary Goux of France and Masters researcher Sabine Kanya
(Eicholzer) of Switzerland.
Financially I am ever thankful to the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center and
the supporters of the Laura Musser fund, who made this project possible through the Upper
Midwest Human Rights Fellowship Grant. I owe much thanks to one of my readers, Dr. Jeffery
Anderson, who encouraged me to apply for the Human Rights Fellowship Grant in the first
place.
Logistically I am indebted to one my readers, Dr. Ron Pagnucco, for so willingly
accessing his contacts in Kenya to arrange for my hosting by CYU and for his assistance with the
fellowship grant application. Without him, this project would have never happened. Dr.
Pagnucco’s contacts in Nairobi are the product of the international relationship that has been
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built between the Diocese of St. Cloud and the Kenyan Diocese of Homma Bay. The key
architects of this relationship are Bishop Okok in Homma Bay, Kenya, Peter Kimeu of Catholic
Relief Services (CRS) in Nairobi, Kenya – a major supporter of CYU – and Bishop John Kinney
and Father Bill Vos in St. Cloud, Minnesota USA. I am honored that my research could have
been a product of this relationship.
Academically, I am most thankful for the invaluable guidance and generous patience of
my advisor, Dr. Gary Prevost. His outstanding expertise in international relations and his
questions about Nairobi pushed me to look deeper and harder at the politics of Kibera than I ever
would have alone. It was a long but incredibly worth while journey together, Gary. Thank you.
I am also very thankful to two of my English major friends, Samantha Henningson and
Joel Swenson, who read and edited sections of this paper. Samantha read and gave suggestions
for editing on Chapters 4.0 and 5.0. Joel gave up two of his Saturday’s to go through Chapters
1.0 through 3.0 with me. Their suggestions on these chapters helped enormously.
Finally, I must also thank Maryknoll veteran, Greg Darr, for a little one-hour
conversation we shared in the Sexton cafeteria at St. John’s University in May 2003. Greg gave
me my first overwhelming introduction to the informal settlement situation in Nairobi. This
conversation was vital in focusing my attention on Kenya’s urban slums. He was the first to
refer me to Christine Bodewes. Without this discussion, this paper would have been about a
completely different topic. Thanks to him, I made it a priority to regularly visit informal
settlements like Kibera while I was in Kenya. It is quite possible that I would never have crossed
the threshold of Kibera slum had that discussion never taken place. Thanks Greg. It was worth
it!

9.1 Weaknesses of this Analysis
Although I believe that the conclusions and recommendations of this paper stand strong
despite the following, the following weaknesses do affect some components of this paper.
First, part of the presented reality of the situation in Nairobi and Kibera concerning the
SSUP in this paper are based off of that depicted in the city’s daily and weekly newspapers. I
most frequently used the Daily Nation, the East African Standard, and the East African. While
daily newspapers are usually quite reliable, mistakes and misquotes do occasionally happen. The
quotes that I used have not been contested to my knowledge, however the possibility exists. Of
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key importance, I was not able to personally interview Honorable Raila Odinga (Minister of
Roads, Public Works, and Housing) myself, and had to instead rely on the media for my
information on his position and plan with the SSUP – quite similar to what nearly all Kiberans
must do.
Second, the copies of the March 2003 KENSUP and SSUP programme and project
documents by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme
(UN-Habitat) that I used may not be finalized copies. For example some documents I obtained,
such as the Nairobi Situation Analysis (NSA) by Syagga, Mitullah, and Gitau, were the
consultative versions instead of the final published versions. Since they were all I had to go off
of, I took the two March 2003 programme documents to be the position of the GoK and UNHabitat and what they planned to do with the KENSUP/SSUP. I did, however, obtain two copies
of both the KENSUP and SSUP programme documents from two distinct and unrelated sources.
The two sets were identical, leading me to conclude that what was written in this version of these
two documents was the current understanding among the KENSUP stakeholders when I obtained
them in June 2003.
Third, my interviews were not systematic. I certainly asked similar and often some of the
same questions in different interviews, however each interview was unique and followed a
pattern of questions resulting from my then current thought process about the topic and followed
a path of the individual discussion.
Finally, I did not complete many interviews. I formally interviewed two officials from
the GoK Ministry of Lands and Settlements, one official from UN-Habitat, one official from the
Shelter Forum (an NGO), the Huruma-J housing cooperative group (about ten members), and
only three Kiberan tenants and no structure owners. I met and spoke with many more people, in
Kibera mostly tenants and one member of a structure owning family, and other individuals
holding diverse places in society all around Nairobi, but only in casual conversation. Although
this may be a weakness, specifically relating to my interviews in Kibera, I was advised by
Bodewes (who works in Kibera) not to go door to door for random interviews with Kiberan
residents. Given the seriousness of the situation in Kibera involving high tension, the acute lack
of information that existed during June-August 2003 that continues to exist currently (April
2004) on a slightly lesser level, and the quickness of rumor-milling, mass interviewing had the

Ehresmann 183
real potential to cause confusion and ignite conflict. In respect to everyone, I limited my Kiberan
interviews to three residents that knew Bodewes.
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Appendix I: KENSUP Press Notice 8 August 2004 from the East African Standard
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Appendix II: KENSUP Consultancy Ad, 8 August 2003 from East African Standard
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Appendix III: Front page of the East African Standard on 8 August 2003
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